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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the effect of non-tariff measures (NTMs) on the Malaysian 
exporters. Motivated by the paucity of studies in this area, this study investigates the 
predicament of the exporters with regard to the main NTMs faced and whether the 
measures impede or enhance exports; and vary across markets. It examines the 
significance of stringency of NTMs, including specific measures, on export intensity. 
Demographic variables used are type, ownership, age, and size of firms. The study also 
investigated the response decisions (exit, loyalty or voice concerns in reactive or proactive 
manner) pursued by the Malaysian exporters when faced with NTMs, the NTM types 
experienced by exporters, and whether information asymmetry is significantly related to 
exports. Two analytical approaches were used namely, 1) gravity model for data extracted 
from the Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) database for the 2001-2013 
period, and 2) multinomial logistics regression on data obtained through a survey of 143 
export firms between June 2014 and December 2014. The key findings reveal that tariffs 
and NTMs in importing countries exert opposite effects on Malaysian exports and greater 
NTM coverage of exports in the importing country promotes the Malaysian exports. 
Agricultural and industry products as well as their major export markets - ASEAN, EU, 
and Japan found NTMs had positive effects. Dual effects (impede and enhance) of NTMs 
were found in EU market. The key findings from the survey data inform firms that find  
NTMs as stringent are those: exporting less than 75 percent of goods; small and medium 
size compared to large firms; resource-based firms exporting less than 75 percent;  
exporting less than 75 percent to the US,  EU and Japan. Similar findings were reached 
for stringency of technical measures (TM) and stringency of private measures (PM). 
Stringency of customs procedures (CP) experienced in the US, EU, Japan, and ASEAN. 
Other non-tariff measures (ONTMs) were found to be not stringent in most export 
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markets, except in Japan. Firms experienced information asymmetry for exports to the 
US and EU markets. Price effects, quantity reduction, and quality restrictions are 
experienced by the exporters in the US, EU and Japanese markets. Firms across all export 
levels (4 export levels- “25 percent and less”, “26-50 percent”, “51-75 percent” and “more 
than 75 percent”) adopt loyalty response strategy in a reactive manner when faced with 
NTMs. Resource-based firms mostly pursue a loyalty-reactive strategy. Firms that export 
“25 percent and less” adopt the exit strategy when faced with NTMs more than firms in 
other export levels. Firms with less than 5 years in operation actively adopt all three 
response strategies in a reactive manner - “exit-reactive”, “loyalty-reactive” and “voice-
reactive”. This study contributes to the existing empirical literature on NTM effects on 
trade from the perspective of a middle income and highly trade dependent economy. It 
also sheds light on the stringency of the impact of NTMs on exports from Malaysia.  
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ABSTRAK 
 
Kajian ini mengkaji kesan langkah bukan-tarif (NTM) ke atas pengekspot-pengekspot 
Malaysia, didorong oleh jurang yang timbul daripada kekurangan kajian dalam bidang 
tersebut. Persoalan kajian yang disiasat, di antaranya adalah i) samada NTM menghalang 
atau meningkatkan eksport dan adakah ia berbeza di seluruh pasaran, ii) samada NTM 
yang dihadapi itu ketat bagi pengeksport Malaysia dari segi intensiti esport dan adakah ia 
berbeza dari segi produk dan pasaran, iii) samada NTM yang spesifik seperti langkah 
bukan-tarif teknikal (TM), prosedur kastam, NTM yang lain (ONTM) dan langkah-
langkah swasta mempunyai hubungan penting ke atas eksport, iv) samada keketatan NTM 
ada hubungan penting dengan  strategi tindakbalas (keluar, kesetiaan atau menyuara-
dengan dimensi masa) diambil oleh para pengeksport Malaysia apabila menghadapi 
NTM, v) jenis NTM (kesan harga,  pengurangan kuantiti, sekatan kualiti dan ancaman 
tindakbalas) yang dihadapi oleh para pengekspor dan vi) samada ketidaksimetrian 
maklumat mempuyai hubungan penting ke atas tahap eksport.  Dua pendekatan 
metodologi digunakan iaitu model graviti dan regresi logistik multinomial untuk 
menganalisis data yang diekstrak daripada TRAINS (Trade Analysis Information 
System) untuk tempoh 2001-2013; dan data yang diperoleh daripada kajiselidik 143 
firma-firma eksport masing masing. Didapati tarif dan NTM di negara pengimport 
memberi kesan sebaliknya kepada eksport Malaysia dan liputan NTM lebih besar 
daripada eksport di negara pengimport menggalakkan eksport Malaysia. Produk pertanian 
dan industri serta pasaran eksport utama seperti ASEAN, Kesatuan Eropah (EU) dan 
Jepun mendapati NTM memberi kesan positif. Dalam pasaran EU, kesan dwi 
(menghalang dan meningkatkan) daripada NTM diperhatikan. Didapati firma-firma yang 
eksport kurang daripada 75 peratus mendapti NTM adalah ketat. Firma bersaiz kecil dan 
sederhana berpendapat NTM adalah ketat. Firma berasaskan-sumber berbanding yang 
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eksport "25 peratus dan kurang" dan "51-75 peratus" mendapati NTM adalah ketat. 
Firma-firma yang mengeksport  kurang daripda 75 peratus ke Amerika Syarikat, EU dan 
Jepun mendapati NTM adalah ketat. Kesimpulan yang sama adalah benar untuk keketatan 
langkah bukan-tarif teknikal (TM) dan keketatan langkah-langkah swasta (PM). Didapati 
prosedur kastam di pasaran Amerika Syarikat, EU, Jepun dan ASEAN adalah ketat. 
Kecuali di Jepun, ONTM didapati tidak ketat. Di dapati firma-firma mengalami kesan 
ketidaksemtrian maklumat untuk eksport mereka ke Amerika Syarikat dan pasaran EU. 
Para pengeksport mengalami kesan harga, pengurangan kuantiti dan sekatan kualiti 
berbanding dengan ancaman tindak balas dalam pasaran Amerika Syarikat, EU dan 
Jepun. Di dapati firma-firma keseluruhanya adalah setia secara reaktif apabila berhadapan 
dengan NTM sebagai strategi tindakbalas mereka. Strategi yang sama dilaksanakan oleh 
firma-firma berasaskan-sumber. Walau bagaimanapun, firma-firma yang mengeksport 
"25 peratus dan kurang" melaksanakan strategi keluar pabila berhadapan dengan NTM. 
Firma-firma yang kurang daripada 5 tahun beroperasi seolah-olah mengamalkan ketiga-
tiga strategi tindak balas dengan cara reaktif secara aktif - "keluar-reaktif", "kesetiaan-
reaktif" dan "suara-reaktif". Kajian ini menyumbang kepada teori dan empirik yang sedia 
ada dari segi kesan NTM ke atas eksport dari perspektif negara yang berpendapatan 
sederhana dan ekonominya yang bergantung tinggi kepada perdagangan anatarabangsa. 
Ia juga menyumbang dalam memberi maklumat tentang keketatan kesan NTM (mengikut 
jenis) ke atas eksport (mengikut sektor dan eksport destinasi) daripada Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
  Malaysia is increasingly integrating with the world through international trade. 
For instance, the total export value in 2015 amounted to RM779.9 billion (MITI, 2015), 
this comprises of 71 percent of its total GDP (constant price) for 2015 (The 
GlobalEconomy.com, 2016). The country’s growth in international trade may be affected 
by non-tariff measures (NTMs), which is on the rise globally and trade-restricting 
(Deardorff and Stern, 1998; Beghin et al., 2012; Mohan et al., 2012). Notwithstanding the 
intent to protect domestic industries or to address market failures on legitimate reasons, 
NTMs can distort and restrict international trade (UNCTAD, 2013). The proliferation of 
NTMs affecting international trade is becoming a major concern for exporters from 
developing countries because of the requirement to comply with various NTMs in order 
to access markets (UNCTAD, 2013). Fugazza and Maur (2008) reported that 
approximately 5,620 tariff lines of most countries are subject to at least one type of NTM, 
with technical measures (TM) of NTM constituting close to 59 percent. The World Trade 
Organisation (WTO, 2012) reported that as high as 31,731 NTMs were imposed. 
 Studies reporting the predicament of Malaysian exporters with regards to NTMs 
are scarce. Only three studies have been conducted thus far on Malaysian exporters with 
regard to NTMs. Azalina et al. (2011) studied the determinants of non-tariff barriers (as 
per the title) in Malaysia’s agricultural sector. The study found average tariffs, sectoral 
competitiveness level and employment growth to be significant determinants of NTM. 
The study did not specifically involve the Malaysian exporters, rather a concern to 
exporters from other countries entering the Malaysian market. Normaz (2010) studied the 
effects of language on trade for Malaysia. Again, it is only one area focused. The study 
concluded that trade is improved when trade partners share a common language.  Rabiul 
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et al. (2010) investigated the impact of trade barriers on the timber trade in Malaysia. It 
concluded that trade barriers generally do not pose a serious problem to Malaysia’s timber 
trade. This study lacks crucial information, as it looked at only the perspective of issues 
of trade barriers in Malaysia. This is of relevance only to exporters from other countries 
dealing with Malaysia in timber trade. Based on these studies, it can be noted that 
examining the impacts of NTMs on Malaysian exporters is scarce.   
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
  The presence of NTMs is real and has the potential to distort and restrict trade. 
Understanding NTMs and its implication on exports is important to effectively formulate 
trade policies and implement market access strategies. This is important for exporters, 
especially from developing countries, as they are the ones facing increasing export costs 
by complying to NTMs, and therefore may likely become unable to compete in the export 
market. UNCTAD (2013) found that exporters from developing countries may be subject 
to systematically biased NTMs. This provides a good reason for developing countries to 
emphasise the effect of NTMs and formulate plans to effectively address these concerns. 
Appropriate policies cannot be formulated without understanding the impact of NTMs. 
Hence, NTMs are now regarded an important agenda for developing countries in their 
effort to trade globally.  
As Malaysia’s trade sector places a high emphasis on exports, there are concerns 
with  accessing current and potential international markets. Between 2013-2014, key 
products exported were electrical and electronic products (33 percent), petroleum 
products (9.3 percent), liquefied natural gas (LNG) products (8.35 percent) and chemical 
products (6.5 percent). These products combined, added up to nearly 60 percent of the 
total products exported in 2013-3014. In 2014, exports achieved totalled RM766.13 
billion surpassed total exports in 2013 by 6.4 percent (MITI Malaysia Report 2014). The 
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report also showed that Malaysia’s major trading partners in 2014 remained unchanged; 
with the largest, China, accounting for 14.3 per cent or RM207.85 billion of Malaysia’s 
total trade. This was followed by Singapore at 13.4 percent which is RM194.52 billion, 
Japan at 9.5 per cent or RM137.45 billion), the US at 8.1 per cent which equates to 
RM116.75 billion and lastly, Thailand at 5.5 per cent which translates to RM79.92 billion. 
ASEAN remained an important and strategic trading partner for Malaysia, accounting for 
26.9 per cent of Malaysia’s total trade in 2014 and 27.4 percent in 2013. Total trade with 
ASEAN was valued at RM389.03 billion; an increase of 3.9 percent from RM374.49 
billion in 2013. In 2015, exports grew by 1.9 per cent to reach a value of RM779.95 
billion. A large portion of this came from trade with major export markets, for example, 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) which increased trade by RM23.09 billion, 
ASEAN (RM12.29 billion), the United States of America (US) (RM12.22 billion), the 
European Union (EU) (RM4.52 billion) and Turkey (RM2.48 billion). In 2015, Malaysia 
retained its global ranking as the world’s 23rd largest exporter (MITI Malaysia Report 
2015).  
However, total elimination of NTMs may not happen soon as countries would be 
maintaining a set of NTMs for economic and social reasons. Hence, Malaysian exporters 
need to wary and meet the NTMs’ requirements, which may pose at times a significant 
increase in costs. Therefore, this study on NTMs provides an important perspective in 
understanding the predicament and readiness of the Malaysian exporters to be competitive 
in the export markets.  Research on the impact of NTMs on exports has produced 
ambiguous results. Many studies have shown the negative effects of NTMs on exports. 
Moenius (2004) studied the impact of national standards of twelve OECD countries’ 
exports and found it to have negative effects on exports of food and beverages, crude 
materials and mineral fuel. Fontagne et al. (2005) derived  similar results for sixty-one 
product groups. Others that found similar impacts include Peterson et al. (2013), Minten, 
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Randrianarison and Swinnen (2009), Anders and Caswell (2009), Calvin, Krissoff and 
Foster (2008), Otsuki et al.(2001), Disdier and van Tongeren (2010), Peterson and Orden 
(2008), Maskus, Wilson, and Otsuki (2001) and Chen et al.(2008). 
However, studies also found that there are trade enhancing effects of NTMs 
through harmonization of standards (Moenius, 2004; Fontagné et al., 2005; de Frahan and 
Vancauteren, 2006 and Disdier et al., 2008). The harmonization of standards enables 
exporters to experience lower costs of exports as they minimize or avoid costs by 
complying to differing standards imposed by importing countries. By complying with the 
set regulations and requirements, it enables exporters to be in the position to increase 
exports and be competitive in the importing market. An increase in the demand for their 
products will result in exporters achieving economies of scales. In summary, the impact 
that NTMs will have on exports largely remains inconclusive. Henceforth, this study on 
NTMs’ effects on Malaysia’s exports is important in further contributing to the argument 
on the effects of NTMs. Existing secondary data on NTMs does not provide any 
indication of the stringency of NTMs across sectors and in major export destinations. 
Many previous studies used the trade restrictiveness index to gauge the effect of NTMs. 
Existing empirical studies on NTMs in Malaysia are either confined to the measurement 
of simple average ad valorem equivalents of core NTMs (Kee et al., 2009) to quantify the 
effects of NTMs on export behaviour or case studies to identify specific sectoral NTMs 
within Malaysia and partner countries (Azalina and Rokiah, 2011; Rabiul et al., 2010 and 
Noor Aini 2011). These studies do not indicate the stringency of NTMs imposed in the 
export markets, especially in developed countries, as the stringency of NTMs may vary 
across markets. The survey approach can be used to show specific stringency of NTMs 
faced by exporters (OECD, 2003; World Bank, 2008), which this study aims to 
accomplish. 
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Dearth of research on NTMs’ impacts on trade, particularly its stringency on 
exports is evident, particularly in Malaysian case studies. Azlina et al. (2011), Normaz 
(2010) and Rabiul et al. (2010) studied the determinants of NTMs and the effects of 
language on trade and barriers pertaining to the timber trade in Malaysia. Appropriate 
policies cannot be implemented without understanding the impact of NTMs on Malaysian 
exporters, more so in the wake of current efforts to expand trade to new international 
markets. Given the weight of the above discussion on NTMs, especially its stringency on 
exports from Malaysia, this study is important as it looks at making a significant 
contribution to the body of knowledge in international economics. 
 
1.3  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
  This research determines the impact of NTMs on exports from Malaysia to her 
destination countries. As established earlier, rarely can there be found studies on the 
impact of NTMs on Malaysian exporters. As such, this study enriches this field of study 
by exploring the impact of NTMs through two research approaches – the gravity model 
and  survey.  First, the gravity model approach was employed to determine the effects of 
NTMs on market accessibility of Malaysian exporters to the European Union, Japan and 
the four Association of South East Asian (ASEAN 4) countries. The ASEAN 4 refers to 
Singapore, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia.  
 The gravity model uses the data extracted from secondary database, TRAINS 
(Trade Analysis and Information System) on trade flow from Malaysia. In this approach, 
the overall impact of NTMs on exports from Malaysia and the NTMs impact by sector 
(industry and agricultural) are studied. The second approach which is survey uses the data 
obtained from 143 export firms through a survey instrument. Though the purpose is 
similar to the first approach, the outcome variable in the survey based approach is more 
specific in determining the stringency of NTMs’ impact on export intensity. It is 
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important to note that such a specific impact study is only possible through the survey 
based approach. Apart from this, the analysis (using the survey data) incorporates views 
gathered from in-depth interviews with selected firms to gain detailed information about 
their experience facing NTMs. Following are the research questions in this study. 
i. Do NTMs impede or enchance exports from Malaysia? 
ii. How stringent are NTMs and TMs relative to other  measures for 
Malaysian exporters by export intensity and export destinations? 
iii. What are the NTM effects (price effects, quantity reduction, 
quality restrictions, and threat of retaliation decision) on Malaysian 
exporters? 
iv. How have NTMs affected the response strategies (exit, loyal or 
express concern (voice)  of Malaysian exporters? 
The above research questions are subsequently addressed with the following research 
objectives. 
i. To empirically examine the overall effects of NTMs on Malaysian 
exports. 
ii. To empirically examine the stringency of NTMs and TMs on 
exports by export intensity and export destinations. 
iii. To determine the NTM types (price effects, quantity reduction, 
quality restrictions, and threat of retaliation) faced by Malaysian 
exporters. 
iv. To assess the response strategies of Malaysian exporters in facing 
NTMs. 
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1.4 STUDY SIGNIFICANCE 
 This study is significant as NTMs play a critical role in international trade. The 
successive General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations have substantially reduced tariffs with the expectation that it will boost 
exports (UNCTAD, 2013). However, export markets have been adopting NTMs as a 
substitute to tariff reduction for various reasons, including as a protectionist measure.  
Inadvertently, the NTMs tend to bear a burden on exports especially from 
developing countries. The presence of NTMs, be it as a policy instrument or otherwise, 
pose impediment to a more free trade zone, thus denying countries, especially the 
developing countries from realising potential gains from free trade. According to World 
Trade Organization (WTO, 2014) (The News Straits Times, June 2015), the elimination 
of NTMs can see global trade increase up to US$1 trillion (RM3.65 trillion) per year 
which is able to create 21 million jobs worldwide.  
How this claim would apply to a country like Malaysia which is already well 
integrated in the world trade, is unknown. Adriamananjara et al. (2004) argued that the 
removal of certain measures can lead to global welfare gain of about US$90 billion in 
2001. Trade facilitation improves when NTMs are removed, thus according to Wilson et 
al. (2005), the global merchandise in developing countries could increase by US$377 
billion between 2000-2001. 
Fugazza and Maur (2008) found that 14 out 26 regions have been impacted with 
higher ad valorem tariff equivalent to NTMs than the average tariff. The impact of 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, which is classified as NTM, on US beef 
exports from 2004-2007 was US$11 billion, estimated to be almost twice than the impact 
of tariffs and tariff rate quotas which is US$6.3 billion (USITC, 2008). This study 
therefore contributes to the NTMs’ effects on Malaysian exports. 
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  Research on the impacts of NTMs on trade exports have produced ambiguous 
results and studies involving Malaysian exporters are little known. Very few studies 
focused on Malaysia, particularly at the firm level. Existing studies are focused on country 
level rather than firm level (Saini, 2011). Most studies use secondary data and therefore 
suffer from secondary data problems.  
  Kee et al., (2006) focused on the import side of Malaysia. Based on the simple 
average ad valorem equivalents of core NTMs, Malaysia was found to have relatively 
high levels of NTMs besides Mexico, Brazil, and Uruguay. Azalina (2010) studied the 
impact of NTMs for Malaysian imports. Other studies undertaken are on the effect of 
language on trade (Normaz, 2010) and the impact of NTMs on trade barriers to the timber 
trade in Malaysia (Rabiul et al., 2010). Azalina et al. (2011) studied the determinants of 
NTMs in Malaysia’s manufacturing sector. The above studies did not focus on the impact 
of NTMs on Malaysian exports, thereby highlighting the significance of this research’s 
undertaking. 
 
1.5 STUDY CONTRIBUTION 
 This study focuses on the effect of NTMs on exports of firms in a developing 
country using primary and secondary data. This contrasts with many studies that look at 
developed countries. Malaysia being a highly trade dependent, non-agriculture based 
economy with high export concentrations in terms of both products and markets, would 
find findings of this study strongly relevant. To date, the predicament of Malaysian 
exporters in facing and managing NTMs is unknown or yet to be documented. This 
study’s findings would strengthen current policy debate on market accessibility of 
traditional markets which has already emerged as a critical item on the national agenda 
and for policy considerations in negotiating comprehensive bilateral free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with major partner countries.  
9 
 
The resumption of Malaysia-European Union Free Trade Area (MEUFTA) 
negotiations would place Malaysia in a better position to put forth the challenges faced 
by its exporters in EU with regards to NTMs, specifically Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) measures imposed on palm oil and timber 
exports. This study provides micro-level evidence, based on a firm-level survey, specially 
constructed to identify the stringency of NTMs in major export markets from the 
Malaysian perspective, which has the advantage of drawing on experiences of economic 
agents that are directly involved in the exporting activities.  Information on the stringency 
of specific NTMs, stringency of NTMs by export destinations and the category of 
Malaysian exporters that it should  be directed to, will provide policy making directions 
for the government to devise specific strategies or incentives targeting the affected 
exporters, and also guide trade negotiators to streamline specific NTMs through trade 
agreements to ensure that they facilitate trade in the interest of the exporters. 
 
1.6 SCOPE OF STUDY 
  This study only involves export firms in Malaysia. The secondary data from 
TRAINS, survey, and interview are the approaches used to obtain data about the export 
firms and the NTMs they face. In terms of geographical scope, the study focuses on 
Malaysian exporters. Using secondary data from the TRAINS database, the export 
destination countries are limited to EU, Japan and the ASEAN 4. The export destinations 
in the survey are limited to the US, EU, Japan, China and ASEAN. The NTMs are derived 
from the UNCTAD’s 2012 classification version (UNCTAD, 2013). Some non-
UNCTAD classified measures are included i.e. other non-tariff measures (ONTMs), 
private measures (PMs) and information asymmetry (InfoAsym). Additionally, the NTM 
types- price effects, quantity reduction, quality restrictions and threat of retaliation were 
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also studied. Analysis of the the non-UNCTAD classified measures are important as they 
are significant to exporters. 
 
1.7 ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS 
 This thesis is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 1 comprises of an introduction 
to the research, the significance of the study, problem statements, research questions and 
research objectives, study contributions as well as scope and limitations of the study. 
Chapter 2 reviews existing literature on NTMs. It provides an in-depth discussion 
on NTMs, comprising of definitions, the classification of NTMs according to UNCTAD, 
trade theories, methods of measuring NTMs, specific NTMs, discussion on signalling 
theory, NTMs faced by developing countries and a brief explanation of RCEP. 
Chapter 3 explains the conceptual framework for this study. It includes a 
discussion on the empirical method of the gravity model. It further describes the survey 
based approach structure, questionnaire design, data collection, and the multinomial 
logistics empirical estimation. Details on the stringency index calculation and interviews 
are provided as well. 
Chapter 4 is the profile chapter and discusses the market accessibility of 
Malaysian exporters to major export destinations. An explanation of the gravity model 
used to analyse the effects of NTMs on exports using data from TRAINS is given. The 
findings and discussion of NTM coverage in the export destination are reported in this 
section. 
 Chapter 5 provides the descriptive information and analysis of 143 firms 
surveyed.  Among the key topics included are the demographic profiles of the exporters, 
NTM incidences, and the NTMs faced by type of firms, size of firms and firm export 
levels. 
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Chapter 6 presents the findings from the survey of firms on the effects of NTMs 
on Malaysian exporters. The multinomial logistics regressions (MNL) results on the 
stringency of NTMs and specific NTMs which include customes procedures (CPs),  
ONTMs and PMs are discussed. This chapter also presents and discusses the findings on 
the effect of InfoAsym on export levels and the stringency NTM types - price effects, 
quantity reduction, quality restrictions and threat of retaliation faced by exporters. The 
results from the multinomial logistics regressions are also interpreted and discussed 
further. 
Chapter 7 explores the various response strategies pursued by Malaysian exporters 
when faced with NTMs. A framework is given to determine the response strategies –exit, 
loyal, or voice. This chapter discusses findings on the response strategies pursued by firm 
type, export level, firm ownership and firm age. 
Chapter 8 focuses on the conclusion, recommendations, policy implications 
and possible areas for future research. Based on the findings, the conclusions are validated  
against existing theories. Following this, some recommendations are suggested for the 
readers and other beneficiaries.  
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CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Numerous studies have been done on the effects of NTMs on exports. This chapter 
starts with the various definitions of NTMs that have been given by several authors. 
Framework that classifies NTMs by UNCTAD (2013) is discussed. As NTMs are 
implicated in trade, it is relevant to explain the theories for international trade. The chapter 
proceeds with the reasons and impact of NTMs on trade as contributed by past studies. 
The chapter further presents the methods used to measure NTMs. It includes the inventory 
approach using frequency index, gravity model and survey approach. The survey 
approach discussion uses the method of measuring stringency of NTMs as given by Melo 
et al. (2014) whereas the Multinomial Logistic Regression (MNLR) approach is used in 
analysing survey data. 
In a subsection, issues related to developing countries’ exports with regards to 
NTMs is discussed.  It shows the predicament of exporters from developing countries due 
to the imposition of NTMs by the importing countries, especially the developed countries. 
It is significantly relevant as Malaysia is a developing country implicated in this study. In 
this section, an explanation of the firm level studies implicating Malaysia with regards to 
NTMs is also provided.  The chapter concludes with the discussion of response strategies 
pursed by exporters when faced with NTMs. On this, studies by Hirschman (1970) and 
Henson and Jaffee (2008) are presented. The significance of this is that it includes 
discussion of the classic framework on response strategies by Hirschman (1970) and the 
modified version by Henson and Jaffee (2008), which this study adopts. 
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2.2  DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF NTMs 
 Gourdon and Nicita (2012) defined NTMs from the perspective of costs which are 
policy related costs incurred from production to final consumer, excluding tariffs. MAST 
(2008) defined NTMs as policy measures other than customs tariffs, that can give rise to 
economic effect on the quantity and price of goods or both in international trade. Beghin 
et al. (2012) defined NTMs as regulated action that indirectly affects the quantity and 
prices or both, of goods traded by altering the attributes and perception of customers. 
Generally, the NTMs which can be country specific or harmonised are defined as policy 
measures (private and government), other than normal customs tariffs, that can potentially 
have an economic effect on international trade in terms of goods, quantities traded and/or 
prices (Carrere and de Melo, 2011 and Rytkonen, 2003).  
NTMs as defined by Linkins and Arche (2002) is, “any measure other than a tariff 
that distorts trade”. Baldwin (1970) defined NTM as, “any measure (public or private) 
that causes internationally traded goods and services or resources developed to the 
production of these goods and services, to be allocated in such a way as to reduce potential 
real world income”. Mahe (1997) defined NTMs broadly to include: 
 Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT) 
 Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
 Transport and infrastructure and costs 
 Telecommunications, comprising telephone, fax, and internet 
   connections 
 Private product standards 
 Technical handling and red tape 
Bora et al., (2002) defined NTMs as that which include export restraints and production 
and export subsidies or measures with similar effect, not just restraints. This definition is 
widely used by GATT and UNCTAD. Baldwin (1970) defined NTMs as any measure 
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(public or private) that causes internationally traded good and services or resources to be 
allocated in such a way as to reduce potential real income.  
Movchan and Eremeko (2003) reviewed the definitions of Baldwin (1970), Walter 
(1972), Mayer and Gevel (1973) and Deardorff and Stern (1997) and defined their version 
on NTMs as measures other than tariffs, that are tightly connected with state 
(administrative) activity and influence process, quantity, structure and/or direction of 
international flows of goods and services as well as resources used to produce these goods 
and services. Hillman (1991) gave a simplistic definition of NTMs which is all 
restrictions, other than traditional custom duties, which distort trade. The Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) (2005) definition is almost the 
same as Hillman’s which is any measure other than tariff that distorts trade. De Andrade 
(2009) defined NTMs as steps related to technical regulations, norms (sanitary or 
otherwise), and procedures to assess conformity, likely to create obstacles to trade. Walter 
(1972) defined NTMs as any measure that distorts the volume of trade, the composition 
of the basket of goods traded between countries, or the direction in which goods are trade. 
For practical purpose, the commonly used definition of NTM is UNCTAD’s (2010) which 
defined NTMs “as policy measures, other than ordinary custom tariffs, that can 
potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing quantities 
traded, or prices or both.” 
 NTMs are often cited as NTB. Both terms are commonly used to denote measures 
adopted by importing countries other than tariffs. However, the distinction is quite 
important to understand their impact. Generally, a NTM either has a positive, negative, 
or no effect on trade. Some of the positive aspects of NTMs’ impact on trade are 
promoting trade, improvement in product quality standards and reduction in compliance 
costs amongst others. It can be imposed based on legitimate reasons i.e. to protect human, 
animal, and plant. On the other hand, when the term NTB is used, it mostly implies a 
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negative effect on trade. It means that the measure acts as a barrier to restrict trade through 
the means of compliance costs, product standards requirements, and other similar 
requisites imposed by importing countries. For example, the European Union is known 
for its very high tolerance limits set for residues or contamination by certain substances 
in foods and feeds. Similar perception was noted for Israel and Switzerland, where very 
high standards were imposed for imports of sesame seeds. In this study, the term ‘NTM’ 
instead of ‘NTB” is used to denote non-tariff measures or barriers.  
Given the importance of understanding the various kinds of NTMs, a global NTM 
classification system was developed. De Dios (2004) presented the UNCTAD 
classification of seven types of NTMs which are: i) para-tariff measures ii) price control 
measures iii) finance measures iv) automatic licensing measures v) quantity control 
measures vi) monopolistic measures and vii) technical measures. In connection to efforts 
to eliminate NTMs, De Dios (2007) noted that NTMs categorised in the red box require 
immediate elimination. These NTMs are non-transparent, discriminatory in application 
and have less restrictive alternative measures. The NTMs categorised in the amber box 
require negotiation with the member or members concerned (countries that impose these 
type of NTMs) before deciding on their elimination. NTMs in this category are 
transparent but discriminatory in application which nullify or impair some benefits or 
obligations of the country, that affect highly traded products in the region or under the 
nine priority sectors that cannot be clearly justified or identified as a barrier. NTMs 
categorised in the green box are imposed on legitimate grounds including scientific basis, 
for protection of public health and safety or religious or national security reasons that are 
consistent with WTO requirements and regulations. The sanitary, phytosanitary, and 
environment regulations that fall into this category are justified and could be maintained. 
In 2008, a comprehensive classification was provided based on the UNCTAD 
Coding System and was developed by several international organizations forming what 
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was called the MAST group (Multi Agency Support Team) (UNCTAD, 2015). According 
to UNCTAD, the classification is based on the existence of NTM. It did not take into 
consideration the legitimacy, adequacy, necessity or discrimination of any form of policy 
or measure used in international trade. It is deemed necessary for i) documentation of the 
NTMs that companies are required to comply ii) facilitation of harmonization of the 
NTMs across different sectors and countries and iii) statistical analysis and research. The 
classification of NTMs helps in the collection and dissemination of information on NTMs 
applied by individual countries. The MAST consists of Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
International Trade Centre (ITC), Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), World 
Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO).  
The latest revision of the NTM classification as reported by UNCTAD (2015) was 
in 2012 which comprises 16 chapters. Chapters A (Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
(SPS), B (Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and C (Pre-shipment inspection and other   
formalities) refer to technical measures. The objectives of technical measures are to 
ensure quality and food safety, environmental protection and national security and protect 
animal and plant health. These objectives also act as mandatory requirement for quality, 
quantity and price control of goods prior to shipment from the exporting country. Chapter 
D refers to contingent trade protective measures. The objective of this measure is to 
ensure that unfair or adverse trade practices are not introduced by exporters in the 
importing countries. It includes anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures. 
Chapter E refers to non-automatic licensing, quotas, prohibitions and quantity-control 
measures other than for SPS or TBT reasons. These measures are implemented to restrain 
the quantity of goods that can be imported, regardless of whether they come from different 
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sources or from one specific supplier.  Chapter F deals with measures related to price 
control including additional taxes and charges. These measures are implemented to 
control the prices of certain imported goods which may be lower than the domestic price.  
Financial measures including advance payment requirements and regulations 
governing foreign exchange rates are aimed to regulate the access to and cost of foreign 
exchange for imports and define the terms of payment. Chapter H refers to measures 
affecting competition. These measure include mainly monopolistic measures such as 
State trading, sole importing agencies or the use of mandatory national insurance or 
transport. Trade-related investment measures are included in Chapter I. These are 
measures that restrict investment by requiring local content or requesting that investment 
be related to export in order to balance imports. Chapter J refers to distribution restriction 
measures where it relates to internal distribution of importing goods. Chapter K refers to 
measures restricting post-sales services by exporters. These measures include restrictions 
on the provision of accessory services. Chapter L contains measures that relate to the 
subsidies that affect trade. These measures may include financial contribution such as 
grants, loans and equity infusions by a government or government body to an industry or 
a company to fund income or price support. Government procurement restrictions 
measures are dealt with in Chapter M. These measure are implemented to protect 
domestic businesses by imposing restrictions on government agencies to place preference 
on national providers (businesses) as compared to foreign bidders in the procurement of 
goods.  
Chapter N deals with intellectual property measures and intellectual property 
rights in trade. It covers measures such as patents, trademarks, industrial designs, lay-out 
designs of integrated circuits, copyright, geographical indications and trade secrets. 
Chapter O is about rules of origin that restrict the origin of products or its inputs. These 
measures include laws, regulations and administrative determinations of general 
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application applied by governments of importing countries to determine the country of 
origin for the goods. Measures implemented include trade policy instruments such as anti-
dumping and countervailing duties, origin marking and safeguard measures The last 
chapter in the classification framework is Chapter P which focuses on export-related 
measures. Export-related measures are all measures applied by the government of an 
exporting country to exported goods, including both technical and non-technical Basically 
these are the measures that a country applies to its exports. It includes export taxes, export 
quotas and export prohibitions. 
  Haveman et al. (2003) divided NTMs into four categories or effect types – price 
effects, quantity reduction, quality restrictions, and threat of retaliation. Price effects 
include minimum import pricing, trigger prices, and variable levies; quantity reduction 
is due to quotas, seasonal prohibitions, and orderly marketing arrangements; quality 
restrictions are related to health, safety or technical standards; and threat of retaliation 
such as antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. The authors noted that the 
price-raising effect of a NTM normally dominates the quantity-reducing effect, resulting 
in an increase in the value of trade between two countries. The authors also found that 
while tariff imposed by the export market can lower both the volume and volume of 
trade, a NTM on the other hand can have dual effect-increase or decrease the value of 
trade, depending on domestic elasticity. The argument points to the elasticity which 
determine whether a coefficient is positive or negative. When the quantity effect 
dominates the price effect, the coefficient is negative; it becomes positive when price 
effect dominates the quantity effect.  
However, the literature is scare on which NTM effect (price effect, quantity 
restrictions, quality restrictions, and threat of retaliation) is stringent and significant for 
Malaysian exports. Generally, it can be argued that price effects that arise from import 
pricing, trigger prices and variable levies, can lead to a lower export level due to high 
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costs of exports. This can lead to a reduction in quantity which in turn affects export 
levels. The quality restrictions would be negatively related to export level; as more 
stringent quality restrictions may constrain exports. The threat of retaliation can also 
impact export level. The seriousness in imposing anti-dumping law on exporters can lead 
to lower export level. In the case of Malaysian exporters, there is a real paucity of studies 
on the Haveman et al., (2003) NTM types faced. This study seeks to fill the gap in this 
body of knowledge by examining these NTMs’ effects types faced by Malaysian 
exporters. 
 
2.3 THEORECTICAL LINKS BETWEEN NTMs AND TRADE 
 Studying NTMs and its effect on trade requires understanding of trade theories 
and models. The Mercantilist theory was the first notable theory that expounded on 
international trade patterns. In the views of Oser and Brue (1988), Mercantilist theory was 
highly nationalistic in its outlook, favoured state regulation and centralization of 
economic activities including foreign trade, stressing the need to increase the stock of 
precious metals, namely, gold and silver to reflect a nation’s prosperity, protection for 
domestic businesses and encourage exports rather than imports (Warburton, 2010). As 
the currency of trade was gold and silver, nations could prosper by accumulating these 
precious metals by exporting more and importing less. The more gold and silver a nation 
had, the richer and more powerful it was. Protectionist measures such as giving subsidies 
and tax rebates to protect local businesses were implemented to encourage exports and 
discourage imports resulting in nations having a favourable balance of trade. Hayek 
(1988) argued that governments largely hamper long-distance trade than initiated it. 
Hence, the Mercantilist theory has laid the seeds of NTM implementation as an invisible 
form of protectionist measure. Free trade, in Mercantilist theory terms, does not benefit 
both trading nations on an equitable scale.  
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 Following the Mercantilists theory, absolute advantage theory emerged. The 
theory of absolute advantage was introduced by Adam Smith, who emphasized the 
importance of free trade in order to increase the wealth of all trading nations. According 
to the absolute advantage theory, trade between two countries happens for goods that have 
absolute advantage. The principle of absolute cost advantage points that a country will 
specialize and export a commodity in which it has an absolute cost advantage. Mutually 
beneficial trade happens on the principle of absolute advantage with the premise that there 
are two countries, two commodities and one factor (labour) of production. The theory is 
based on the labour theory of value, which asserts that labour is the only factor of 
production and that in a closed economy, goods are exchanged in accordance to the 
relative amount of labour they took to produce. From the above explanation of the concept 
of absolute advantage, the theory focuses on the ability of a country to specialize in the 
production of a goods more efficiently than another country. Unlike the mercantilism 
theory, the absolute advantage theory encourages trade between countries. NTMs’ 
influence was ignored in this theory. In reality, NTMs can lead to costly labour as 
exemplified by the following single factor of production such as the need for specialised 
skills due to imposed requirements. Thus, NTMs could result in a country that has 
absolute advantage to produce more goods than a foreign country to experience costly 
labour. 
 Ricardian theory is based on the model of absolute advantage (Golub and Hsieh, 
2000). The theory posits that comparative advantage happens when a country is relatively 
more efficient in the production of a particular product than another country is in the 
production of that similar product. Comparative advantage measures efficiency in terms 
of relative magnitudes. Since countries have limited resources and level of technology 
they tend to produce goods in which they have a comparative advantage. Comparative 
advantage implies an opportunity cost associated with the production of one type of 
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product compared to another. This is the reason why countries tend to specialize in 
production of certain products. In other words, a country should specialise in producing 
and exporting those products in which it has a comparative or relative cost advantage 
compared with other countries and should then import products in which it has a 
comparative cost disadvantage. This theory can be said to be the milestone of 
international trade theory as it bases the comparative advantage in costs (value of goods 
is expressed in terms of labour content and it is the only factor of production) as the basis 
for trade.  Schumacher (2013) argued that the theory’s trade model encourages 
international trade and that nations and populations will benefit from it.  Other 
assumptions are perfect competition and constant returns to scale and free trade. 
Unfortunately, the assumption of free trade i.e. no restriction on the movement of goods 
between countries is unrealistic in today’s trade situation. Today, international trade faces 
restrictions in the form of NTMs. Less developing countries (LDCs) and developing 
countries (DCs) in particular, find it difficult to enjoy comparative advantage in the 
production of labour intensive commodities due to protectionist policies employed by 
developed countries. 
The Ricardian theory which advocates free trade ignores the influence of NTMs 
affecting trade between countries. For a number of reasons (mainly due to protectionist 
policy), NTMs can put a country in a disadvantaged position when it (NTM) can cause 
the export of products that the country has comparative advantage to become costlier than 
producing the same product domestically. Hence, in the light of NTMs’ strong impact on 
trade, the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage does not reflect today’s real trade 
situation. On the import aspect, the theory argues that products will be imported from 
countries that are relatively more productive than when produced locally. In this regard, 
NTMs imposed by private firms (as well as public policies) in the home country can 
significantly increase the cost of importing products, leading to the logic that it is sensible 
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to produce both products locally. It can be argued that a country may be in comparative 
disadvantage because of NTMs. However, studies to empirically show this argument are 
needed, especially with regard to Malaysia. 
The Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) theory stresses factor endowments as the basis for trade 
(Lam, 2015 and Verter, 2015). The theory expounds that a country should produce and 
export goods that require resources (factors) that are abundant in supply and import goods 
that require resources that are short in supply. H-O theory assumes perfect competition, 
constant returns of scale, and factor endowment to scale. Here, the resource that is in 
abundance will be used to produce and export products and the products that require 
factors that are short in supply will be imported. The NTMs’ role in determining the 
product exports orientation (capital intensive or labour intensive) is lacking. The H-O 
theory is also known as the factor proportions theory, in short it means that factors that 
are high in demand than supply would be costly; and factors that are less in demand but 
in abundant supply would be cheaper. Hence, according to the H-O theory, countries 
produce goods that require cheaper factors of production (labour, land, and capital). In 
this context of this argument, the imposition of NTMs may render factors of production 
that are less costly now become costlier due to compliance costs and other investments 
needed to comply with standards and requirements. The NTMs imposed by importing 
countries infringe the free trade assumption made by the H-O theory.  
The Ricardian and Heckher-Ohlin frameworks assume perfect competition and 
constant returns to scale as well as only explain inter-industry trade. In reality, this trade 
model is unable to account for the patterns of trade that pervade today’s trading model 
which mostly involve intra-industry trade. It is no surprise that except for Eaton and 
Kortum (1997), no other studies on trade barriers effects are found within the Ricardian 
framework.  
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 H-O theory suggests that firms engaged in exports reflect their intensity in either 
skills or capital or both. In the case of developed nations like the US, it has been 
empirically noted that firms are more capital and skill intensive. However, in the case of 
developing countries, more empirical evidence is needed to explain the developing 
countries’ orientation in their product exports i.e. capital intensive or skill intensive. 
Alvarez and Lopez (2005) found that developing countries have an abundance of 
unskilled labour. If Malaysia has abundance of labour,  using H-O theory, it can be 
concluded that Malaysia should export labour intensive products.  
 This motivates Krugman (1979, 1980) and Helpman (1985) to develop a new trade 
theory. The new trade theory extended the neoclassical international trade theory by 
imperfect competition, economies of scale, and strategic behaviour. The new trade theory 
argues that due to the ‘love for variety’ by people in the importing countries, this leads to 
firms producing similar products but these products are differentiated by brand, quality, 
packaging, etc. The increase in demand for this product variety leads to firms 
experiencing economies of scale which results in monopolistic competition. Large firms 
stand to be more profitable in producing and exporting products than smaller firms. 
Hence, the market moves towards a few, large firms which end up controlling the market. 
One of the major implications of this model is that the volume of trade is much larger 
than it would be if differences in international factor endowments were the only cause of 
trade. Studies using the monopolistic model to assess the trade flow include Lawrence 
(1987), who was the first theorist to use the model to predict volumes of trade and to use 
disaggregated data on production and trade flows to determine which countries and 
industries differ significantly from the model prediction. In his study, he found that Japan 
has an unusually low volume of imports due to the existence of trade barriers.  
The role of NTMs in this theoretical context is in the form of protectionism. NTMs 
are imposed to protect domestic firms to achieve competitiveness vis-à-vis competitors 
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from outside. One may argue that NTMs can make firms more innovative due to the need 
to produce products that are differentiated by higher quality and standards surpassing the 
NTM requirements in the importing countries. The study on NTMs and its impact on 
trade flow employ this theory based on the premise that consumers incline to have 
variegated products which can be differentiated by brands and standards. This notion has 
clear relations with NTMs where consumers in the importing countries are expected to 
demand for the product or products of a specific brand and standard. The role of NTMs 
requires exporters to comply with certain standard requirements if their products are to 
be accepted by the consumers in the export market. As stated by Leland (1979), 
compliance with standards’ requirements would help to overcome the disconnect between 
producers and consumers due to incomplete or asymmetric information. Mangelsdorf et 
al., (2012) supported Leland (1979) and further noted that compliance with standards by 
exporters from developing countries can overcome the issue of reputation problem and 
show consumers that exporters from developing countries) are able to meet stringent 
standards and provide safe products.  
Another tenet of the new theory related to NTMs is the economies of scale, where 
large quantities of product can be produced at a lower cost. Here, the NTMs can enable 
firms to achieve economies of scale if NTMs act as a catalyst to trade. This then leads to 
the enhancement of trade and simultaneously bolsters a firm’ production of a specific 
product resulting in it achieving economies of scale. NTMs can thus promote 
monopolistic competition. Another aspect of the argument put forth by this theory is the 
fact that large firms tend to benefit in international trade. Here, NTMs make it difficult 
for small and medium firms to experience constraints in costs, resources and capacities. 
These firms lack the resources both financially and non-financially to comply with NTMs 
imposed in the export markets resulting in larger firms controlling the exports. All in all, 
the new trade theory befits the discussion on NTMs’ impact on trade flow. Studies have 
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found positive relationship between firm size and export behaviour (Wignaraja, 2002; 
Aitken, Hanson and Harrison, 1997) implying that larger firms tend to be more successful 
in in their exports. Marandu et al. (2012), found firm size to be inversely related to trade 
behaviour. The authors further argued that smaller firms perceive NTMs as significant 
compared to larger firms, citing limited resources, including financial and managerial 
capabilities as reasons. 
The effect of trade barriers to trade flow was not measured until Harrigan’s (1993) 
study on the import-reducing effects of trade barriers in OECD countries in 1983. 
Harrigan (1993) explicitly adds measures of trade barriers to the original model to directly 
examine the impact of trade barriers on trade flows. However, in his study, tariffs and 
transport costs were substantial barriers rather than NTMs. Others  who used monopolistic 
competition framework were Lawrence (1987), Lee and Swagel (1997) and Harrigan 
(1996). 
However, the use of the gravity model to estimate the NTMs in international trade 
has overtaken other approaches since four decades ago. Many researchers such as 
Tinbergen (1962), Poyhonen (1963), Linnemann (1966), Anderson (1979), Bergstrand 
(1985 and 1989), Helpman and Krugman (1985), Eaton and Kortum (1997), Evenett and 
Keller (2002) and Haveman and Hummels (2004) used the model to estimate trade flow. 
Recent studies that used this model include Wilson et al. (2005), Soloaga and Montenegro 
(2006), Djankov et al. (2006), Lejour and de Paiva Verheijden (2004), Walsh (2008), 
Chevassus-Lozza et al. (2005) and Razzaghi et al. (2012). The utilising of the gravity 
model in estimating trade flow is well established in economic literature. The theoretical 
justification for the use of the gravity model of trade is that the model is derived from 
Newton’s law of gravity (Head, 2000).  Newton’s law states that the farther the distance 
between two masses, the attraction between these forces are lesser. This perspective 
underpins the operation of gravity model where it explains that the farther the 
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geographical distance is between two countries in international trade, the trade volume is 
expected to be lower. The argument is that when countries are far apart, there are 
increased number of trade restrictions due to higher transport cost, fewer cultural 
similarities, demand conditions such as consumer preferences and expectations. Hence, 
the ‘gravitational force’ is directly proportional to the masses of the objects (countries). 
The model is also analysed against a partial equilibrium model of export supply 
and import demand as which was developed by Linneman (1966). Anderson (1979) 
derives that the gravity model postulates CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) 
preferences functions for all countries as well as weakly separable utility functions 
between traded and non-trade goods. Eaton and Kortum (1997) also develop the gravity 
equation from a Ricardian framework. Deardorff’s (1995) gravity equation originates 
from one of Hecksher-Ohlin’s (H-O) perspective as well. Other arguments justifying the 
gravity model approach is based on the Walrasian general equilibrium model, which 
postulates that each country has its own supply and demand functions for all goods. 
Traditional trade theories (Abosulute Advantage, Comparative Advantage and 
Hecksher Ohlin Theory) are only capable of explaining why countries trade but do not 
explain firstly, as to why some countries’ trade links are stronger than others and 
secondly, the reasons why the level of trade between countries tends to increase or 
decrease over time. Although, the Absolute Advantage theory initiated the understanding 
of international trade dynamics, it is unable to explain the changing nature of trade 
patterns. One reason for this lies in the fact that it considers labour as a homogeneous 
measure for the production within a country. Another reason for its inability to explain 
changing trade patterns between countries is due to the idea that a nation with the absolute 
advantage of producing a good should always export it.  
Comparative Advantage theory dwells on the premise that trade between countries 
can occur due to difference in either factor endowment or technology. However, the 
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theory could not explain intra-industry trade and does not consider most of other factors 
such as economies of scale, imperfect competition and demand side of trade. Furthermore, 
the theory still accepts labour as the only homogeneous production factor within the 
country which sets the basis for costs and exchange determinant in trade, not considering  
international differences in labour productivity (Suranovic, 2010). Hecsher-Ohlin’s 
theory introduced capital endowment as an  additional factor to the labour as the only 
factor endowment in the Comparative Advantage Theory.  
The difference of two proportioned factors producing capital intensive good or 
labour intensive good for exports, seems more real in the current trading context. It 
explains why a country that has an abundance of capital should export capital export of 
labour intensive good and export of labour intensive good should be done by a country 
with an abundance of labour (Suranovic, 2010). However, it reality this predicted pattern 
did not work based on Leontief’s (1953) study of USA’s trade with the rest of the world. 
It was found that the USA, as a capital intensive nation, was an exporter of labour-
intensive goods and an importer of capital-intensive goods, in contrast to Hecksher-
Ohlin’s theory. It is evident that these classical trade theories have shown to be deficient 
in current context of international trade patterns. The gravity model is successful in 
resolving these shortcomings. The model allows more factors to be taken into account to 
explain the extent of trade as an aspect of international trade flows (Paas, 2000). Hence, 
until now the gravity model is heralded as a good choice in analysing bilateral trade as it 
contains elements of both the demand and supply side explanations of trade.  
 Other firm based trade theories include Country Similarity Theory (Linder, 1961), 
Product Life Cycle Theory (Vernon, 1966), Global Strategic Rivalry Theory (Krugman, 
1980) and Porter’s National Competitive Advantage Theory (Porter, 1990; Grant, 1991). 
Unlike the country-based theories, these theories incorporate other product and service 
factors in explaining trade flows. These factors include brand and customer loyalty, 
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technology and quality. However, these theories have disregarded the NTMs as a factor 
to be considered in international trade. The Country Similarity theory dwells on the 
premise that trade (export) is most likely to happen between countries that have similar 
preferences. Measures of similarity include similar per capita income and common intra-
industry trade. The manufacturing sector is the main focus in this theory’s argument. The 
argument on NTMs with this theory could be similar to the monopolistic theory, where 
the NTMs can lead to firms producing differentiated products and building brand images 
that can help increase consumer’s acceptance of these products in importing countries. 
However, this has to be within the limits of the Country Similarity theory’s assumption 
of similarity in consumer preferences and similar income per capita. NTMs can result in 
trade becoming more difficult between countries with similar income per capita and 
consumer preference.  
The Product Life Cycle (PLC) theory explains international trade patterns 
according to the PLC stages. The theory posits that when a product is at a new product 
development stage, it will usually be produced in the home country. However, when the 
product is at the maturity stage, firms will find locations where cheap factors of 
production can be obtained. However, the PLC theory ignores the emerging countries’ 
capabilities in research and development, where highly skilled labour and technology are 
available even at the new product’s development stage. The PLC theory does not consider 
NTMs in explaining the patterns of trade despite the possibility of NTMs having 
important repercussions. Compliance to NTMs can cause firms to seek research and 
development capabilities in cost efficient countries like China and India. According to 
Bhaumik et al. (2009), China and India have become the choice for firms pursuing low 
cost solutions through R&D offshoring. The authors state that with large technical and 
scientific manpower coupled with a huge and growing market, India and China are 
emerging as preferred destinations for the offshoring of R&D. As Huggins et al. (2007) 
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noted that in 2006, India and China were the most popular destinations for research and 
development projects. This is to reduce overall compliance costs imposed by NTMs. 
Hence, this theory cannot prevail in reality. 
Global Strategic Rivalry theory (Krugman, 1980) posits firms achieving 
competitive advantage to compete in a competitive industry by creating barriers to market 
entry. Firms need to achieve sustainable competitive advantage in order to compete in the 
industry with competitive players. Sources of barriers to entry are as follows; i) strong 
research and development capabilities, ii) ownership of intellectual property rights, iv) 
economies of scale, iii) unique business processes, and iv) control of resources or 
favourable access to raw materials. However, the role of NTMs in explaining competitive 
edge of firms is not dealt with in this theory. In the wake of stringent NTMs, firms may 
have problems achieving competitive advantage. Exporting to countries that will incur 
high compliance costs may affect their product pricing strategy which could result in them 
not achieving the desired competitive edge. It may also be the case where a once 
competitive firm can become less competitive due to NTMs. 
The Porter’s National Competitive Advantage theory (Porter, 1990; Grant, 1991) 
stresses that a nation’s competitiveness in an industry depends on the capacity of the 
industry to innovate and upgrade. According to this theory, four determinants control a 
nation’s competitiveness capacity. They are i) local market resources and capabilities, ii) 
local market demand conditions, iii) local suppliers and complimentary industries, and 
iv) local firm characteristics. The NTM factor was not included in this theory when 
explaining trade. NTMs can result in firms being in both favourable and unfavourable 
positions. NTMs can further encourage firms to produce quality and innovative products 
which are demanded by importing countries. This leads to higher demand quantity 
resulting in firms achieving economies of scale, in return becoming more competitive via 
lowering product price (due to lower average cost) in the importing country. However, 
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this scenario is likely to happen only to large and established firms. On the other hand, 
NTMs can result in firms experiencing higher compliance costs which will put them at a 
disadvantage when competing with firms in an importing country. Hence, if a nation has 
exporters that are not in a position to withstand or cope with higher compliance costs and 
requirements due to NTMs, the nation becomes less competitive. This theory does not 
reflect the reality of the trade situation at present time. 
 
2.4 PAST STUDIES ON NTM IMPACTS ON EXPORTS  
 The WTO (2012) stated that studies conducted in quantifying the effect of NTMs 
found that the impact of NTMs on trade is almost twice as much as of tariff. In a study by 
Hoekman and Nicita (2011), NTMs reduced by 5 percent will improve trade by 2-3 
percent. Three broad effects were identified by Dhar and Kallummal (2007), arising from 
the impact of NTMs. These effects are a) regulatory protection effect- rent to domestic 
sector; b) supply shift effect- compliance cost impact in terms of increase in domestic 
supply; and c) demand shift effect-new information effect, which leads to increased 
demand. These effects are discussed in the perspective of a welfare-oriented approach. 
Effects in the context of the mercantilist approach are on compliance costs and market 
entry decision (Melitz, 2003).  
The literature also discussed the effects of NTMs on small and large firms. The 
costs incurred for compliance to standards and regulations affect small and large firms 
differently which in turn determine their capability and capacity to compete and achieve 
profits. Granslandt and Markusen (2000) also stated that the regulations and standards 
could impose a fixed cost for firms which could affect their competitiveness when they 
enter a market. The authors argued that the difference in the costs due to difference in 
standards gives rise to real trade costs for exporters, hence putting them at a disadvantage 
position to enter a market. The cost of entry could be high and as a result their ability to 
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compete with domestic players for the same product type is affected. Melitz (2003) added 
that the unmanageable fixed costs can cause a firm to decide not to enter a market. This 
could result in trade diversion. Granslandt and Markusen (2000) added that the 
incompatible standards do not favour the small firms (exporters) as their costs of 
compliance could be a substantial amount.  
Standards and technical regulations imposed by importing countries are a serious 
matter for exporters especially from developing countries. The seriousness of standards 
as NTMs is reported by Chen et al. (2008) which found that 40 percent of exports from 
developing countries are subject to NTMs including standards. As reported by UNCTAD 
(2005), the inability to meet stringent environmental and safety standards by developing 
countries have led to the failure of exporting their agricultural and manufactured products 
to developed countries. The standards and technical regulations have only served to 
strengthen the domestic players and achieve competitive advantage vis-à-vis exporters 
especially from developing countries.  
The paper by Chen et al., (2006) involved 17 developing countries and only two 
Asian countries were implicated, and none were from the ASEAN region. So the 
argument about standards and export decisions involving developing countries in its 
entirety is inconclusive. Many other developing countries were not studied to confirm 
that standards impact their export decisions. The research findings, however, could be 
different for ASEAN countries. For example, Malaysia, a developing country in the 
ASEAN region, has improved its global enabled ranking (Lawrence et al., 2012). The 
report noted that Malaysia has established institutions, policies, and services that facilitate 
free flow of goods over boarders. Though this report informs of Malaysia’s improvement 
in ease of trading position, it also tells about the country’s seriousness in global trade, 
hence it could have undertaken efforts to be competitive in foreign markets, which implies 
the possibility of meeting the standards imposed by importers on Malaysia’s exports. For 
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this, research is warranted for Malaysia to strengthen the argument on standards becoming 
a hindrance to export decisions in developing countries.  
Chen at al. (2008) discussed four types of standards. These include quality 
standards, design standards, testing, and certification procedures and labelling 
requirements, all of which have distinct objectives. Standards are used as a strategic tool 
for product differentiation and market segmentation (Clayton et al., 2003). Smith (2009) 
researched the prevalence of public and private standards and found that firms have 
incentives to provide, for example, high quality food to gain competitive advantage and 
it was further noted that in cases where information was made available to consumers on 
how to judge if food quality is imperfect or otherwise, market and legal incentives may 
be insufficient to give consumers the level of quality and protection that society as a whole 
would like.  
  Studies on NTMs’ effects on Malaysian exporters are rare. As such, this research 
will contribute to the body of knowledge in this area. According to Dhar and Kallummal 
(2007), the welfare-oriented approach was adopted to isolate only those measures that 
restrict trade. It did not address the measures taken for legitimate reasons i.e. protection 
of health and the environment as well as safety (which are sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) and Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT) measures). The United States-China 
Business Council (USCBC) made clear distinctions for SPS and TBT measures (standards 
and regulations) from that of other NTMs such as quotas, licensing/tendering 
requirements and government and industrial restrictions. Due to this, measures that are 
legitimate in nature are not termed NTMs. This differs with many other definitions of 
NTMs which include measures implemented for legitimate purposes. Maskus et al. (2001) 
pointed out that the principle of national treatment should be taken as a criterion for 
judging the measure. The author noted that if the standard or regulation is applied for both 
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domestic and foreign products, then the measure is not trade-distorting, hence not an 
NTM. 
The argument on the NTMs’ impacts on trade  goes both directions i.e. trade 
impeding and trade promoting or facilitating. Positive effects of NTMs lead to enhancing 
trade while negative implications of NTMs result in incurring losses both in financial and 
non-financial aspects. Financial losses are mainly due to increased costs of compliance. 
Non-financial losses are related to becoming less competitive in the domestic market of 
the importing country due to slower time to market, subsidies and other preferential 
treatment by governments to protect its local firms. While some NTMs are meant to 
correct market failures, there are concerns that many NTMs may be imposed to protect 
domestic industries (Liu and Yue 2009), which is contrary to WTO’s framework of fair 
trade policy. For example, the authors argued that the practice of applying SPS and 
technical trade measures may be discriminatory and unjustified which act as barrier to 
trade (Grant and Anders, 2010; Baylis et al., 2010; Otsuki et al., 2001; Disdier and 
Marette, 2010) even among the WTO members. WTO (2012) informed that NTMs which 
are imposed for legitimate reasons such as to address market failures, still will still incur 
costs for exporters. 
Survey findings from across the world show that NTMs have constrained 
businesses in their ability to make inroads into the foreign markets (OECD, 2003). In a 
survey conducted by the International Trade Commission (ITC) Client Surveys in 2008, 
involving 300-1500 companies in each country, NTMs have become the top three 
concerns in their trading practices with foreign markets. Developing countries are mostly 
negatively affected by NTMs. These countries have limited access to information, 
infrastructure and minimal capacity to withstand the impact of the NTMs requirements. 
As noted above, exporters responding to NTM requirements mostly face increased costs 
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of compliance and longer time to deliver the products, hence reducing their 
competitiveness.  
For example, exporters usually get their products to undergo laboratory testing, 
securing conformity assessment certificates, inspection of shipment before the goods are 
delivered. The entire process can be really time consuming along with increased costs 
incurred. The effects of failing to meet the NTMs requirements can be extreme to the 
point of imposing full bans on products from entire countries and regions. In the last two 
decades full bans were imposed on Asian and African countries. In 1997, the EU banned 
all fishery products from Bangladesh due to food safety concerns. The seafood processing 
plants in Bangladesh were found to have serious quality control problems by EU. This 
resulted in overall decline of 8.7 percent in Bangladeshi seafood exports globally (Cato 
and Dos Santos, 1998). The ban caused Bangladesh exporters to deflect their exports to 
other countries like Japan and US.  
 It can be said that trade deflection is a course of action which could be a norm for 
exporters facing the impact of NTMs. In the context of Malaysian exporters, there is lack 
of evidence of trade deflection or other responses due to NTMs. Literature in 
understanding this relationship is still in its infancy, especially with regards to exporters 
from developing countries. 
On the other hand, NTMs do enhance exports. Rial (2014) noted that exporting 
countries complying with NTMs’ requirements in the markets which they have already 
accessed, tend to enhance exports. Due to an understanding of and complying with the 
NTMs, these countries have become more competitive than countries that have yet to 
establish their mark in the markets. Neeliah et al. (2013) in supporting this argument, 
found that certain exporters from middle-income countries who are able to comply with 
strict SPS measures, use this as a strategy to compete with exporters with low cost of 
production, because these exporters may not be able to bear the high costs of compliance. 
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This situation could be a concern for those exporters especially from developing countries 
and less developed countries as the high compliance costs may render it difficult for them 
to access to export markets. 
Rial (2014) also noted that reduction in information asymmetries between 
consumers and producers, in regards to the quality and safety of the product, favours 
export enhancement. The effort undertaken to comply with NTMs could ultimately result 
in positive impact for the exporters concern through capacity upgrade and instituting 
procedures and regulations that promote efficient process and production facilities (Van 
Tongeren et al., 2009). 
It was noted that exports can be enhanced through harmonisation of NTMs. The 
SPS and TBT agreements per se, seek to promote harmonisation mainly to allow 
exporters to reduce adaption costs (related to product information and product 
compatibility) in importing markets (Maskus et al., 2001). 
Stringent requirements could adversely affect exporters as compliance can be 
expensive. In such a situation, exporters from developing and less developing countries 
may be in a disadvantaged position as they may face constrains in accessing compliance 
resources, among which are scientific and technical expertise, consultants, institutions, 
and limited information and finance as opposed to developed countries (Jongwanich, 
2009 and Henson and Loader, 2001). The argument put forth is that compliance with 
NTMs leads to higher value of products produced and exported. This study’s findings 
will be able to shed some light on which side of the coin Malaysian exporters operate. 
Studying the NTMs’ effects is relevant for adopting suitable policies for exporting 
countries and development of export approaches that promote competitiveness. 
The literature also discussed NTMs’ impact on export decisions. Melitz (2003) 
studied export decisions at the firm level. He discussed that firms decide to export based 
on their marginal cost (MC) as threshold level. If the MC is higher when doing business 
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in the domestic market, there is the possibility that firms will exit. When MC is higher in 
serving export markets and lower in domestic markets, the firms will not decide to export 
but remain as a domestic market player. Firms decide to expand into international markets 
when MC (marginal costs) to do business in the international markets is lower than the 
threshold level. The model by Melitz (2003) helps explain the connection between the 
marginal costs and standards faced by exporters. This research involving the Malaysian 
exporters is expected to shed light on responses of Malaysian exporters when faced with 
NTMs. Understanding the kind of responses  by the exporters in facing the challenges 
imposed by NTMs (public standards included) as well as private measures will have 
significant implication to theoretical understanding, trade policies, and development 
plans. Unfortunately, little information is known in this area and therefore this study seeks 
to fill in this gap where appropriate. 
Mehta and George (2003) highlighted the plight of a large developing country like 
India in penetrating international market with stringent SPS standards. As a result of 
stricter and shifting standards in developed countries, many Indian exporters exit the 
market while some others find alternative markets. In this case, the Indian exporters could 
have succumbed to escalating marginal costs (Melitz’s model) causing them to face losses 
in the international market and eventually exit the markets. It is clear that quantity 
reduction as one of the effects of NTM as studied by Haveman et al., (2003) seems to fit 
well in the Indian case. However, Disdier et al. (2008) showed that Ecuador, Costa Rica 
and Kenya exporters did not lose export markets due to SPS and TBT measures and its 
higher costs of compliance. Haveman et al. (2003) and Disdier et al. (2008) provide in-
depth understanding on why some exporters benefit from higher compliance costs while 
others exit the export markets due to the same reason. 
Following the above discussion, the Melitz (2003) model and the signalling theory 
(as discussed in Chen. et al., 2008) are instrumental works in establishing the connection 
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between standards and regulations and export decisions. The signalling theory argues that 
exporters understand and can access information pertaining to the standards and 
requirements of the importing countries. This sharing of information can be beneficial to 
all parties. The example of the ban on Bangladesh highlights the case of domestics 
standards when not in sync with international standards due to lack of information.  
Researches commonly cite the following reasons as to why companies, especially 
among developing countries, do not establish standards that match the international 
community, which are increased cost of compliance, lack of expertise, limited knowledge 
of what is expected and limited infrastructure amongst others. The lack of transparency 
among exporters of the standards expected by importing countries is often overlooked. 
To elucidate further, it is useful to refer to Chen et al. (2008), who argued that signalling 
theory is often not discussed as it should be. Signalling theory argues that standards and 
labelling requirements positively impact exporters in terms of export volume and export 
scope. The argument is that quality standards reduce consumer uncertainty leading them 
to decide to buy products even at higher prices. The same argument is given for product 
and design standard, compliance to which would result in product compatibility and 
reduction in coordination failures among producers.  
However, as noted by the authors, the same is not true for regulations related to 
testing and certifications imposed by importing countries. This contribution is definitely 
useful in understanding which regulations affect the exporters’ performance in terms of 
economies of scale and scope. Both traditional theories and the gravity model seem to 
ignore the importance of signalling in trade. This could be because information 
asymmetry is not treated as an NTM with respect to NTM classification by UNCTAD 
version 12. However, the role of information cannot be denied in trade flow. This 
conclusion is made based on the lack of consideration given to the role of information 
transparency on standards and requirements.  
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Buyers’ uncertainty about the quality of products offered for sale impedes 
international trade (Greif, 1992). Spatial, cultural, and linguistic barriers in international 
trade accentuate buyers’ difficulties in discerning product quality. Exporters from 
developing countries face greater challenges credibly signalling product quality because 
international buyers tend to infer product quality from the generally poor reputations of 
products’ country of origin (Hudson and Jones, 2003). As Chiang and Masson (1988) 
observed that exports from developing countries usually are subject to ‘statistical 
discrimination’ amongst consumers in the export markets due to imperfect information. 
Fisher (2006) noted that exporters from developed and developing countries often 
complain, among other things, on the general lack of transparency about doing business 
in a given market.  
Some NTMs can expand trade as they enhance demand for goods through better 
information about the good or by enhancing the goods (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). 
This is supported by Leland (1979) in his argument that information asymmetries can be 
reduced due to the transparency of or informing on the minimum quality standard. 
Transparency and openness in countries’ regulatory processes are fundamental in 
ensuring the development of regulations that are effective in achieving legitimate 
regulatory objectives while minimising their impact on international trade (Raj, 2005). 
Promoting transparency, predictability, and public participation in the development of 
regulatory and policy decisions includes making information and regulations accessible 
to all domestic and foreign persons and businesses requesting them, providing a 
meaningful opportunity for foreign stakeholders to comment before a proposed measure 
is adopted, and opening regulatory and rule-making processes to all interested parties 
(Shortall, 2007).  
However, there could be instances where information on private standards may 
not be readily available and accessible. These can be an important hindrance for exporters. 
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Literature on the private standards as trade barrier is scarce, especially in the case of food 
chains, both public and private systems are influenced by trade agreements in the WTO 
and by the work of international food quality standardisation organisations. While this 
leads to increased transparency of public regulatory processes, one concern is that a 
similar level of transparency may not apply to private standards and their associated 
control and enforcement processes. 
Firms have incentives to provide high quality food in order to gain competitive 
advantage, but in cases where information available to consumers on which to judge food 
quality is imperfect, market and legal incentives may be insufficient to give consumers 
the level of quality and protection that the society as a whole would like. While easy 
access to regulatory information is important for domestic companies, it is critical to 
foreign firms that may be unfamiliar with the economic, cultural, and regulatory 
environment of a particular market (Czaga, 2004). Indeed, international trade depends on 
such transparency. As one economist puts it, “it is important for traders to know what the 
rules are and where to find them” (Kleitz, 2006). To succeed in an overseas venture, firms 
must have information on the specific rules, regulations, and other requirements to help 
them understand the risks, constraints, and other factors that they will face if they enter 
the market. This information is of equal importance to them once they operate there.  
Other important benefits of open and transparent regulatory processes are that they 
give firms more time and flexibility to adjust to regulatory changes and may help increase 
firms’ compliance rates (Czaga, 2004). The openness of countries’ regulatory rule-
making processes to all interested domestic and foreign parties also improves regulatory 
efficiencies while reducing the likelihood that ineffective or discriminatory regulations 
will result in technical trade barriers. Moreover, when all domestic and foreign 
stakeholders can contribute to the regulatory process via formal and informal 
consultations, their involvement can reduce ‘buyers’ uncertainty about the quality of 
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products offered for sale which impedes international trade (Greif, 1992). Spatial, 
cultural, and linguistic barriers in international trade accentuate buyers’ difficulties in 
discerning product quality. As Chiang and Masson (1988) observe, “Information 
imperfections may cause consumers to practice ‘statistical discrimination’ against 
imports from developing countries. 
The above discussion is sufficient grounds to argue that the signalling aspect 
needs to be included in international trade studies to provide a more accurate picture of 
trade flows. The absence of signalling standards and requirement in the study of NTMs’ 
impact on trade may produce bias results and conclusions. Hence, it is imperative that the 
level of knowledge or information about standards and requirements possessed by 
exporters and importers be considered as one of the variables to measure the impact of 
NTMs on trade. This study explores the effect of information asymmetry on Malaysia’s 
exports (export level). 
Paying no or less emphasis on the importance of NTMs, particularly the SPS and 
TBT, can render exporters in an unfavourable position with regard to the domestic 
competitive markets of importing countries. Fontagne et al., (2005b) found that 
environment related measures i.e. SPS and TBT have negative impact mainly on global 
trade of fresh and processed food relative to manufactured products. Metha and George 
(2003) further highlighted the nature of trade complexity and market access by 
developing countries into countries that enforce the SPS measures. Bao and Qiu (2012) 
noted a similar impact involving TBT measures. The survey results suggest that a large 
number of companies are affected by NTM-related problems, most of which are technical 
measures (SPS and TBT).  
Malaysia’s exports constituted 74 percent of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) 
in 2014 (World Bank, 2015). If exports suffer, it will have a negative impact on the 
Malaysian GDP. It was found by Krueger (1978), Feder (1982) and Thornton (1996) that 
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countries exporting a large part of their output tend to grow faster than other countries. 
Kumar (2015) studied the relationship between GDP and exports in India for the period 
of 1980-2009 and it has positive causality i.e exports contribute to economic growth. 
Asim (2014) discussed in his paper that exports significantly contribute to economic 
growth as it involves more capacity utilization, perfect resource allocation, economies of 
scale, improve hi-tech innovations as a result of soaring rivalry in the international 
market. 
The economic and empirical theory remains unclear on whether trade is 
enhanced through harmonisation of NTMs. Although efforts have been taken to quantity 
the effects of NTMs on trade, the outcome still remains inconclusive due to the fact that 
data is either incomplete or not available (Korinek et al., 2008). However, as opposed to 
the common findings that NTMs restrict trade, there are arguments put forth i that NTMs 
do facilitate trade, hence providing conflicting points against theoretical predictions that 
standards hinder trade. Swann et al. (1996) noted that national standards encourage 
imports into the UK. This argument on how the barriers enhance trade is based on 
signalling theory which can provide an alternative perspective to the mainstream literature 
on NTMs. Kee et al. (2010) noted that during the crisis in 2008, countries use NTMs like 
state assistance and local content requirements against imports. Cadot et al. (2010) noted 
that the vast literature on NTMs still does not provide clear identification, measurement, 
and impact of NTMs on trade. It is still very much a vague area which can benefit from 
scientific research. Fisher (2006) pointed that it might be useful to provide aid to address 
the internal market barriers that impede exports such as cumbersome domestic regulatory 
frameworks. 
  Importing countries often impose NTMs for legitimate reasons such as setting 
safety regulations and standards that prevent the spread of harmful diseases and protect 
consumers. However, there is growing concern that such measures can act as barriers to 
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trade flow. Standards imposed that impede trade flow may be due to political purposes 
(Baylis et al., 2009). While some NTMs are meant to correct market failures, there are 
concerns that many NTMs may be imposed to protect domestic industries (Liu and Yue, 
2009), which is contrary to WTO’s framework of fair trade policy. Tariffs are widely used 
to protect domestic producers’ incomes from foreign competition and non-tariffs are used 
to restrict imports. 
Fontagne et al. (2005) assessed environment related NTMs and presented the 
motivation behind imposing the standards by importing countries. The authors found two 
reasons to do so. Firstly it is for protectionism purposes as importing countries tend to be 
protective of their firms against exporters. Exporters complying with the standards are 
disadvantaged vis-à-vis the domestic firms in the importing country. This causes 
exporters to lose out in the market place. Secondly, it is based on concerns for the 
environment i.e. measures are taken to protect human, animal and plant life or health. 
Although this is a legitimate reason for environment related (SPS and TBT) standards to 
be imposed on exporters, it could nevertheless result in both an increase or reduction in 
exports.  
Fontagne et al. (2005) distinguished between a protectionism measure and 
environmental concern measure (which is a legitimate reason from WTO’s free trade 
perspective). According to Fontagne et al. (2005), when many countries are affected by 
environment related standards and regulations, it implies a wider consensus i.e. both 
parties-exporters and importers, understand the legitimacy of the standards and regulation 
to safeguard the impact of the product on the environment or the magnitude of risks for 
health and safety. When a single country or limited number of countries enforce the 
standards and regulation, it is highly possible they did it to protect domestic firms, which 
is against the WTO rules of free trade. Lee and Chen (2011) concluded that developed 
nations have resorted to protectionism in the name of environmental protection which 
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resulted in developed nations trading among themselves. Their action has side-lined 
developing countries, thus hindering their export expansion efforts. 
In the light of the above discussion, the reason behind imposing standards and 
regulations could be a critical factor in enhancing or reducing trade. However, there is 
little evidence to firmly establish the kind of motivation (protectionism or environmental 
concerns) and its effects on trade. 
 
2.5  MEASUREMENT OF NTMs 
 The existing literature has provided information on the methods used in measuring 
NTMs.  Deb (2006) initially tabulated these methods and the table has been enriched with 
more studies measuring NTMs in recent years. The measures include non-econometric 
and econometric approaches. The non-econometric approach comprises of the frequency 
or coverage approach, price wedge approach, and survey based approach. The 
econometric modelling approach consists of gravity models, augmented gravity models 
and CGE (Computable Generalised Equilibrium) analysis. Strengths and limitations of 
the methods are provided in Table 2.1. Each method allows for the possibility of 
prioritising different types of mechanisms. Surveys, for example,  can determine which 
specific NTM are important to exporters. However, the survey method has one main 
disadvantage as the cost incurred for this method is generally high. Additionally, Carrere 
and de Melo (2011) noted that surveys conducted on different products and countries are 
not suitable to be compared with one another as the standard level used for comparison 
differs greatly. 
 The inventory method is a popular method adopted to quantify NTMs (Beghin 
and Bureau, 2001) and is used commonly in regulations or standards, detentions and 
industry complaints. The rules and actions imposed in these areas are subject to counting, 
which then creates the NTM variables for analysis. The inventory approach has 
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limitations in that it does not show differences in the impact and types of standards. In 
employing the gravity model to examine the potential impact of NTMs on trade, the use 
of count variable is often used (Beghin and Bureau, 2001). The count of standards and 
other NTMs have been used in various studies. One of the earliest studies was done by 
Swann at el. (1996). The authors used the count of standards in determining the possible 
impact they have on trade in Germany and the UK. The actual level of standard was not 
analysed based on the assumption that all standards have equal importance, hence they 
have equal weightage. However, their study made the distinction between the existence 
of similar standards that exist across countries and standards that differed internationally.  
These counts were included in equations to determine the impact of standards on 
imports, exports, and overall trade ratio. A similar count method was used by Moenius 
(2004) involving 12 different developed countries. The author incorporated the counts in 
the gravity model of trade. Like Swann et al. (1996) and Moenius (2004). they made the 
distinction between shared standards and country specific standards. Swann et al. (1996) 
and Moenius (2004) both used the count method and found that the inability to measure 
the severity of the standards seems to be a major limitation. 
 The frequency ratio only reflects the incidence of the NTMs. It does not show the 
impact on prices, trade and welfare. However, the occurrence of the NTMs is valuable 
information. One of the advantages of using the frequency index is that it does not suffer 
from endogeneity of the weights in the import value. The coverage ratio (CR) faces the 
problem of endogeneity that renders the ratio downward bias. The frequency index does 
not attach the import value and only considers the presence and absence of an NTM in a 
product category. The frequency index only gives the percentage of the import 
transactions that are affected by NTM.  
 The coverage ratio (CR) measures the extent of trade covered by NTM. The CR 
becomes higher if more products are affected by NTM. As mentioned above, the CR has 
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the problem of and /or it has larger import value of the affected products, where if a 
product in a product category is totally affected by NTM, that weight will be zero, hence 
the CR is downward biased. To eliminate this problem, the frequency index is used. 
Recent studies use both the coverage ratio and frequency index to measure the impact of 
NTM on trade as exemplified in Bao and Qiu’s studies (2010). 
  Empirical methods that are commonly used to analyse bilateral trade is the gravity 
model. The model is derived based on the Newtonian’s physics function that describes 
the force of gravity. The gravity model is based on this law and uses it to study trade. 
Studies in estimating the variables’ effect on bilateral trade have been many and on-going. 
The gravity model is widely used in empirical literature to estimate the determinants of 
bilateral trade (Oguledo and Macphee, 1994). Other studies include Hassan (2001), Batra 
(2004), Sohn (2005), Rahman (2010),  Hatab et al. (2010) and many more. The gravity 
model was subject to criticism for lacking in theoretical foundations of trade until the 
model was given rigorous theoretical justification by authors like Helpman (1987), 
Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985, 1989) which greatly improved its validity and 
reliability (Baltagi, 2001). In its simplest form, the gravity model explains the flow of 
trade between a pair of countries as ‘proportional’ to the gross national products or 
economic “mass” or national income and inversely proportional to the distance of 
countries engaged in trade. Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963) were among the first 
to use the gravity model to study trade flow.  
In the past decade or so, the gravity model was accepted and utilised by many 
other authors to study trade between countries. Among them are Matyas (1998), Cheng 
and Wall (2005), Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) who claimed that the gravity model is a 
good empirical tool that gives a better fit to the most of regional and international trade 
flow data sets. The following researchers: Clausing (2001), Cernat (2003), Ghosh and 
Yamarik (2004), Jayasinghe and Saker (2007), Carrere (2006) and Vicard (2009) used 
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the gravity model to assess trade creation and trade diversion. Others like Aitken (1973) 
and Frankel (1997) captured regional trade agreement’s (RTA) effect using the gravity 
model. Soloaga and Winters (2001) studied the distinct effect of trade creation and trade 
diversion using dummy variables.  The basic gravity model in equation was augmented 
with additional variables. Aitken (1973) was the first to augment the basic model by 
adding a dummy variable (value of 1 if the trading countries belong to the same agreement 
regulation and zero otherwise) to study the effect of a Preferential Trade Agreement 
(PTA) on trade. The study showed that PTA members have a positive effect on bilateral 
trade among its members. Other authors that studied the PTA effect, besides those 
mentioned above, include Hamilton and Winters (1992), Frankel and Wei (1994) and 
Pusterla (2007). Feenstra (2004) used the gravity model to assess the impact of additional 
variables like sharing of borders between the trading countries, common language used, 
and membership in RTA.  
Sen et al. (2013) recently studied bilateral trade using the augmented gravity 
model. The authors also studied the effect of PTA on intra-regional trade within ASEAN 
plus six members. Linders and de Groot (2006) argued that a logarithmic transformation 
of the gravity model will not hinder the estimation process. There were four PTA dummy 
variables that augmented the model. 
  There are also other variables that have augmented the gravity model. Among 
them is testing the effect of infrastructure on bilateral trade (Saputra, 2014). The 
infrastructure variable can have a negative or positive effect on exports. Good  
infrastructure is expected to reduce costs, thus promoting exports. On the other hand, if 
the state of the infrastructure is poor, it would be costly for exporters to export their goods, 
thus this acts as a deterrent in promoting trade. Hence, the coefficient of the infrastructure 
variable may be positive or negative depending on the quality of the infrastructure.  
Another important variable is the effect of exchange rate on trade which is commonly 
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studied using the gravity model. Cieslik et al. (2012) studied the exchange rate effect 
using gravity model. Others who studied the exchange rate’s effect on bilateral trade 
include Ullah and Khan (2014), Jafari et al. (2011), Wang and Ji (2006) and Kwack et al. 
(2007). 
The exchange rate variable studies a currency’s volatile (appreciation and 
depreciation) impact  on bilateral trade. Currency depreciation (increase in exchange rate) 
in a country is expected to provide favourable conditions for exporting products as it is 
cheaper to export. On the contrary, currency appreciation would cause importing to 
become expensive, hence the affected country is expected to decrease its import of goods. 
As documented by Kwack et al. (2007), the renminbi appreciation contributed to a 
reduction in China’s trade surplus. 
Variables like common broader (Agostino et al., 2007, Warin et al., 2009; 
Normaz, 2010; Xu and Julian, 2012; Saputra, 2014), language (Xiong, 2012; Agostino et 
al., 2007; Warin et al., 2009; Normaz, 2010; Xu and Julian; 2012, MacPhee and 
Sattayanuwat, 2014), colony (Agostino et al., 2007; Warin et al., 2009), culture and export 
experience (Lawless, 2013) of the importing country have been augmented to the gravity 
model. 
  Peridy and Ghoneim (2013) studied the effects of NTMs on product categories  
pertaining to the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. The authors studied 
the effect of 16 NTMs on 10 product categories. The study found that NTMs contributed 
to significant impacts in certain MENA countries. The gravity model used in the study 
showed that NTMs contributed to a significant decrease in trade for a majority of the 
MENA countries. Hoekman and Zarrouk (2009), through a survey approach, identified 
NTMs’ negative effects on trade in MENA countries. 
 Others who studied NTMs using the gravity model include Carrere and de Melo 
(2011), Ghali et al. (2013), Rahman and Ara (2010), Walsh (2008), Xiaohua and Qiu 
 48 
 
(2012) and Sun et al. (2014). Walsh studied the total services trade which according to 
the author has similar outcomes to trade in goods when using the gravity model. The study 
found that the collective wealth of countries and a common language seem to be the most 
important determinants. However, there is a difference as in the trade of goods, distance 
was not a significant determinant as opposed to in trading of services. The NTM variable 
included in the model is found to be insignificant in trading of services. 
Rahman and Ara (2010) studied the transaction costs (TC) as a trade barrier to 
analyse trade flows of Bangladesh. Their study showed that TC is significantly related to 
trade and as expected has a negative sign denoting higher TC reduces bilateral trade. Bao 
and Qiu (2012) studied the effects of technical barrier to trade (TBT) on China’s exports. 
The study found that the TBT of a developing country has significant effects on the export 
patterns of other developing countries but it has no significant effect on a developed 
country’s export patterns. 
Challenges and limitations of the use of gravity models have been noted by Yotov 
et al., (2016).  Multilateral resistance is a challenge for researchers using grvity model in 
their study as the terms used to denote the construct are theorectical in nature which are 
not obersavable by both the researcher and policy maker.  Another limitation arise from 
the of the use of ordinary least square (OLS) to estimate gravity equation. The drawback 
of the OLS is it is unable derive information from zero trade flows because observations 
(information) gets dropped from the estimation sample when the value of trade is 
transformed  into a logarithmic data. According to the authors, this problem  zeroes 
become a serious issue when the trade data becomes more disaggregated. The authors 
also highlighted the problem of trade data plagued with heteroscedasticity in gravity 
equations where its presence can lead to biasness in estimates of the effects of trade costs 
and trade policy. Further, obtaining reliable estimates of effects of trade policy within the 
gravity model is a challenge, especially with regards of variables that are endogenous 
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where it is possible of these variables to interact with unobservable cross-section trade 
costs. The presence of fixed effects for importers and exporters is a cause of concern for 
researchers to estimate the effects of non-discriminatory trade policy such as export 
subsidies or most –favoured-nation, within the structural gravity model. The authors 
noted when fixed effects are present, the gravity model will not be able to  estimate the 
impact of any variable in situations where, i)  it affects the exporters’ propensity to export 
all destinations, ii) imports are measured by the variable without regard to origin and iii) 
representing sums, averages, and differences of country-specific variables. Lastly, 
although it is common practice to use aggregated trade data, it is should be avoided as the 
policies developed with these data may not be specific and not effective. Hence, it is  
important to use disaggregated data for effective policy development and implementation. 
The survey method is used to analyse and understand the perceived impact of 
NTMs. In many specialised literature on NTMs, surveys have been discussed as a 
quantitative method to evaluate their impact on trade. While the inventory approach is 
able to identify the type of NTMs, specific details could not be obtained.  Laird (1996) 
argued that surveys could give details that are more relevant by narrowing the scope. 
Deardorff and Stern (1997) implied that the estimates on NTMs must be done at the most 
disaggregated level possible. 
The WTO Trade Report (2012) used survey findings to confirm the prominent 
presence of TBT and SPS measures in developing and developed economies. Basu et al., 
(2012) used firm level questionnaire-based surveys to validate official information. The 
authors found that through the firm level survey database, information is clearly indicated 
on the measures imposed by trading partners. The World Bank (2008) found that surveys 
are able to identify specific information on trade barriers experienced by exporters. It 
further noted that through such surveys, countries with the least developed economies 
(LDCs), would be able to properly identify the difficulties (barriers to trade) faced by 
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their exporters and accordingly come up with action plans to resolve the concerns. Data 
on perceived barriers (obtained through surveys) provide valuable, complementing 
information to official data (such as TRAINS database) to identify measures that restrict 
trade. For example, the WTO (2012) informed that the conclusion on TBT and SPS 
measures often used by developed countries rather than developing countries are based 
on both econometric and survey evidence. Though TRAINS currently has the most 
comprehensive database on NTMs, according to Kee et al., (2004) it gives no indication 
of the ambiguity of specific NTMs. 
 World Bank (2008) surveys conducted on LDCs include 23 interviews with 
exporters in Cambodia and 40 interviews with Indonesia exporters. There was also a sum 
total of 96.7 percent response from 1000 questionnaires sent to Korean exporters, 44 
interviews with Laos exporters, 76 interviews with Peru exporters, 155 survey 
questionnaire responses from Singapore exporters, 105 survey questionnaire responses 
from Taiwan exporters and employees from 40 firms in Vietnam were interviewed. 
International Trade Centre (ITC) admits that it is only through surveys that there is the 
possibility of identifying specific non-tariff measures which businesses find as a 
constraint and burdensome to exporters. The survey identifies at product, sector and 
country-level, the problems that businesses face when complying with NTMs.  The NTMs 
studied by ITC include not only those imposed by other countries (importing countries) 
but also the bottlenecks in the exporting country that impede exports. ITC has conducted 
NTM surveys (completed or on-going) in a number of developing and least developed 
countries(LDCs). These countries include Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, 
Cambodia, Colombia, Cote D'Ivoire, Egypt, Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Jamaica, 
Kazakhstan,  Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Mauritius, Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, United Republic of Tanzania, Thailand, 
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Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and Uruguay. Table 2.1 shows the strengths and limitations 
of measurement methods 
   Table 2.1: Strengths and Limitations of NTM Measurement and Methods 
 
 
Method Strengths Limitations 
Inventory   It is a useful and easy method to determine the 
occurrence of NTMs and the frequency of 
various types of NTMs. 
 
  Complements well with other methods such as 
gravity model. 
 
  Can be used in the computation of the Trade 
Restrictiveness Index. 
 It does not show severity of NTMs’ impact 
and does not does not provide a 
quantification of the effect of regulations on 
trade per se . 
 
 Accounts only for the presence or absence of 
an NTM, without indicating the value of 
imports covered. 
 
 Endogeneity problem of the import value 
weights. 
Frequency    Convenient method to  
 determine the incidence of NTMs. 
 
  Data is useful to be used with other methods 
such as gravity model. 
 
 No endogeneity problem. 
 Import value not attached, only considers the 
presence and absence of an NTM in a product 
category. 
 
 Does not reflect the relative value of the 
affected products and thus cannot give any 
indication of the importance of the NTMs to 
an exporter overall, or, relatively, among 
export items. 
Gravity 
Model  
 It quantifies the effect of NTMs on trade 
flows. 
 
 A simple and widely used method to show 
trade flow patterns between countries. 
 
 It relies on a limited series of easily available 
data, which allows for its application to a large 
set of countries without relying on specific data 
collection.                                            
 There may be other factors other than 
NTMs for residual errors. 
 
 The negative effects in using this method 
range from the sensitivity of the results 
obtained to the specification of the gravity 
equation estimated, to the quality of the data 
and to the sample of countries. 
Computable 
General 
Equilibrium 
 Able to assess complex negotiation modalities 
in multilateral negotiations. 
 
 Widely used to study the likely effects of 
NTMs and development of trade policies. 
Helps in answering "what-if" questions by 
simulating the impact of trade policy changes 
on prices, incomes and substitution effects 
across products and sectors in equilibrium on 
markets under different assumptions. 
 May not have the features to detect beyond 
border NTMs and not easy to implement. 
 
 Assessment of supply-shift and demand shift 
effects, in a CGE context is much more 
complex. 
 
 Only extrapolate from existing trade data and 
interpretation of simulation results could be 
done hastily without understanding the 
reality of NTMs. 
Survey  Useful in identifying specific NTMs which 
might not be possible through other 
methods. 
 
 It is a costly approach and requires 
special skills to design and administer. 
 
  Data collection could be an arduous task 
and takes a long time 
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  Malaysia is not included in the survey yet.  As of January 2013, more than 16,000 
companies have been contacted and around 10,000 of these companies have been 
interviewed. This adds to the testimony that utilising the survey method to understand 
NTMs faced by exporters is an important approach in this area. Survey data is used to 
measure the stringency of NTMs. Moenius (2004), Kox and Lejour (2005), Fontagne et 
al. (2005), Gebrehiwet et al. (2007) and Winchester et al. (2012), have studied the impact 
of SPS standards and other NTMs on trade by using indices on explanatory variables in 
gravity models. However, the stringency index derived from the perceptions of exporters 
on NTMs was discussed by Melo et al.,(2014). The authors derived the stringency index 
based on the perception of exporters on the sanitary, phytosanitary, and quality (SPSQ) 
standards along the 0-7 Likert scale. The aggregate stringency index that captures all 
NTMs was calculated as a simple average of the stringency perception. 
 
2.6   NTMs AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ TRADE 
  Henson and Loader (2001) noted that the reduction in tariffs by developed 
countries on imports from developing countries has been impressive ranging from 26 
percent to 48 percent. However, this reduction in tariff does not provide proof of trade 
liberalisation for developing countries to a major extent. Asian countries’ exports to 
developed countries like US, EU, Japan, and Canada have to comply to NTMs even for 
products that have comparative advantage such as food, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
textiles, leather and engineering products. NTMs faced by Asian countries are mainly in 
the forms of TBT, sanitary regulation, quotas, packaging, labelling, technical standards, 
labour and environmental standards and testing an inspection (OECD, 2005). A firm level 
study by Baller (2007), conducted in both industrial and developing countries consistently 
identified technical regulations as the main NTMs.  A study by Chen et al. (2006) on firm 
level analysis found that testing procedures and lengthy inspection reduce exports of 
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developing countries by 9 percent and 3 percent respectively, and that standards reduce 
the likelihood of exporting to more than three markets by 7 percent. It seems that TMs 
are the main concern for developing countries. TMs are defined by Roberts and De 
Kremer (1997) as: 
Standards governing the sale of products in national markets 
which have as their prima facie objective the correction of market 
inefficiencies stemming from externalities associated with the 
production, distribution and consumption of these products. 
 
The proliferation of TMs can be established through the increasing rate of its 
notifications year by year (1981-1998) according to a report by GATT/WTO (OECD, 
1997). Especially in the case of agricultural and food exports, a prerequisite to 
successfully export trade is the compliance to TMs (Horton, 1998). It is widely 
acknowledged that SPS measures can impede trade in agricultural and food products as 
theorised by Petrey and Johnson (1993), Thilmany and Barrett (1997), Gordon and  
Marter (1997). The impact of SPS measures can be conveniently grouped into three 
categories. Firstly, they can prohibit trade by imposing an import ban or by exorbitantly 
increasing production and marketing costs. Secondly, they can divert trade from one 
trading partner to another by laying down regulations that discriminate across supplies. 
Finally, they can reduce overall trade flows by increasing costs or raising barriers for all 
potential suppliers. For these reasons, SPS measures are prominent issues for developing 
countries (UNCTAD, 1997; Singh, 1994; Henson and Loader, 1999). 
The TMs associated with risk related or non-risk related externalities were 
discussed by Roberts et al., (1999). Policy instruments for TMs are used to correct market 
failures (Caswell and Henson, 1997). Governments can resort to the use of ex-post TMs 
to redress market failures should the buyer’s interest is violated. They can adopt ex-ante 
TMs such as bans, technical standards or information requirements to remedy failures in 
the market. According to Caswell and Henson (1997), governments tend to use the ex-
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ante measures to control market failures as the measures related to ex-post are usually not 
sufficient to provide the required level of protection. UNCTAD (2010) also showed that 
developing countries are not equipped to face the NTMs imposed on their exports. These 
include their inability to assess the implications of developed countries’ requirements, 
participate effectively in dispute settlement procedures and demonstrate that their 
(developing countries) measures match the requirements imposed by developed countries 
(Bellanawitha et al., 2009, as cited in Saini, 2011). 
Based on the discussion above, it is important to study the NTMs faced by firms 
in developing countries for a better understanding of the implications of NTMs in the 
global trade business. Developing countries have potentially a comparative advantage 
over developed countries in the food and agricultural sectors (Murphy and Shleifer, 1997; 
Edwards, 1992). In 1994, 72.5 percent of developed countries imported agricultural 
products from developing countries (UNCTAD, 1997). The developing countries can be 
better integrated in the global trading system through exploitation of their national and 
regional comparative advantages (Bathrick, 1998). Henson and Loader (2001) argued that 
the ability of developing countries to expand their market globally and integrate into the 
world trading system depends on their ability to meet the global trade demands which 
includes pricing, quality, and standards. Developing countries, however, could end up 
spending substantial amounts of money in order to comply to NTMs. Jakubiak et al. 
(2006) and Wilson and Otsuki (2004) revealed that 3.85 percent of production costs was 
spent on compliance and average costs of customs clearance was 6.95 percent of total 
export value. 
Malaysia being a developing country would require studies on NTMs both at 
national and firm levels, which at the moment are scarce. There is no firm level study on 
NTMs’ effects on trade involving Malaysian exporters. However, there are a few studies 
conducted on determinants of Malaysia’s exports. Mohd and Murni (2012) studied the 
 55 
 
effects of having memberships in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) on 
Malaysian exports. The study included GDP of OIC member countries, FDI Malaysia, 
local population size, exchange rate, price ratios, distance and boarder variables in the 
gravity model. It was found that these variables were the main determinants of Malaysia’s 
exports. However, NTMs’ effect was not studied.  
Another study was conducted by Normaz (2010) on the role of language on 
Malaysian exports. The research indicated that countries with a common language, trade 
more and costs involved in information search is therefore reduced. It further noted that 
Chinese languages generally have wider acceptance among Asian countries. Haque et al. 
(2013) studied Malaysia’s furniture exports and found that the size of the market that 
goods were exported to and the competitive aspect of this trade contributed positively to 
Malaysia’s furniture export. However, trade barriers were not analysed in this study. 
No study has thus far been conducted on NTMs effect on firms’ levels of export 
with regards to Malaysia’s exporters. In this study, the firm’s level of export is studied 
along with the NTMs. Generally, the impact of NTMs on firm size is studied, but in this 
study besides the firm size, the level of export is also explored. This study focuses on the 
perceived criticality and stringency of NTMs. The identification of NTMs that a firm 
considers important for its export is critical while the stringency of NTMs refers to the 
strictness of the measures which may vary across exporting countries.  
Generally NTMs are accepted as measures that can distort trade. However, the 
level of strictness of the NTMs on export level needs to be studied. The stringency of the 
a similar NTM imposed across countries may vary greatly due to a number of reasons. 
For example, this could happen due to non-harmonisation of the NTM requirements 
(Moenius, 2004; Chen and Mattoo, 2008 and Czubala et al., 2009). An exporter may find 
the stringency of the same NTM imposed differently across the exported countries. For 
example, the imposition of maximum residue limits (MRL) on imports of oranges by 
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Argentina, Brazil, Chile  and Columbia (Cadot et al., 2015) reflect the varying stringency 
of such an imposed measure. The Codex Alimentarius is an authorised international 
impartial reference for MRLs. It lists MRLs for 83 chemicals. However, Argentina 
imposes MRLs on 79 different chemicals, Brazil imposes MRLs on 101 different 
chemicals, Chile on 110 and Columbia on 72. It shows that Brazil and Chile are more 
stringent in imposing the MRLs compared to Argentina and Columbia on the import of 
oranges. Studies on the impact stringent CPs, other non-tariff measures, and private 
measures on trade exist in the literature, however,  the effect of these measures on 
Malaysia’s exports is less known.  
 
2.7  RESPONSE STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY EXPORTERS 
 When faced with NTMs, exporters usually make decisions that affect their 
business situation. In the discussion of the behaviour of exporters when faced with NTMs, 
the Hirschman (1970) model has become an important literary work to be referred to. The 
response strategies widely adopted in the field of trade are attributed to Hirschman’s study 
of the behaviour of individuals, members of an organisations and collective actors in the 
context of them facing deteriorating situations. In his study, Hisrchman (1970) derived 
three options as response behaviours. These three response behaviours are exit, loyalty, 
and voice.  
 According to Hirschman (1970), the exit option is pursued when outside options 
are available. In the case of organisations, the exit choice of the current situation seems 
viable when other operating environments are available. The voice response behaviour 
happens when organisations are faced with constraints in specific market environments 
but do not wish to exit. In this scenario, the organisations will voice their concerns in 
order to influence the constituents to improve the environment. The third option is loyalty. 
This option is pursued when organisations decide to withstand and comply to constraints 
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imposed on them by the environment that they do business. In such a context, 
organisations remain in business.  
In adapting the Hirschman’s (1970) model, Henson and Jaffee (2008) used the 
response strategies but included a dimension to his framework i.e. ex-ante ‘proactive’ 
behaviours (anticipating standards) or ex-post ’reactive’ behaviours (waiting and 
adapting). For them, the ‘exit’ and ‘reactive’ combination of behaviours are considered 
to be the most negative options. With these dimensions added to the Hirschman’s options, 
the behaviour options have now been expanded into six aspects which are exit-reactive, 
exit-proactive, loyalty-reactive, loyalty-proactive, voice-reactive and voice-proactive. 
This study uses the Henson and Jaffee’s (2008) model to examine the export 
behaviours of Malaysian exporters. Examination of the behaviour options pursued by 
Malaysian exporters will add to the scare literature available in this area, especially in the 
context of exporters from developing nations like Malaysia. 
 
2.8  SUMMARY AND RESEARCH GAPS 
 NTMs have become an important agenda in international trade. The arguments 
put forth from various authors point towards reducing trade potential in particular exports 
from developing countries. However, there is evidence that NTMs do enhance trade 
meaning that the extent and nature of the effects of NTMs remains inconclusive. More 
studies are required, especially at the firm level in developing countries to strengthen the 
position of NTMs’ impact on trade. Studies in this area are mainly based on NTMs of 
public nature which are classified by UNCTAD as version 12. However, those that are 
not classified under UNCTAD such as information asymmetry as well as culture and 
private standards require much attention. Research on the role of private standards of 
exporters in developing countries is rare and thus far, no study has been undertaken in the 
case of Malaysian exporters. Hence, research on the role of private standards in the case 
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of Malaysian exporters is significant, especially if it  facilitates penetration into foreign 
markets. The research will also demonstrate the extent to which the private standards are 
superior to public standards in importing countries. This research aims to answer the 
following queries; Firstly, do standards help differentiate Malaysian products in foreign 
markets and do they provide a competitive advantage? Secondly, what are the challenges 
that Malaysian exporters experience and how they respond to public standards’ 
requirements? Next, how are all these impact export decisions made and does the decision 
making process really matter for Malaysian exporters? Finally, which sectors are 
affected? To date, there are not many studies in the literature on response behaviour of 
export firms with respect to NTMs. In Malaysia, such an investigation has not been 
conducted till present time. Hence, understanding the response approach of Malaysian 
exporters is the key in developing a framework and creating policies to boost and enhance 
the export trade in Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER 3 : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 The research methodology chapter discusses the conceptual framework for the 
study which is explained in section 2. This section also presents the framework on 
strategic responses on NTMs. Section 3 covers the discussion on gravity on trade flow. 
Section 4  explains the survey method and the multinomial logistic regression method. 
The specification for the multinomial regression logistics for the empirical models for the 
survey data as well as the stringency computation is provided in this section. This section 
also continues with discussion on questionnaire design, survey administration flowchart, 
interviews conducted and diagnostic tests (including multicollinearity test details). 
 
3.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 The conceptual framework used for this study is given in Figure 3.1. The topic 
of NTMs is embedded in the realm of international trade subject; hence theories on 
international trade become an important aspect of the NTM conceptual framework. 
Trade barriers in the form of protectionism have been in place and practiced since time 
immemorial. 
 The variables or the elements included in the framework are to assess the 
relationship between NTMs and exports. Numerous studies have examined NTMs 
impact on exports, including by trade organisations such as WTO and UNCTAD. 
However, the impact of NTMs is not fully one-sided, where the predominant view is 
that it affects trade negatively.  Some studies have found otherwise; where NTMs 
enhance exports (Maskus et al., 2001; World Bank, 2005; van Tongeren et al., 2009; 
Neeliah et al., 2013 and Rial, 2014). As shown in the conceptual framework below, this 
study aims to examine NTMs’ impact on exports.  
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 Two approaches are used to examine the relations in this framework which are 
the gravity model and survey. The gravity model uses data from TRAINS for 2000-
2013 period and the survey approach uses data collected between the period of June and 
December 2014 from 143 export firms in Malaysia. For the survey data, the exports are 
categorised into 4 levels - ‘25 percent and less’, ‘26-50 percent’, ’51-75 percent’ and 
‘more than 75 percent’. 
  
 
The framework explains that NTMs could be accountable for a sharp increase in 
costs through transport and marketing costs (Melitz, 2003). This can be seen as the reason 
why some firms decide not to export. Pertaining to this, the Melitz (2003) model was 
developed to explain export decision at firm level. Melitz studied export decisions at the 
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firm level. The role of NTMs on export decisions by firms is quite clear. NTMs can incur 
costs to firms and consequently this effects their export decisions. The key features of 
Melitz’s model are as follows;  
i) producer of heterogeneity and fixed costs of exporting  
ii) at any period of time, there are existing firms or establishments 
distributed over sectors, productivity, countries and export status 
iii) productivity is stochastic and generates movements of 
establishments (or firms or plants) into and out of exporting 
iv)  unproductive firms also shut down 
v) new establishments are created by incurring sunk cost. 
 
The theory deals with firms deciding to export based on their marginal cost (MC) 
as the threshold level. If MC is higher in doing business in the domestic market, the 
possibility is that firms exit. When MC is higher in serving export markets and lower in 
domestic markets, the firms will not decide to export but remain domestic market players. 
Firms decide to expand into international markets when MC (marginal costs) to do 
business in the international markets is lower than the threshold level.  
The model by Melitz helps explain the connection between the marginal costs and 
standards faced by exporters. Understanding the kind of responses by the exporters in 
facing the challenges (in the form of standards and regulations) will have significant 
implication on theoretical understanding of trade and trade policies. Melitz further 
explained how international trade can impact firms with regards to inter-firm reallocation 
of resources within an industry. The model explains that market trades tends to favour the 
more productive firms to export while those firms that are not productive are forced to 
exit. The model further argues that the situation of those firms that are productive and 
increase their exports; and those that are not and exit, leads to the reallocation of resources 
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towards those firms that are productive. The model also explains that more profits are 
achieved by firms with higher productivity. 
Asymmetry in information hampers trade and creates negative effects in trade. 
According to Akerlof (1970), it gives rise to low quality products traded in export markets 
which in turn reduces the quantity traded due to low demand. Hence, exporters emphasise 
the importance of signalling their quality of products exported to avoid adverse market 
effects. Chiang and Mason (1988) showed that imperfect information (causing 
information asymmetry) between buyers and sellers led to  consumers in export markets 
discriminating against products from developing countries, especially countries that 
lacked brand presence globally. In this regard, studies concerning information asymmetry 
(InfoAsym) on exports from developing countries are limited. This study aims to fill this 
gap by studying the effects of InfoAsym on export levels of a developing country. 
Information and transparency of information on standards, specifications and 
requirements have significant effect on exports of a country, more so for developing 
countries. Trade theories seem to not have examined/studied the role of information in 
trade simply because it is not a NTM (with regard to UNCTAD’s NTM classification). 
TRAINS therefore does not document exporters’ concerns related to the lack of proper 
information to facilitate their trade. Hence, it is difficult for researchers to contribute 
significant findings using secondary data such as from TRAINS. This predicament 
therefore, can be studied only through a survey based approach. 
NTMs labelling requirements are in place for exporters to inform consumers about 
product standards and quality. Labels inform buyers on how the product was produced 
including testing and certification process undergone in making  a specific product. This 
information gives a sense of assurance to buyers about the quality of the product being 
sold. In the case of exporters from developing countries, they suffer from pre-conception 
of the product quality held by buyers especially in developed countries. Hence, these 
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exporters face difficulty in effectively signalling their product quality. Signalling theory 
also dwells on the importance of information transparency to exporters in order to conduct 
business in importing countries. Maertens and Swinnen (2009) and Leland (1979) implied 
that asymmetry in information adversely impacts exports.  
Private standards of measures are not included as an NTM under UNCTAD’s 
classification. They are also not dealt with in the TRAINS. It could be the case where 
information on private standards of measures may not be easily accessible. This can be a 
major hindrance for exporters. More empirical investigations on the private standards of 
measures as a trade barrier is deemed necessary. Using the Malaysian exporters’ survey 
results as a platform, data on the effect of private standards of measures is hoped to be 
obtained. 
The framework also includes a study by Haveman et al. (2003) on NTMs types 
which are price, quantity reduction, quality restrictions, and threat of retaliation. These 
effects are studied to identify and understand which are the NTM type faced by Malaysian 
exporters. As an example, the price effect is there will be an increase in price of good 
exporters due to increase in costs. This NTM effect could hamper exporters’ 
competiveness in the export market. Quantity reduction could be due to imposition of 
quotas, as one of the measures. The reduction in quantity exported may cause exporters 
to face higher costs of production due to no effect of economies of scale. Hence, in this 
context, the exporter’s price is usually higher and becomes less competitive. The quality 
restrictions are due to standards; both public and private standards which are imposed on 
exporters. They have to comply with these standards in order to market their goods. In 
complying to the required standards, exporters usually face increased costs, which cause 
the products to become more costlier when exporting to other countries. This could 
impede trade flow. The last NTM effect is threat of retaliation which usually happens 
when export markets impose serious anti-dumping laws to deter anti-dumping measures 
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from exporting countries. The NTM effects explained will be examined to determine 
which are the types faced by Malaysian exporters. This could be a significant contribution 
in the study of NTMs and exports especially as it concerns a developing country like 
Malaysia. 
 This research framework studies the response strategies of exporters from 
Malaysia when they face NTMs. The conceptual framework used to analyse the strategy 
pursued by Malaysian exporters upon facing NTMs is based on Hirschman’s (1970) 
conceptual framework. It discusses three response strategy concepts which are ‘exit’, 
‘loyalty’ and ‘voice’ in analysing the behaviours of firms facing declining situation. In 
this context, NTMs could be a possible cause for the ‘decline situation’. Henson and 
Jaffee (2008) included a time dimension to the framework (see Table 3.1) to denote the 
existence of a time factor for compliance efforts. The time dimension inclusion to the 
original framework informs whether the exporters pursue the exit, loyal and voice out 
strategies in a reactive or proactive manner. This conceptual model is adopted in studying 
the response strategies pursued by Malaysian exporters. 
 
Table 3.1: Strategic Response to NTMs (Henson and Jaffee, 2008) 
Complain about existing 
and new NTMs   
Participate in NTM 
creation and/ or negotiate 
before they are imposed    
Exit 
Loyalty 
 Voice 
Wait for NTMs and exit   Anticipate NTM’s impact 
and leave some markets   
Wait for NTMs and 
comply   
Reactive Proactive 
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           Table 3.1 shows three strategic response options pursued by exporters when faced 
with constraints in their exports in the export market. The ‘exit’ strategic response occurs 
when exporters find NTMs imposed in a particular export market is difficult to comply 
with and decide to exit that market. They may divert to lesser stringent markets with 
regards to NTMs or focus on domestic markets or in some cases leave the business. 
Firms choose to be reactive and exit the market as a strategic action only when an 
NTM is imposed on them. They wait until the NTMs are imposed and subsequently exit 
the market. Some firms exit the export market before the NTMs are imposed. They 
anticipate the NTMs to be critical to them and decide to exit due to lack of resources and 
the ability to comply with the set regulations. Firms that continue to do business in the 
export market despite the imposition of NTMs, pursue the ‘loyalty’ strategic response. 
Being reactive or proactive, these firms continue to make their products present in the 
export market. Being proactive is a better option because they anticipate the NTMs to be 
imposed and ensure that they take necessary action to comply with the requirements ahead 
of time. Reactive response could be disadvantageous as it could cause delay and 
inefficiency to market their products in the export market.  
The last option is voicing about their predicament to the regulators and authorities 
like WTO due to the NTMs imposed. This is when exporters are unhappy with the NTMs 
imposed and make known their grouses. Firms do this reactively and proactively. 
Reactively when they complain only regarding the NTMs imposed on them while 
proactively is when they protest or complain ahead of the time that the NTMs are 
imposed. Henson and Jaffee studied the Kenya and Indian export firms and found that all 
firms that exited in this instance, did so reactively. Chemnitz (2007) and Henson and 
Jaffee highlighted that opting for one of these various options depends on several factors 
which include country, market, firm levels and the requirements arising from NTMs 
imposed.  
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Control variables used in this study are firm type, size, age and firm ownership. 
The most common control variables used in research are firm size and age. Talebnya et 
al.(2009) used firm size and age as control variables to study ownership structure and firm 
performance of Tehran’s public listed companies. Mercedes et al. (2014) also used firm 
size and age as control variables in their study of board characteristics and firm 
performance. Fu and Jia (2012) used these control variables in their study as well. 
According to the authors, firm size was one of the first variables to be used as a necessary 
control variable in studying the relationship between variables. 
 
3.3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 This section explains the gravity method and multinomial logistic (MNL) as its 
two empirical approaches. 
 
3.3.1 Gravity Method 
 Gravity model is used in this study to analyse data on NTMs derived from 
TRAINS. The model has been in use since 1962, where Tinbergen introduced it to 
measure the impact of NTMs in his seminal work (Tinbergen, 1962; Poyhonen, 1963). 
The model has been widely used to approximate the effects of institutions such as customs 
union and exchange rate mechanisms on trade flow. The model specifies an equation that 
measures  bilateral trade flows between any two nations using the proximity and their 
sizes, which are represented by the GDP. Though the model is useful in explaining 
bilateral trade flows, it is not without criticism as it lacks a theoretical basis. Despite 
criticisms, the gravity model is well-suited for empirical studies and as such is noted for 
its suitability for policy analysis (Haris and Matyas, 1998). This is evident in many 
empirical studies, among which are works by Tinbergen (1962), Linnemann (1966), 
Aitken (1973), Thursby and Thursby (1987), Matyas (1997) and Chen and Wall (2005).  
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Furthermore, this method has been proven to be very important in the analysis of 
bilateral trade flows and has been widely used in empirical literature to explain bilateral 
trade and export determinants (UNCTAD, 2013 and Hatab et al., 2010). Many studies 
have used the gravity model with augmented variables and found that the model is 
relevant to explain the impact of NTM on trade flow. These studies include Martinez-
Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2003), Hassan (2001), Sohn (2005),  Bussiere and 
Schnatz (2006) and Huot and Kakinaka (2007).  Deardorff (1995) has shown that the 
gravity model can be justified from traditional trade theories. Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) stressed that the gravity model is one of the most empirically successful trade 
analytical tools in economics. 
For this reason, the gravity model approach is used to estimate the impact of 
NTMs on exports for pooled data from TRAINS for the period of 2000 – 2013. Aggregate 
data is used to detect the NTMs. Firstly, using secondary data, this study explores the 
NTM effect on overall trade in two sectors - agriculture and manufacture (industry). It is 
not the intent of this study to look at specific commodities within the sector which would 
require disaggregated trade data. This is due to the paucity of data at commodity level, 
hence it is inappropriate to analyse the commodity-wise effect. Gourdan (2014) noted that 
NTMs should be estimated using product-level trade data, but if data is rarely available 
or insufficient at such a level of disaggregation, estimation of the effects would be 
difficult. For example, data extracted from the WTO I-TIP show that from 2000-2013 , 
there were more than 20 commodities exported to EU. Secondly, given the large variation 
in the commodity type and lack of sufficient trade data, estimating the commodity-wise 
effects may produce results which are too dispersed thereby could weaken estimation and 
may mislead trade policy makers.   
Thirdly, little variation is noted at product level which would contribute to 
multicollinearity problem. This is noted by Carerra and de Melo (2011) where the authors 
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argued that little variation in NTM for a given product/commodity makes identification 
of the effects of NTMs much more difficult. Lastly, the presence of zero trade is observed 
across many products exported by Malaysia. Conducting analysis with incomplete and 
insufficient data such as this would result in biasness in NTMs’ estimates. This is noted 
by Martin and Pham (2015) where zero trade record is a common feature in bilateral trade 
data. They further observed that this was frequently seen across country-pairs and 
products. The authors also stated that zero trade flows can be largely seen when 
disaggregated trade data are used. Heteroscedasticity is also an econometric problem 
associated with gravity equation models. Using Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood 
(PPML) method can solve the heteroscedasticity issue, but if zero trade observations are 
frequent, the results would still yield bias estimates. Jayasinghe et al., (2010) concurs to 
this, noting that PPML is not a good estimation method if excessive zeroes are present. 
The basic gravity model as specified by Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963) 
is as follows: 
/ tanit jijt t ijtGDP GDP Dis ceX 
                  (3.1) 
Where, ijt
X
 is the value of bilateral trade between country i and j at time t. itGDP and 
jtGDP  are country i and j’s respective income at time t. The distance between two  
countries are measured by tan ijtDis ce .The α is a constant of proportionality. When 
equation (1) is transformed into logarithmic form, a linear model equation is given as 
below: 
   1 2 tanijt it jt ijt ijtlnX ln GDP GDP ln Dis ce            (3.2) 
where, α, 1 and 2  are coefficients to be estimated. The ijt is the error term that captures 
any other shocks and chance events that may affect bilateral trade between the two 
countries. The core gravity model equation is in line with the imperfect competition trade 
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model and the Hecksher-Ohlin model which argues that bilateral trade is positively 
related to income and negatively related to distance. 
The population variable is augmented for both the export and import countries. 
The inclusion of distance as an explanatory variable is due to the following reasons: 
i. Distance is a good measure of transport costs. Transport costs are 
function of the distance between trading countries. The further the 
distance, transport cost becomes higher leading to high trading 
costs. Hence, the distance variable is a proxy for transport costs. 
So, a negative coefficient is expected for the distance variable. 
ii.  Distance is a good indicator of elapsed time during shipment. 
Hence the variable is used in the model to measure time in transit 
of goods shipped. For example, for the survival intact of perishable 
goods, the probability is a decreasing function of time in transit. 
iii. Distance variable is used to measure costs incurred to find trading 
opportunities and build relationships with potential trade partners. 
iv. Distance variable can be used to measure the cultural proximity 
where the further the distance between two trading countries, the 
further is the cultural differences. 
Over time, the basic gravity model with the natural logarithms of income, population and 
distance has been augmented with several other variables that account for factors that may 
affect trade such as real exchange rate and dummy variables for economic or custom 
union, common language, common boarders, or historical relationships among countries. 
In addition to this, the gravity model can also be used to measure the effect of government 
and private policies on trade flow between countries. 
The basic gravity model in this study will be augmented with NTMs variables that 
account for factors that affect trade flow. The data on NTMs is derived from the TRAINS 
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database. Studies have been carried out using data from the TRAINS database (Kee et al., 
2009; Anderson and Neary, 2003; Deardorff and Stern, 1997). However, it can be 
expected that information on NTMs is limited and one cannot expect extensive data on 
NTMs for Malaysia because its exporters do not frequently report the NTMs that they 
face. The existing data on NTMs will be used to estimate its impact on trade flow.  
Most gravity models considered for the study on trade flow effect include GDP, 
distance and population as common variables. This study will also consider the effect of 
NTMs on trade flow from the industry level and exports to other regions. Hence, the basic 
gravity model is augmented to include these variable effects on trade flow. The following 
are the models that explain the above. Using the secondary data from TRAINS, the gravity 
model measures the industrial and agricultural sectors’ influence on trade flow. The 
model includes these variables as shown below: 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
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    (3.4) 
The model also measures the impact of exports to other regions. Due to the limitation of 
data in TRAINS, the regions measured in the model are; ASEAN, Japan and European 
Union. Hence the model taking on these variables are as follows: 
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lnX lnGDP lnGDP lnPOP lnPOP lnDST
ADJ TRF ECR DASEAN ECR DEU
ECR DJPN
     
   
 
      
   

     (3.5)    
where, Xijt is country i’s exports to country j’s in year t;  
GDP = real GDP 
POP = population 
DST = distance between economic centres of i and j 
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ADJ = common border between i and j (dummy variable equal to 1 if i and j share a border 
and 0 otherwise) 
TRF = tariff rate  
ECR = export coverage ratio (used interchangeably with frequency counts, denoted as 
frequency counts (FC))  
DAGRI = dummy variable equal to one for agricultural products (HS01-24) and 0 
otherwise   
DIND = dummy variable equal to one for industrial products (HS25-99) and 0 otherwise 
DASEAN = dummy variable equal to one for ASEAN countries and 0 otherwise  
DEU = dummy variable equal to one for EU15 countries and 0 otherwise; 
ε = error term, that picks up other influences on bilateral trade 
α = constant term 
 
3.3.2 Data: Source and Summary Description 
Data was sourced from the databases of UNCTAD, TRAINS and WTO. The 
WTO’s database on NTMs is based on infrequent and incomplete notification by its 
members. Apart from this, data was also directly obtained from firms involved in the 
export trade market in Malaysia via survey. The TRAINS database provides 
information on NTMs which can be accessed by any interested party. The existing 
database is one way to identify the presence of NTMs (Bora et al., 2002). This approach 
is also known as the inventory approach which lists the frequency of NTMs faced by 
exporters. However, data on NTMs in the TRAINS is not extensive for developing 
countries, including Malaysia. The data, besides being insufficient, is also not consistent 
(CIES, 2006) rendering it difficult for any kind of analysis which according to CIES is 
burdensome and time consuming.  
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This study uses the TRAINS to derive information on NTMs and the 
measurements derived are frequency (F) and export coverage (EC) ratio. These 
measurements usually are used to provide an indication of on the type of NTMs 
employed in trade market. On the frequency ratio as a measurement method of NTMs, 
it has been noted that frequency (F) sometimes cannot be a good method used to 
measure the trade effects attributed by NTMs (OECD, 1996; Walkenhorst, 2004). It 
may also be subjected to aggregation biasness (Linkins and Arce, 2002) when tracing 
the NTMs’ effects on a particular industry. The authors also noted using the frequency 
approach may not provide information pertaining to NTMs’ effect on quantities 
imported, process or trade flows. Measuring the impact of NTMs using the frequency 
method may produce misleading information as the NTMs effects may not correlate 
with the estimated tariff equivalents (McGuire et al., 2002). 
The EC ratio measures a country’s export that is subject to a particular NTM or a 
particular group of NTMs (OECD, 1996). However, the coverage ratio does not measure 
the extent of the effect of a particular NTM on overall imports. Its effect on prices, 
production, consumption and import values cannot be determined as well (Clark and 
Zarrilli, 2001). The coverage ratio method is a widely used method (Pritchett, 1996). 
However, it is acknowledged that this method suffers from endogeneity problem. 
Therefore, to check the sensitivity of the results, the frequency counts (FC) method is 
used as an alternative measure. Although the coverage ratio method is criticized for not 
being able to detect the seriousness of NTMs, the information, nevertheless, can be 
exploited for establishing initial trade policy framework before getting into the specifics. 
For this purpose, the coverage ratio is a method that can be used with ease.   
 
 73 
 
3.4 SURVEY BASED METHOD 
 In addition to the data collected from TRAINS, data was also collected from 
exporters through a survey to complement and strengthen the discussion. 
 
 3.4.1    Data From Survey on Exporters 
            In addition to the TRAINS database that is used to collect data on NTM 
incidences, a survey of NTMs imposed on exporters in Malaysia was also conducted. 
As evident in the discussion above, the methods used in estimating the impact of NTMs 
have limitations. The survey based approach is a useful way to overcome these 
limitations. The survey approach is adopted when other sources of information are 
lacking. Coupled with interviews, the survey approach can measure the effects from 
numerous aspects in contrast to other methods. The survey based approach provides 
good information on barriers faced by developing countries. For example, this approach 
can uncover critical information on the barriers faced by exporters in Malaysia when 
exporting products to United States and European countries as well as barriers faced in 
their own country  such as administrative ones. 
 
3.4.2  Questionnaire Design 
 Survey method provides first-hand information on NTMs. Laird (1996) noted that 
surveys can narrow the scope of information gathered regarding the NTMs. The World 
Bank (2008) also stressed that through surveys, information on specific NTMs faced by 
exporters can be obtained. The list of exporters was obtained from the Malaysia External 
Trade Development Corporation’s (MATRADE) website. The website list of exporters 
was reviewed and validated for correctness of information before used in the survey. 
There are 23 industries or sectors listed as per Table 3.2 below; 
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 The  industries were later grouped into resource-based and non-resource-based for 
analysis purpose. The grouping of firms is based on national classification system for the 
manufacturing sector. Resource-based firms include food, beverages, and tobacco, wood 
products, paper products, chemicals and related industries, plastic products, petroleum 
products, rubber products, and non-metallic mineral products. 
Table 3.2: List of Sectors 
Industry/Sector Industry/Sector 
1 Agricultural Products 13 Medical, Scientific, Measuring 
Equipment & Parts 
2 Building Hardware, Building 
Supplies & Products 
14 Non-Ferrous Metals Products 
3 Chemicals, Petrochemicals & 
Pharmaceuticals 
15 Photographic, Cinematographic, 
Video & Optical 
4 Palm & Palm Kernel Oil 
Products 
16 Rubber Products 
5 Plastic Products 17 Souvenirs, Handicrafts & 
Giftware 
6 Pulp, Paper & Paperboard 
Products 
18 Sports Goods & Equipment 
7 Clay/Sand-based & Non-
Metallic Mineral Products 
19 Supporting Products 
8 Food & Beverage Products 20 Textile & Textile Products 
9 Electrical, Electronic Product 
Components & Parts 
21 Toys 
10 Furniture Products 22 Transport Equipment, 
Components & Accessories 
11 Iron & Steel Products 23 Wood & Wood Products 
12 Machinery & Machinery 
Components 
  
 
Non-resource-based firms refer to textiles and apparel, basic metal, machinery, 
electrical and electronics, transport equipment, and others. In terms of firm size, small 
firms refer to establishments with full-time employees of 5 – 74 persons, medium-sized 
firms are those with 75 -199 employees and large firms are those with 200 or more full-
time employees.  Although data on sales turnover is available from the survey, firm 
size, as employed in the study is solely based on the number of employees that firms 
have. From the ownership perspective, foreign owned firms are those with more than 
 75 
 
50 percent foreign equity. As there is no standard classification for firm experience or 
firm age, the firms are classified into less than 5 years in operation, 5-10 years in 
operation and more than 10 years in operation. Firms that are more than 10 years in 
existence are considered to be established or mature firms, as per the literature. 
The survey comprises of two parts; the administration of the questionnaire is the 
first part and the second part consists of the interviews. The purpose of the interview is 
to explain to potential respondents about the survey which includes a briefing on NTMs 
as well as the importance of this survey. The survey instrument has several parts in it. 
These parts are explained in the table below: 
 
Table 3.3: Parts in Questionnaire 
 
 
 
In relation to the distribution and collection of the questionnaire, mail and online 
surveys or mixed-mode surveys were two data gathering techniques used in this study. 
The mixed-mode survey is also at times referred to as a “hybrid” survey as noted by 
Burns and Bush (2006). According to the authors, the mixed-mode survey approach has 
become a popular survey technique. The popularity of the mixed-mode surveys is due 
to the use of online survey research (Burns and Bush, 2006). These data gathering 
techniques were used to give respondents more than one option in documenting their 
Part 1 Introduction to the survey which includes survey purpose and 
importance. 
Part 2 Demographic details such as the industry/sector that the firm 
belongs to, nature of ownership, years in operation, firm size, 
annual turnover, location of firm, percentage of sales exported, 
and major export markets. 
Part 3 Notes on types of NTMs as classified by UNCTAD. 
Respondents are required to read this section before proceeding 
Part 4 NTMs faced in export markets.  
Part 5 Specific NTMs and measures. 
Part 6 Information asymmetry with regard to NTMs. 
Part 7 NTM types faced by exporters 
Part 8 Response strategy/option. 
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responses. The online option was well received by respondents due to the availability 
of personal computers. Simultaneously, this also helped increase response rates from 
respondents. 
A sound understanding of the NTMs experienced or faced by exporters is 
important for governments and authorities to develop strategies and action plans to 
overcome barriers to trade. As shown in various studies, NTMs contribute significantly 
to trade restrictiveness across countries (Kee et al., 2009). While the official data (such 
as TRAINS and other databases as approved by governments) on NTMs helps in 
developing strategies and action plan aimed at overcoming trade barriers, the data does 
not contain information on specific challenges faced by firms involved in exporting (Kee 
et al., 2004). The exporting firms are best placed to provide information on specific 
challenges and barriers in their export endeavours. 
The main aim of the survey in this study is to understand the NTMs faced by 
Malaysian exporters. The survey aims to provide valuable insights on the specific trade 
barriers faced by Malaysian exporters which can be used by authorities or policy makers 
in developing strategies, policies and action plans. As discussed in the earlier chapter, 
survey data complement official data to validate NTMs’ effect (Basu et al., 2012). The 
framework used in this study to administer the survey and collect data is summarised 
below; 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Survey Administration Framework 
1) Meeting with 
MITI 
2) MITI 
endorsedstudy 
 
3) Develop 
questionnaire 
 
6) Administer 
questionnaire  
5) Finalize 
questionnaire 
4) Pre-test 
7) Reminder 
 8)  Questionnaire      
           response 
9) Conduct 
interview 
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Upon the approval from the Ministry of International Trade and Industries (MITI), the 
survey questionnaires were administered. In addition, interviews were conducted with 
selected exporters. The results of the survey are included in chapter 6. The list of exporters 
was obtained from the exporters’ directory from the MATRADE website. Three-hundred 
questionnaires were administered across sectors, however only 143 valid responses were 
obtained. 
 
3.4.3  Empirical Specification 
 In this study, multinomial logistic regression (MLR) was used to analyse the 
collected data from 143 export firms through a survey. The objective of this analysis is to 
establish the relationship between levels of exports (dependent variables) and a number 
of independent variables that include stringency of NTMs, stringency of (TM), stringency 
of specific measures such as CPs, other non-tariff measures (ONTMs) and PMs, 
information asymmetry and NTM effect types. Each set of relationship is analysed against 
the main export markets that include the US, EU, Japan, China and ASEAN. MLR is the 
linear regression analysis used in the analysis of the data involving four export levels as 
dependent variables  – ‘25 percent and less’, ‘26-50 percent’, ‘51-75 percent’ and ‘more 
than 75 percent’. These four export levels are dependent variables; thus the multinomial 
regression approach is best suited for this analysis. The multinomial logistic regression 
(MLR) model used is generally effective where the response variable (or dependent 
variable) is composed of more than two levels or categories.   
 Many studies use a categorical approach (yes or no) to determine export intensity 
or level. However, such an approach does not reflect a deeper understanding of the degree 
of export intensity. This study uses the proportion of export to sales to measure export 
intensity or degree of involvement which ensures validity and reliability when measuring 
export behaviour (Katsikeas et al., 2000). The positive aspects of using this method is 
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firstly, it has macroeconomic implications as it is directly related to maximisation of a 
country’s exports (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2003) and secondly, firms are more 
comfortable in sharing information on export proportion to sales than data related to net 
profit (Marandu, 2008). 
For the dependent variable with k categories, the multinomial regression model 
estimates k-1 logit equations. This is because one equation will be a reference point for  
three other equations when comparison is done. Logits use a logarithmic function to 
restrict the probability values to (0, 1). Technically this is the log odds (the logarithmic 
of the odds of y = 1). The multinomial regression model is based on the logit function. 
The MNL estimates for the k-1 log odds of each category of the log linear model is as 
follows: 
1 1 2 2[ ( 1)] ... k kLogit P Y x x x       
                      (3.6) 
Directly specifying the logit,  (x), 
  1 1
1 1
exp( ... )
1 exp( ... )
k k
k k
x x
x x
  

  
 

  
x
          (3.7) 
The parameter i  refers to the effect of ix  on the log odds that Y=1, controlling other jx
, for instance, exp( )i , is the multiplicative effect on the odds of a one-unit increase in 
ix , at fixed levels of other jx . The MNL is suited to handle responses that are polytomous, 
i.e. taking r > 2 categories. Let 
j denote the multinomial probability of an observation 
falling in the 
thj category, to find the relationship between this probability and the p 
explanatory variables, 1, 2 ,......, pX X X , the multiples logistic regression model then is: 
0 1 1 2 2
( )
log ...
( )
j i
i j i j i pj pi
k i
x
x x x
x

   

 
    
                             (3.8) 
Where j = 1.2,…, (k-1), i = 1,2,...,n. Since all the  ‘s add t unity, this reduces to: 
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   (3.9) 
for j = 1,2,… (k-1), the model parameters are estimated by the method of MNL. Statistical 
software is used to do this fitting. 
Each model or equation consists of explanatory control variables; firm type, firm 
ownership, firm age as well as firm size, one explanatory core variable  and one dependent 
variable that has four categories. The explanatory core variables are stringency of NTM, 
stringency of TM, stringency of CPs, stringency of other non-tariff measures (ONTMs), 
stringency of PMs and information asymmetry (InfoAsym). The dependent variable for 
each model has four categories - ‘25 percent and less’, ‘26-50 percent’, ‘51-75 percent’ 
and ‘more than 75 percent’. The ‘more than 75 percent’ is the reference group in the 
multinomial logistics regression analysis. The following model is specified for control, 
core and dependent variables: 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP +  
         β3FIRMAGE + β4FIRMSIZE + β5CorVar                               (3.10) 
Where 1 4Y  is for 1Y = ’25 percent and less’ export level, 2Y = ‘26-50 percent’ 
export level, 3Y = ‘51-75 percent’ export level and 
4Y = ‘more than 75 percent’ export 
level. CoreVar is core variable that is specified for each model which includes stringency 
of NTMs (denoted by STRNTM), stringency of TMs (denoted by STRTM), stringency 
of CPs (denoted by STRCP), stringency of ONTMs (denoted by STRONTM), stringency 
of PMs (denoted by STRPM) and information asymmetry (denoted by InfoAsym). 
The stringency index  is calculated based on the research done by Melo et al. 
(2014). Based on the exporters’ perception of the various core variables on a 5- point 
Likert scale (for a NTM, 1 is not stringent and 5 is very stringent), a stringency index is 
calculated on a simple average of the stringency perception. For core NTM variables, 
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there are 16 dimensions under the technical and non-technical measures. A simple 
average of the stringency perceptions, 𝑟𝑛 of the 16 NTM dimensions is calculated. 
Against each export market, the simple average of the stringency perceptions of the NTM 
dimensions is given as 𝑟𝑖
𝑛, where i is the export destination. The stringency index 
(SINDEX) computation is given as below: 
      (3.11) 
where, 𝑥𝑡
𝑛 is the stringency of a NTM at reported time. 
The same approach of calculating the stringency index is used for other core 
variables; i) TMs, ii) CPs, iii) ONTMs, iv) PMs and  v) information asymmetry 
(InfoAsym) against export levels; and stringency of NTM types.  
 Hence, the equation for each core variable is given below; 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRNTM      (3.12) 
 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRTM      (3.13) 
 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRCP      (3.14) 
 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRONTM      (3.15) 
 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRPM      (3.16) 
 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5INFOASYM     (3.17) 
 
          The control and NTM core variables are also analysed for each export market. 
The five export markets in this study are the US, European Union (EU), Japan, China, 
and ASEAN. These countries were chosen to understand the effect of the NTMs in the 
𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 =
1
16
∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑟𝑖    
𝑛  
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export market. However, information asymmetry is not considered as an NTM under the 
UNCTAD 2012 classification. The core variables are examined against each export 
level. The equation for each NTM core variable in each export market is given below: 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +             
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRCoreVarExMUS,EU,Japan,China,ASEAN                (3.18)                              
 
Where the StrCoreVarEM is the stringency of core NTM variable in an export market 
(ExM). The ExM includes, the US, EU, Japan, China, and ASEAN. Hence, the 
equations for the above are stated as below; 
 Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +   
            β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRNTMUS,EU,Japan,China,ASEAN                                        (3.19) 
 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +   
            β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRTMUS,EU,Japan,China,ASEAN                                           (3.20) 
 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +   
            β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRCPUS,EU,Japan,China,ASEAN                                            (3.21) 
 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +   
            β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRONTMUS,EU,Japan,China,ASEAN                                     (3.22) 
 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +   
            β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRPMUS,EU,Japan,China,ASEAN                                           (3.23) 
   
 
Apart from analysing the core NTM variables, this study also investigates 
InfoAsym on the export level. Though the InfoAsym is not listed as a NTM measure 
under the UNCTAD 2012 classification, its importance for the export market has been 
widely discussed. Hence, this variable is examined with regards to the four export levels. 
With the explanatory control variables - firm type, firm ownership, firm age and firm size, 
the model for this core variable (InfoAsym) is as restated below; 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5INFOASYM     (3.17) 
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The InfoAsym is then analysed against each export market as stated in the equation below; 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5INFOASYM US,EU,Japan,China,ASEAN                           (3.24) 
 
Through the survey, the NTM types faced by exporters are studied. There are four 
NTM types that include the price effects, quantity reduction, quality restrictions and threat 
of retaliation (reference group) that could be faced by exporters (Haveman et al., 2003). 
The stringency of NTM is analysed. 
As for the other models, the explanatory control variables - firm type, firm 
ownership, firm age, firm size were included with the stringency of NTM variable 
(denoted by STRNTM) against the NTM types. 
         In examining the NTM  types faced by Malaysian exporters, the following 
empirical models are specified; 
Z1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
Β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRNTM      (3.25) 
 
Here, 1 4Z  refers to NTM types whereby 1Z  refers to price effects, 2Z is quantity 
reduction, 3Z is quality restrictions and 4Z is threat of retaliation. These NTM types are  
 
examined for each market. The empirical model is shown below; 
 
Z1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE  
           + β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRNTM US,EU,Japan,China,ASEAN                                (3.26) 
 
 
3.4.4 Interviews 
 
 Interview sessions were carried out to collect information on NTMs faced by 
exporters. A total of 20 exporters were interviewed. The firms’ breakdown includes 11 
small sized firms, six medium-sized firms, and three large-sized firms. The proportion of 
the type of business is 60 percent resource-based firms and 40 percent non-resource-based 
firms. The firms were selected from a list of 300 contactable exporters. Each firm was 
contacted to seek permission for a telephone interview session which would last not more 
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than 17 minutes. Only 20 exporters agreed for the interview session and the date and time 
for the session were agreed upon after discussion. 
3.4.5     Diagnostic Tests 
   Diagnostics tests used in the MNL analysis of data are discussed in this section. 
First, is the deviance or -2 log likelihood (-2LL) statistic. The deviance is a measure of 
how much unexplained variation there is in a logistic regression model; the higher the 
value, the less accurate the model. A model fit requires the value to be significant. This 
would then denote that there is a relationship between the dependent variable and the 
combination of independent variables. The second test is the Pseudo-square. According 
to McFadden (1973), values of a Pseudo-square ranging from 0.2 to 0.4, are considered 
“highly satisfactory.” With regards to sample size, Schwab (2002) indicates that for 
multinomial logistic regression, a minimum of 10 cases per independent variable is 
required. 
Third, the reliability test was conducted. The question of reliability addresses 
the issue of whether a research instrument, for example, a questionnaire, will produce 
the same results each time it is administered to the same person in the same setting. 
Reliability analysis measures the overall consistency of the items in the questionnaire. 
It is designed as a measure of the internal consistency, i.e. do all items within the 
instrument measure the same thing? Internal consistency is estimated by determining 
the degree to which each item in an instrument correlates with every other item. It is 
measured on the same scale as a correlation coefficient and its value lies between 0 (no 
internal consistency) and 1 (perfect internal consistency).  
Cronbach’s alpha is the most common measure of internal consistency 
(“reliability”). As a rule of thumb, internal consistency is considered excellent if the alpha 
value exceeds 0.9, good if it exceeds 0.8, acceptable if it is greater than 0.7, questionable 
if it between 0.6 and 0.7, poor if it is between 0.6 and 0.5 and unacceptable if it is smaller 
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than 0.5 (George and Mallery, 2001). SPSS conducts the reliability analysis with ease. 
The most important table is the Reliability Statistics table that provides the actual value 
for Cronbach’s alpha. The  Cronbach’s alpha is 0.975, which indicates a high level of 
internal consistency for the scale with the sample size of 143. 
 Multicollinearity test was the fourth diagnostic test conducted. The independent 
variables in the models are tested for multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) statistics. VIF is commonly used to test for multicollinearity (Elango, 2003). As a 
rule of thumb, when VIF is less than 10, multicollinearity is not a concern (Burns and 
Bush, 2000). In the case of this study’s independent variables for various models, all have 
VIF far less than 10. The VIF varied between 1.018-1.921. As a result, multicollinearity 
is not an issue for this study. Details of the multicollinearity test are provided in Appendix 
B. 
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CHAPTER 4 : NON-TARIFF MEASURES AND EXPORTS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Understanding the impact of NTMs on Malaysia is interesting because it is a 
highly trade dependent, non-agriculture based economy with high export concentrations 
in terms of both products and markets. Market access has already emerged as a critical 
item on the national agenda. To set the background of the study, this chapter details 
market access in major export destinations for Malaysia, the European Union, Japan and 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the NTMs on Malaysian shipments to major export markets based on the magnitude and 
structure of the NTMs. Section 3 presents the econometric specification employed in this 
study, it describes the data, and provides definitions as well. Section 5 details the 
empirical results, while section 6 summarises the key findings. 
 
4.2 NTM COVERAGE IN MAJOR EXPORT DESTINATIONS 
 Table 4.1 illustrates the dependency of Malaysia’s exports on the markets of the 
EU, Japan and ASEAN 4. All three markets comprise a substantial percentage of total 
Malaysian exports, with the ASEAN 4 commanding the highest export share. In terms of 
products traded, the corresponding shares in Malaysian exports of agriculture to the three 
major markets remain lower than that for industry, as Malaysia is predominantly an 
industry based exporter. Agricultural products only accounted for about 11 percent of 
total exports in 2013. 
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Table 4.1: Export Shares in Major Destinations, 2000-2013 (in percent) 
 
Notes:   1. Agriculture refers to HS 01-24 and Industry to HS 25-99. 
             2. The export shares for agriculture and industry refer to shares of the total agricultural  
                  Exports of Malaysia and total industrial exports of Malaysia respectively. 
Source: Calculated from UNCOMTRADE. 
 
That Malaysian exports are largely industry based is a crucial point to note when 
examining the effects that NTMs have on trade. Most of the SPS measures, which have a 
narrower focus than TBT (Kelly, 2003), are imposed on food and agricultural products. 
Therefore, a focus on SPS measures per se may not sufficiently capture the degree of 
trade restrictiveness on Malaysian exports because TBT and other measures that relate to 
non-risk reducing measures such as product compatibility, quality attributes and 
conservation issues are relevant for both agricultural and non-agricultural products (see 
also Fliess and Lejarraga, 2004) on how TBTs are the leading concern for developing 
countries. 
The three major markets in Table 4.1 are not only key export destinations for 
Malaysian products, but are also countries that have actively notified the WTO. These 
notifications provide advanced warning of new or modified measures and an opportunity 
for trading partners to raise questions or objections to the proposed measures (Jaffee and 
Henson 2004). The number of notifications by the ASEAN 4 and Japan to the WTO for 
the period of 2000- 2013 were 27, 160 (calculated from the online SPS-IMS and TBT-
IMS portal). The high cumulative number of notifications from the ASEAN 4 vis-à-vis 
the other countries/groups plausibly signals an increase in regulatory activity. Most of the 
notifications fall under the TBT agreement. However, the EU measures are considered 
  Agriculture Industry Total Exports 
Country/ Group 2000 2007 2013 2000 2007 2013 2000 2007 2013 
EU 11.93 12.55 8.63 13.78 11.98 8.46 13.68 12.03 8.47 
Japan 5.39 4.69 3.85 13.53 9.65 11.92 13.07 8.79 9.84 
ASEAN4 22.82 15.80 17.70 25.66 24.59 26.34 25.48 23.81 25.41 
TOTAL 40.14  33.04  30.18  52.97  46.22  46.72  52.23  44.63  39.47  
Share in Total            
Malaysian Exports 5.26  8.71  10.54  94.74  91.29  89.46  - - - 
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stringent and exporters from the developing world are highly affected by them (Maskus 
et al., 2001; Disdier et al., 2008). 
While the notifications mentioned above are not specific to Malaysia, bilateral 
data is available on notifications and the detention of export consignments of agricultural 
and food products from Malaysia to the EU. The information, sourced from the Rapid 
Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) portal, is useful because it is widely 
acknowledged that traders in agricultural and food products are susceptible to NTMs 
(Henson and Loader, 2001). The EU is at the forefront of stringent food safety standards 
and regulations (Rokiah, 2009) due to the harmonisation process for such measures 
between the member states. More importantly, RASFF also provides reasons for the 
notifications and the detention of the consignments. 
A total of 47 notifications on Malaysian exports were filed by the EU from 2000-
2010. Most were classified as border rejections1 (21 notifications), while the remainders 
were either alert or information2 notifications. The majority of the notifications originated 
from UK (17 notifications), followed by Italy as a distant second. The rejection of export 
consignments is not limited to the value of the product, per se, but includes transportation 
and other export costs which are incurred by the exporter (Otsuki et al., 2001; Henson 
and Loader, 2001; Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 2003). From 2002-2010, the number of 
rejections by EU on agriculture based food products from Malaysia is 136 (UNIDO, 
2015). The reasons for the notifications regarding Malaysia’s consignments filed by the 
EU, based on the RASFF portal, are contamination in the form of organic and chemical 
compounds, the presence of bacteria, food additives that are unauthorised and prohibited 
                                                          
1. Border rejection relates to consignments that have been tested and rejected at the external borders of the 
EU when a health risk is found. The notifications are transmitted to all European Economic Area (EEA) 
border posts to reinforce controls and to ensure that the rejected product does not re-enter the Community 
through another border post. 
2.Alerts are triggered by the member state that detects the problem, and immediate action is taken to 
withdraw or recall the product. Information notification is performed when a risk is identified in a 
consignment, but member states do not have to take immediate action because the product has not reached 
their markets. 
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substances in the form of specific drugs and antibiotics. The contaminants were 
principally found in fish and fish products, poultry, fats and oils (affecting whole milk 
and palm oil exports). For example, in 2008, the exporters of seafood products from 
Malaysia faced the prospect of a ban from the EU due to some Malaysian fishing vessels 
and seafood processing procedures which failed to comply with EU standards (Zahaitun, 
2008). 
Malaysian exporters have also voiced their concerns over the phytosanitary 
controls for fresh fruit (SIRIM, 2005). Specifically, the SPS measure regarding pesticide 
residue on fruits is considered difficult (as it is more stringent than International Codex 
Standards) and costly for exporters to comply to as the maximum residue levels are set at 
the limit of detection. This is a problem for tropical fruits. Products such as fish, meat, 
fruits and vegetables are typically subject to extensive control in the EU (Henson and 
Loader, 2001). It appears at this stage, based on the reasons for notification and detention 
of Malaysian exports to the EU, that the major problem lies in meeting basic food hygiene 
requirements (Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 2003). 
Apart from barriers to export consignments of food and agricultural products from 
Malaysia, recent selected episodes of export disruption indicate specific labelling 
problems in food and natural resources such as timber and biodiesel. In the context of 
labelling based on production, processes and methods (standards for product harvesting), 
Austria has trade measures that may discriminate against timber imports from Malaysia 
on similar labelling grounds. There are also growing prospects for other European 
government mandating schemes, such as eco-labels, which indicate the point of origin or 
the nature of forestry management. The Dutch government has already mandated 
labelling on imported timber. At present, a ‘Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA)3,’ 
                                                          
3. This requirement is also considered problematic because it could alter Malaysia’s WTO rights.  
. However, the VPA is important for Malaysia given that the EU is scheduled to adopt the Due Diligence 
Regulation in 2011 that will prohibit illegally sourced timber from entering the bloc. 
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which permits the ban of imported forest products to the EU if EU customs officials 
decide that measures in the exporting countries to verify the legality of the product (which 
already exists) are not adequate, is being negotiated with Malaysia. Another issue related 
to timber that has affected Malaysian exporters is Directive 67/548/EEC that adopts a 
hazard classification system for substances in timber products that are considered 
dangerous, namely, boric acid.  
A related issue is the mandated sustainability criteria related to emissions and land 
use for the cultivation of biofuels. Allegations have recently been made by a Dutch non-
governmental organisation (NGO) regarding the emissions from forest and peat swamp 
areas which have been converted into palm oil plantations in Malaysia. 
 Apart from exports of food and natural resources, the EU’s guidelines based on 
the principle of producer’s responsibility that deals with end-of-life environmental 
impacts have also affected manufacturers of electrical and electronic (E&E) products. In 
2002, the EU enforced a guideline on wastes [Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
(WEE) Directive 2002/96/EC] from the E&E industry, which stipulates the 
responsibilities that producers and exporters have for the treatment, recovery and disposal 
of related equipment. Similarly, another directive (the Restrictions on Hazardous 
Substances (RoHS) directive was put in place to restrict the use of certain substances, 
which subsequently affected manufacturers, sellers, distributors and recyclers. Both 
requirements were transmitted through the supply chain (Vossenaar et al., 2006), and 
eventually the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Malaysia bore the brunt of the 
high costs of compliance (MITI, 2006). 
The selected cases of export disruption (primarily regarding the EU) described 
above highlight the importance of not only examining the incidence of NTMs, which 
varies distinctly across product groups and markets, but to also identify the product 
concentration of Malaysian exports in major destinations and the stringency of those 
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destinations in terms of the number and types of NTMs imposed. Table 4.2 presents the 
export coverage of NTMs on Malaysian consignments in major destinations for both 
agricultural and industrial products. 
 
Table 4.2: Coverage of NTMs for Malaysian Exports in Major Destinations 
 
  No. of Measures  Export Coverage (percent) 
Type of Measure A I Total A I Total 
EU (2007)             
Quantity Control  509 61 570 12.57 13.83 13.67 
Technical 659 120 779 25.31 36.28 17.43 
TOTAL 1168 181 1349 12.64 15.81 15.38 
Japan (2009)          
Para-Tariff  524 322 846 3.84 22.41 20.73 
Quantity Control  532 9 541 1.95 4.60 3.95 
SPS  17442 3715 21157 4.57 11.07 10.28 
TBT 2168 10705 12873 4.18 10.79 10.12 
TOTAL 20666 14751 35417 4.10 12.03 10.87 
Singapore (2001)          
Automatic Licensing  18 6 24 7.03 8.19 7.27 
Quantity Control  93 109 202 14.62 18.35 18.09 
Monopolistic 1 13 14 56.15 17.96 18.53 
Technical  182 84 266 16.25 19.76 18.23 
TOTAL 294 212 506 16.27 18.40 18.23 
Thailand (2008)          
SPS  299 8 307 5.69 0.31 5.67 
TBT 0 601 601 - 5.28 5.28 
Other Technical  32 1 33 3.84 0.31 3.84 
TOTAL 331 610 941 4.94 5.28 5.27 
Philippines (2008)          
Para-Tariff  64 101 165 1.59 1.49 1.47 
Quantity Control  120 175 295 1.59 1.49 1.47 
Anti-Competitive 1 2 3 1.30 1.44 1.42 
SPS  779 42 821 1.59 0.73 0.98 
TBT 19 408 427 3.14 1.46 1.49 
Other Technical 17 - 17 1.29 - 1.29 
TOTAL 1000 728 1728 1.59 1.39 1.42 
Indonesia (2007)          
Para Tariff  55 4 59 8.54 7.77 8.28 
Automatic Licensing  12 117 129 14.66 1.22 1.29 
Quantity Control 73 666 739 7.86 2.92 3.04 
Monopolistic  6 24 30 11.48 6.90 6.96 
Technical  185 195 380  2.40 1.30 1.45 
TOTAL    331 1006 1337   4.38   2.36   2.48 
     Notes: 1. The NTMs are examined from the Malaysian perspective as an exporter. 
  2. A – agriculture; I – industry 
     Source: Calculated from WITS and UNCOMTRADE. 
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The first striking observation from Table 4.2 is the substantial number of NTMs 
imposed in Japan in relative to other countries. The number of SPS measures for 
agricultural products and the number of TBT measures for industrial products is 
astoundingly high in Japan. Nevertheless, the ECR for SPS is only 5 percent for 
Malaysian agricultural products, whereas measures for TBT for industrial products is 
more than double at 11 percent. In contrast, the EU only has a few principal types of 
NTMs relative to Japan. This should not be misinterpreted as lower degree of 
restrictiveness in the EU market vis-à-vis Japan for the following reasons. Firstly, the 
ECR of all NTMs for Malaysian products is obviously higher in the EU than Japan. The 
larger coverage of NTMs for Malaysian industrial export consignments are relative to 
agricultural products, despite the greater number of measures instituted on agricultural 
products. The table further illustrates that the number of NTMs per se is not an indication 
of the severity of an export barrier. Secondly, it may be more difficult to surmount a single 
barrier than multiple NTMs if the former is imposed with greater intensity. 
Among the three ASEAN member countries listed in Table 4.2, the ECR of NTMs 
for Malaysian consignments is highest for Singapore. Despite the wide variety of NTMs 
in the Philippines, the coverage ratio is relatively small for Malaysian exports. Given that 
there are no reported NTMs in the WITS database for Indonesia, the ECR is further 
derived from the ASEAN database for ASEAN 4 and presented in Table 4.3. Large 
discrepancies are noted in the number and type of measures instituted in the ASEAN 4 
between the WITS database and the ASEAN database respectively. However, the 
coverage ratios for Malaysia’s trade with Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines is 
derived using the WITS database which produced relatively similar results to those using 
the ASEAN database. Based on Table 4.3, Indonesia appears to have the highest number 
of NTMs and multiple categories, but the coverage ratio for Malaysian consignments to 
Indonesia remains low. 
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Table 4.3: Coverage of NTMs for Malaysian Exports in ASEAN 4 
 
Notes: 1. The NTMs are examined from the Malaysian perspective as an exporter. 
           2. A – agriculture; I – industry 
Source: Calculated from ASEAN database 
 
It is likely that exports from different product groups may be disproportionately 
affected by NTMs in the importing countries, depending on the export concentration in 
those markets. In the case of agricultural products, the EU commands a relatively large 
market share of Malaysian exports of HS13 (lac, gums, resin, other vegetable saps and 
extracts) and HS23 (residues and waste from the food industry and prepared animal 
fodder), while Japan dominates consumption of HS06 (live trees and other plants, bulbs, 
roots, and cut flowers). In 2013. EU imported almost 20 percent of the total fats and oils 
products from Malaysia. Within the ASEAN4, market concentration by product groups 
is not apparent in Malaysia’s agricultural trade with Thailand and the Philippines. In 
  Number of Measures Export Coverage (percent) 
Type of Measure A I Total A I Total 
Singapore (2006)             
Para-Tariff  2 17 19 18.03 20.27 20.24 
Automatic Licensing 59 31 90 36.09 20.82 21.13 
Quantity Control  26 239 265 46.62 19.31 19.47 
Technical  9 70 79 29.99 16.78 16.86 
TOTAL 96 357 453 34.32 18.78 18.94 
Thailand (2007)          
Automatic Licensing  - 38 38 - 5.61 5.61 
Quantity Control 33 44 77 1.90 5.20 4.84 
Technical 75 21 96 2.23 7.29 4.51 
TOTAL 108 103 211 2.07 5.47 5.03 
Philippines (2007)          
Para-Tariff  12 - 12 1.92 - 1.71 
Quantity Control 40 26 66 1.26 1.47 1.47 
Technical  7 214 221 0.32 1.56 1.55 
TOTAL 59 240 299 1.28 1.52 1.51 
Indonesia (2007)       
Para-Tariff  55 4 59 8.54 7.77 8.28 
Automatic Licensing  12 117 129 14.66 1.22 1.29 
Quantity Control 73 666 739 7.86 2.92 3.04 
Monopolistic  6 24 30 11.48 6.90 6.96 
Technical  185 195 380 2.40 1.30 1.45 
TOTAL 331 1006 1337 4.38 2.36 2.48 
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contrast, high levels of export concentration in Malaysia’s agricultural trade with 
Singapore are noted in the following: HS01 (live animals), HS04 (dairy products, bird’s 
eggs, natural honey, and edible products), HS07 (edible vegetables, certain roots and 
tubers), HS08 (edible fruits and nuts, the peels of citrus fruit and melons) and HS10 
(cereals). For Indonesia, Malaysia’s export concentration is only high for HS12 (oil seeds, 
oleage fruits, miscellaneous grains and seed fruits) products. 
As for industrial products, not all exports with high levels of market concentration 
are subject to NTMs in the importing country. Therefore, the export concentrations of 
products in the following categories are only mentioned when at least one type of NTM 
has been instituted by the importing country. In the case of trade with the EU, the export 
concentration for Malaysian industrial products is considerably high for HS64 (footwear, 
gaiters, and the like, parts of such articles). Similarly, for the industrial trade with Japan, 
high levels of market concentration are found for HS51 (wool, fine/coarse animal hair, 
horsehair yarn and fabric), HS70 (glass and glassware) and HS81 (other base metals, 
cements, and articles thereof). Within the ASEAN4, although there are several products 
traded between Malaysia and Singapore that display high levels of export concentration, 
only HS25 (salt, sulphur, earth, and stone, plastering materials, lime and cement) and 
HS71 (natural/cultured pearls, precious stones and metals and coins) are subject to NTMs. 
In the remaining ASEAN member countries, only HS58 (special woven fabric, tufted 
textile fabric, lace and tapestries) products from Malaysia, which are subject to NTMs in 
Indonesia, are highly concentrated in that market. 
There are strong variations in NTM coverage by type of measure, commodity, 
and importing country. However, the ECR derived in this section and the export 
concentrations of products and markets only provide information on the potential trade 
impact of NTMs, while the empirical results in the following section capture the direction 
and the magnitude of the impact that NTMs have on Malaysian exports. 
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4.3 IMPACT OF NTMs ON MALAYSIAN EXPORTS 
4.3.1 Econometric Specification 
 
 This chapter uses an ex-post approach, employing a gravity-based econometric 
model to analyse the overall impact of NTMs on Malaysian exports, and to separate the 
impacts by product group and importing country. The basic equation is augmented and 
the following equations are estimated in log linear form (refer to chapter 3): 
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   (3.5) 
where Xijt is country i’s (reporter) exports to country j (partner) in year t. The other 
variables are defined below: 
GDP = real GDP 
POP = population  
DST = distance between economic centres of i and j  
ADJ = common border between i and j (dummy variable equal to one if i and j share a 
border and 0 otherwise)  
TRF = tariff rate  
ECR = export coverage ratio (used interchangeably with frequency counts, denoted as 
FC)  
DAGRI = dummy variable equal to one for agricultural products (HS01-24) and 0 
otherwise  
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DIND = dummy variable equal to one for industrial products (HS25-99) and 0 otherwise 
DASEAN = dummy variable equal one to for ASEAN countries and 0 otherwise  
DEU = dummy variable equal to one for EU15 countries and 0 otherwise 
DJPN = dummy variable equal to one for Japan and 0 otherwise 
ε = error term that picks up other influences on bilateral trade  
α = constant term. 
 
4.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Table 4.4 presents the results of the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
Random Effects (RE) models. The Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 
is employed to determine whether RE Generalised Least Squares (GLS) is appropriate 
and the simple pooling can be rejected. The LM statistics are overwhelmingly significant 
and support the appropriateness of the panel GLS model for all specifications. The RE 
estimator is also chosen for the following reasons, despite the fact that the Fixed Effects 
(FE) estimator is much more common in gravity models than the RE estimator (Egger, 
2000). The RE estimator has the advantage of not requiring the exclusion of variables 
that are time invariant. In this case, both the distance (DSTij) and contiguity (ADJij) 
variables are invariant across time periods, and these variables are of considerable interest 
to this study. Furthermore, all of the variables exhibit more variation in the data across 
country-pair-HS product groups (between variation) than over time (within variation). 
This is not surprising given the large number of cross-section entities (based on country-
pair-HS product groups) used for the estimations, which are believed to have some 
influence on bilateral exports. As such, an FE may not work well for data with minimal 
within variation or for variables that change slowly over time. 
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Table 4.4: Panel Gravity Estimates for Malaysian Exports  
(using coverage ratios)  
 
Variables               (1)                                (2)                          (3) 
lnGDPi 3.099 3.064 3.323 
  (4.508) (4.518) (4.513) 
lnGDPj 0.982*** 1.124*** 1.106*** 
  (0.121) (0.120) (0.128) 
lnPOPi -13.634 -13.854 -14.856 
  (10.827) (10.861) (10.854) 
lnPOPj 0.936*** 0.874*** 0.894*** 
  (0.102) (0.101) (0.100) 
lnDSTij -2.612*** -2.950*** -2.997*** 
  (0.244) (0.239) (0.259) 
ADJij -0.627 -1.122* -0.1.138* 
  (0.620) (0.618) (0.665) 
TRFij -0.028 -0.027 -0.029 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
ECRij 0.161*** - - 
  (0.015)   
ECR*DAGRIij - 0.058*** - 
   (0.014)  
ECR*DINDij - 0.171*** - 
   (0.025)  
ECR*DASEANij - - 0.105*** 
    (0.017) 
ECR*DEUij - - 2.073*** 
    (0.516) 
ECR*DJPNij - - -0.494 
    (6.305) 
Constant 142.845* 147.879** 158.751** 
 (75.065) (75.394) (75.408) 
No. of 
observations 27,160 27,160 27,160 
R2 overall 0.301 0.294 0.301 
Breusch-Pagan 
LM test 
  
 
χ2 (1) = 48054.36 
(Prob > χ2 = 0.000) 
χ2 (1) = 
47045.18 
(Prob > χ2 = 
0.000) 
 
χ2(1) = 
47121.29 
(Prob > χ2 = 
0.000) 
           Notes: 1. The dependent variable is lnXij.  
                      2. The figures in parentheses are the standard errors, adjusted for clustering on  
                        country-pair-HS products.   
        3.***significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent and * significant at 10 percent. 
 
All traditional covariates in the gravity model, with the exception of common 
border, are found to be significant. The common border effects are generally irrelevant 
for this study, given that only Thailand, and Singapore border Malaysia in the sample of 
countries used in this study. Additionally, the negative sign for POPi, which is contrary 
to the theoretical prediction, deserves some explanation. The result is, in fact, not 
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unexpected because this study employs unidirectional gravity estimation. Hence, there is 
a lack of variation in the data within the entity, as the only reporter country in this case 
is Malaysia. Therefore, the equations have been re-estimated without the inclusion of 
POPi, but the results for the other variables do not change in terms of their signs and 
significance. As a result, Table 4.4 reports the gravity estimates with the inclusion of 
POPi. 
From column (1), tariffs, and NTMs in the importing countries exert opposite 
effects on Malaysian exports. Tariffs, though negative, do not significantly affect export 
consignments. Interestingly, the positive and significant coefficient for ECR indicates 
that a greater NTM coverage of exports in the importing country promotes Malaysian 
exports. Column (2) makes a distinction in the export coverage of NTMs between 
agricultural products and industrial products. The interaction terms of ECR with the 
respective dummy variables for agricultural products and industrial products are again 
positive and significant. Column (3) makes a distinction between importing countries. 
The ECR interaction terms with the dummy variables for ASEAN, EU, and Japan are all 
positive and significant. 
The coverage ratio of NTMs as a proxy of trade policy, though widely used (see 
Pritchett 1996), Rose (2004) and others believe that it suffers from measurement error, 
as it suffers from an endogeneity problem. Therefore, to check the sensitivity of the 
results, equations (1) to (3) are estimated using FC as an alternative measure. The results 
reported in Table 4.5 indicate that the sign on the influence of NTMs becomes negative 
for agricultural products in equation (2) and for the EU in equation (3), implying that the 
presence of NTMs negatively affects Malaysia’s agricultural exports and exports to the 
EU. The contradictory results from Tables 4.4 and 4.5 suggest the presence of dual effects 
of NTMs by commodity group and by importing country; they can facilitate trade or even 
hinder it. Why do NTMs facilitate exports?  
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Table 4.5: Panel Gravity Estimates for Malaysian Exports                          
                  (using frequency counts for robustness checks) 
 
Variables             (1)                               (2)                                (3)      
lnGDPi 3.598 3.663 3.730 
  (4.533) (4.533) (4.534) 
lnGDPj 1.205*** 1.229*** 1.235*** 
  (0.122) (0.121) (0.125) 
lnPOPi -15.054 -15.178 -15.346 
  (10.897) (10.897) (10.901) 
lnPOPj 0.793*** 0.742*** 0.739*** 
  (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) 
lnDSTij -3.276*** -3.239*** -3.045*** 
  (0.239) (0.235) (0.241) 
ADJij -0.151* -1.361** -0.985 
  (0.631) (0.613) (0.628) 
TRFij -0.030 -0.025 -0.029 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
FCij -0.080 - - 
  (0.051)   
FC*DAGRIij - -0.185*** - 
   (0.054)  
FC*DINDij - 0.611*** - 
   (0.207)  
FC*DASEANij - - 0.335*** 
    (0.084) 
FC*DEUij - - -0.172*** 
    (0.058) 
FC*DJPNij - - 0.142 
    (0.194) 
Constant 156.626** 156.825*** 156.168** 
 (75.637) (76.636) (75.661) 
No. of observations 27,160 27,160 27,160 
R2 overall 0.291 0.303 0.296 
Breusch-Pagan  
LM test 
 
 
χ2 (1) = 48034.23 
(Prob > χ2 = 0.000) 
χ2 (1) = 48048.56 
(Prob > χ2 = 0.000) 
 
χ2(1) = 48011.19 
(Prob > χ2 = 0.000) 
      Notes: 1. The dependent variable is lnXij. 
                 2. The figures in parentheses are the standard errors, adjusted for clustering on 
                     country-pair-HS products. 
                 3.  ***significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent and * significant at 10 percent. 
 
The result is easy to interpret if one keeps in mind that Malaysia’s exports are 
highly concentrated in products and markets, leaving little choice for exporters but to 
respond in a manner that is the most advantageous to their interests. It is therefore not 
surprising to find positive coefficients on NTMs for industrial products relative to 
agricultural products and for Japan and ASEAN relative to the EU based on Table 4.5. 
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This suggests that Malaysia has responded somewhat positively to requirements in the 
importing countries, more so for products that are of economic importance. 
However, in the case of the EU, EU-wide regulations (the large majority of import 
requirements for products to enter the markets of the EU member states is set at the EU 
level and is harmonised across member states (Rau et al., 2010) may constrain trade as a 
Malaysian exporter needs to adapt its products to meet the requirements of each 
individual European country, with some rare exceptions.  
To further elaborate on the possible reasons for the dual effects of NTMs, the 
following discussion presents a number of illustrative cases on Malaysia’s response to 
NTMs in importing countries. In the case of agricultural products and food, the stringent 
regulations and standards have, to some extent, led to agricultural improvements 
(Schlueter et al., 2009). This can be taken as an example of a positive benefit of NTMs 
on developing countries as adjustments are continuously made  in the production systems 
to adhere to the stringent regulations and standards imposed by importing countries. In 
fact, the Malaysian government established the farm accreditation scheme (SALM) based 
on the principles of Good Agricultural Practice (GAP). As a result, of this, farms have 
seen great improvement in terms of product quality. Furthermore, the implementation of 
a number of certification schemes [such as ISPM (International Standards for 
Phytosanitary Measures) No.7 (Export Certification Scheme), ISPM No.14 (The Use of 
Integrated Measures in a Systems Approach for Pest Risk Management) and ISPM No.15 
(Guidelines for Regulating Wood Packaging Material in International Trade)] to comply 
with international standards has reduced export costs (Wan and Yong 2005). Nonetheless, 
benchmarking SALM to the EurepGAP (or GLOBALGAP) standard is still important for 
exporters of fresh fruit and vegetables, as the SALM scheme has yet to be recognised in 
overseas markets and therefore does not facilitate market access. 
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Progress has also been made in improving processing facilities and imposing 
stricter controls on the hygiene standards for seafood products, which are subject to 
different standards in the EU and Japan. The rate of rejection of seafood products exported 
to the EU has declined over the years, and Malaysia’s border rejection rate in the EU is 
considerably lower than competitors such as Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and China 
(Rokiah, 2009). However, challenges still remain for SMEs in the fish processing 
business to meet EU’s hygiene requirements for Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Point (HACCP). 
Finally, Malaysia’s participation in various international standardisation bodies, 
such as the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) is testimony of 
its commitment to compliance. On the regional front, Malaysia is engaged in a 
programme of harmonising standards within the context of ASEAN and the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC). To date, 51.5 percent of the 3,786 Malaysian Standards 
are aligned with international standards (Mariani, 2005). To further facilitate trade in 
regulated sectors, Malaysia has signed the ASEAN EEMRA (Mutual Recognition 
Arrangement for E&E), regarding the recognition of test and certification results for E&E 
products among ASEAN member countries. MRAs are important to Malaysia, as network 
trade in E&E goods forms the backbone of the industrial sector. Malaysia is also a party 
to some APEC MRAs such as the EEMRA Part 1 on the acceptance of test reports and 
the APEC MRA on toy safety. 
As illustrated by the discussion above, the Malaysian government has resorted to 
a somewhat more “offensive” strategy to address NTMs in importing countries instead of 
a “defensive” strategy. Despite the stringent requirements in major export destinations, 
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there have been few attempts to redirect exports to less demanding markets. Obviously, 
the benefits that accrue from economies of scale following compliance with standards and 
regulations are important, given the small home market and the concentration of exports 
in specific products and markets. In this context, NTMs may be considered an incentive 
to make the necessary adjustments in the existing systems and modes of production to 
ensure that exports are not unduly jeopardised. 
 
4.4 SUMMARY 
 The empirical findings of this chapter support the presence of dual effects of 
NTMs on Malaysia’s export consignments, thereby providing a less pessimistic view on 
the negative effects of NTMs per se on trade. From the Malaysian experience in the trade 
of broad categories of products, NTMs appear to exert a beneficial impact on industrial 
exports but not on agricultural exports. Additionally, the positive effects of NTMs are 
present in trade with ASEAN and Japan but not with the EU. 
There are numerous reasons that could explain this result. Firstly, the economic 
importance of industrial exports has given exporters little choice except to conform to the 
standards and regulations of the importing country to ensure continued access to the major 
markets. Conversely, compliance costs may be higher for agricultural products, which are 
prone to various health and safety standards, while information costs remain low for these 
homogeneous products. Secondly, the harmonisation of standards within ASEAN has 
most likely facilitated trade between the association and Malaysia. Comparing the EU 
and Japan, it is not surprising that the beneficial effects of NTMs are only apparent in 
Malaysia’s trade with Japan, as the products traded are primarily industrial goods. As for 
trade with the EU, Malaysia not only exports an almost equal share of agricultural and 
industrial exports but also has also to contend with EU’s stringent regulations. 
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        CHAPTER 5 : DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS ON FIRM LEVEL SURVEY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter presents the descriptive findings of demographic profiles, explorative 
statistical analysis and frequency analysis of the incidence of NTMs faced by exporters. 
It looks at aggregating the data collected and examining the incidence of various types of 
NTMs as reported by the 143 Malaysian exporters in the survey. The chapter then 
proceeds with discussing the details of the demographic profiles of the 143 firms which 
took part in the survey (refer to section 5.2). Section 5.3 deals with the incidences of 
NTMs faced by the export firms.  Discussion on the NTMs faced by firm type (resource-
based and non-resource- based) firms is given in section 5.4. Explanation on the NTMs 
faced by firms exporting products according to export level is provided in section 5.5. 
The last section discusses the NTMs faced by the size of export firms.  
 
5.2 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES 
The demographic profiles include analysing the following: i) firm type ii) firm 
ownership iii) firm age iv) firm size v) firm annual turnover and vi) firm major export 
markets. Firm category refers to resource-based and non-resource-based firms. Resource-
based firms manufacture products that have a high component of natural resources as raw 
material. The natural resources include plants, forest, animals, soil, oil, energy sources, 
air, water and other natural resources. Examples of resource-based firms are those 
involved in exporting furniture products, chemical products, agricultural products, oil and 
gas products, palm oil products, rubber products as well as food and beverage products . 
The non-resource firms use non-natural products in the production of products. The non-
resources are materials (processed), technology and other components that are not 
naturally found. Firms that use non-resources (non-natural) are firms in the electrical and 
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electronic sector, machinery and machine components, equipment manufacturing, toys 
and so forth. 
Figure 5.1 shows the composition of firm categories. Resource-based firms 
constitute about 38 percent and non-resource-based based firms are about 62 percent. This 
is out of the 143 export firms which responded to the survey. 
 
Figure 5.1: Firm Type 
 
Figure 5.2 shows Malaysia’s major export products for Jan-Dec 2015. It can be 
observed that the non-resourced-based products are exported more. As can be seen in 
Figure 5.2, the resource-based firms export LNG, chemicals, petroleum, palm oil and 
rubber products which constitute about 31.2 percent of total exports for the given period. 
In the same period, the non-resource-based firms export electrical and electronic, 
machinery and parts, metals as well as optical and scientific products which constitute 
48.4 percent of total exports. The remaining 20.7 percent comprises of other products 
which include agricultural, furniture, iron and steel, toys, building hardware etc. Hence, 
if the computation of percentage exports of resource-based products includes 
contributions from other products, it can be estimated that the total resource-based 
products can be about 40 percent, leaving the remaining 60 percent to non-resource-based 
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products. Hence, the proportion of the sampled firms in this study were reflective of the 
proportion of resource-based and non-resource-based firms in the population. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Malaysia’s Major Export Products Jan-Dec 2015 
Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia (2015) 
 
 
                                                     Figure 5.3: Firm Ownership 
Figure 5.3 shows that the export firms that responded to the survey were 
predominantly Malaysian-owned firms which totalled to 87.4 percent. Firms owned by 
foreigners comprised 12.6 percent. 
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Figure 5.4: Firm Years of Operation 
 
Most export firms that responded to the survey have operated for more than 10 
years whereby 60.8 percent of these firms responded to the survey. Others have been in 
business for less than 5 years and 5-10 years in business with 18.9 percent and 20.3 
percent respectively (refer to figure 5.4). 
As shown in Figure 5.5, small- size export firms responded the most with 62.5 
percent. Medium-sized firms that responded totalled to34.4 percent and large size firms 
that responded came up to about 3.1 percent. When both the small and medium-size firms 
are combined, the sum total of the sample firms is 96.9 percent. This is reflective of the 
population which is about 99 percent. 
 
Figure 5.5: Firm Size 
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Figure 5.6 shows that more than 70 percent of the export firms have an annual 
turnover of more than RM1, 000,000. Firms with a turnover of less than RM1, 000,000 
but more than RM500,000 constitutes about 11.9 percent. Others having a turnover of 
between RM101-RM500, 000 and less than RM100, 000 are 8.4 percent and 7 percent 
respectively. 
 
Figure 5.6: Firm Turnover 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Major Export Markets 
In regards to export markets, findings from firms that responded to the survey 
shown that most exporters export to the ASEAN market (29 percent). Exports to the US, 
China, Japan and EU markets constitutes 24 percent, 21.2 percent, 13.8 percent and 12 
percent respectively (refer to figure 5.7). 
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5.3   NTMs’ INCIDENCES FACED BY MALAYSIAN EXPORTERS 
 Figure 5.8 shows the various NTMs faced by the Malaysian exporters who took 
part in this study. Among the NTMs that are faced by Malaysian exporters, at the top of 
the list are pre-shipment, TBT (Technical Barriers – to – Trade) and RoO (Rules of 
Origin). Pre-shipment measures (a technical measure) emerges as the topmost concern 
for the exporters. Overall, 77.6 percent of the exporters noted that they faced pre-shipment 
measures. 
Figure 5.8: Incidence of NTMs 
 
This is followed by TBT measures which are faced by 65.7 percent of the 
exporters. TBT, according to Yue and Beghin (2009), are effective protectionist measures 
whenever they do not address market failures and information asymmetries. The rules of 
origin measures, though only faced by 56.6 percent of exporters, is still high compared to 
other NTMs faced. Pre-shipment inspections (PSIs) are often necessary to provide some 
assurance on the quality/quantity of the shipment and thus promote international trade. 
However, PSIs add to the costs of trading and may reduce the competitiveness streak of 
exporters, especially from developing countries. UNCTAD (2013) found that exporters 
from developing countries on average face almost 20 percent of their trade and products 
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being affected by PSIs. In a study by Rokiah (2007), Malaysia’s resource-based export 
firms - biofuels and wood products face TBT measures imposed in EU and Japan.  
This study’s findings are further strengthened by Zarrilli and Musselli (2004) and 
Doanh and Kee (2007), who found that incidences of NTMs is higher in agriculture 
exports than on manufactured products. Bora et al. (2002) also noted that agricultural 
product exporters in all countries report a high incidence of NTMs which increases 
production costs. Mohan et al. (2012) noted that pre-shipment measures are among the 
technical barriers most commonly faced by agricultural product exporters. They also 
found that the rules of origin (RoO) measure is a major concern for exporters of 
agricultural products from developing countries who export to the US and EU. 
Compliance to stringent rules of origin and completion of customs documentation to 
prove exporters’ eligibility for preferences adds to the total costs which offsets part or 
even the total margin obtained from the preferential treatment provided to exporters from 
developing countries from countries like the US and EU (Brenton and Ikezuki, 2005). 
Inama (2003) and Mattoo et al. (2003) estimated that the total cost of border formalities 
with regards to the rules of origin measure for a product is about 3 percent of the total 
value of the product when entering the EU market. For the RoO imposed in the US, the 
total compliant costs for developing countries was 6.2 percent in 2001 (Carrere and de 
Melo, 2004). OECD (2005) found that among the main NTMs faced by Asian exporters 
are TBT and PSI. 
A survey by the Government of India (GOI) in 1999 and Mehta (2005) discerned 
that Indian exporters to the US, EU and Japan face among others stringent TBT and PSI 
measures. Rules of origin (RoO) was cited as one of the NTMs faced by India and 
Pakistan exporters (Taneja, 2007). Stringent RoO has been cited as a significant barrier 
for exporters from developing countries to the US, EU and Japan (Carrere and de Melo, 
2011). In a study by Mimouni et al. (2009), TBT and PSIs measures were cited as being 
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serious obstacles to trade faced by exporters from five developing countries. RoO 
becomes a necessary measure when free trade agreement is enacted. For Malaysian 
exporters, RoO is likely to be imposed by Japan and AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) 
member countries as Malaysia has forged trade partnerships with Japan and is a member 
of AFTA. RoO measures may not be an issue with the US and EU as Malaysia is yet to 
establish a pact with these countries. 
 
5.4 NTMs BY FIRM TYPE 
 Figure 5.9 shows Malaysian based firm exporters of resourced-based and non-
resource-based products who face NTMs. The resource-based exporters face SPS, TBT, 
and PSIs among the top NTMs. As discussed earlier, the resourced-based firms use 
natural resources to produce their output (product).  
 
Figure 5.9: NTMs  by Firm Type (Category) 
 
Examples of firms in such a category are oil and gas, plantation, wood, furniture, animals, 
forest, chemical, palm oil, rubber, food and beverage firms and so forth.Non-resource-
based export firms face TBT, PSI and RoO as the top three NTMs. Non-resource-based 
firms sell products that are not from natural resource such as firms in the electrical and 
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electronic sector, machinery and machine components, equipment manufacturing, toys 
etc. OECD (2005) found that Asian exporters to the USA, EU, Japan, and Canada face 
NTMs mainly in the form of TBTs, SPS, PSIs. Resource-based exporters who trade in 
food products, chemicals, textiles and leather products are particularly affected. This 
concurs with the findings of Mehta (2005) that Indian firms faced NTMs as listed by 
OECD (2005) on developing countries’ exports. Mehta found that resource-based 
products such as vegetables, textiles, chemicals and prepared food were mostly affected 
by the NTMs. 
The high incidence of RoO measure faced by non-resource-based firms could be 
due to Malaysia being a member of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and Malaysia-
Japan Partnership Agreement (MJPA) which requires the invocation of the measures by 
the importers for preferential treatment to be bestowed on its members.  
5.5 NTMs BY FIRM EXPORT LEVEL 
 Figure 5.10 explains the situation of Malaysian exporting firms which face NTMs 
by level of exports.  
   Figure 5.10: NTMs  by Firm Export Level 
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Firms that export ‘25 percent and less’ and ‘26-50 percent’ seem to face NTMs more 
frequently than the other export level firms. Firms that export ‘more than 75 percent’ tend 
to experience the least incidences of NTMs. 
 
5.6 NTMs BY FIRM SIZE 
 The size of exporters’ firm can be connected to the severity of NTMs faced. In the 
case of Malaysian exporters, as depicted in Figure 5.11, a high percentage of small and 
medium-sized export firms face higher incidences of NTMs compared to large-sized 
export firms. Small firms face the most incidence of NTMs amongst the three firm sizes. 
 
Figure 5.11: NTMs by Firm Size 
 
Small and medium firms largely face PSI, TBT, SPS, competition and RoO types 
of NTMs in their export destinations. Barnett and Amburgey (1990) found that small 
firms lacked available resources to handle NTMs such as customs related transactions; 
this results in high trade costs which eventually impedes exports (Leonidou, 1995).  
The customs formalities are captured under the PSIs which is the highest form of 
NTM faced by Malaysian exporters of small and medium firms in this study. Ojala and 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
 (
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
)
Small -size Medium-size Large-size
 112 
 
Tyvrainen (2007) also found that the stringency of NTMS faced by small and medium 
sized firms in the Japanese market is due to lack of resources and capability to operate in 
the market. In research studies on firm size and export behaviour in the early years, a 
positive relationship of both the variables were concluded (Wignaraja, 2002; Aitken et 
al., 1997; Burton and Schlegelmilch, 1987 and Reid, 1984). However, some studies 
concluded otherwise (Archarungroj and Hoshino, 1998; Marandu, 1995 and 
Karafakioglu, 1986). One of the main reasons argued by authors on firms feeling the heat 
upon facing the incidence of NTMs is the cost of compliance (CoC) (Bell, 1997; Hudson 
and Godwin, 2000; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2003; Wilson and Otsuki, 2004; Passadila and 
Liao, 2007 and Saini, 2011). They noted that smaller-sized firms face financial and other 
resource constraints in complying with NTMs whereas large firms face lower compliance 
costs (Guntz et al., 1995). 
 
5.7  SUMMARY 
 The chapter presents important information about the 143 firms surveyed. The 
participation by non-resource-based firms was the highest among the 143 firms which 
tallies with the actual export contribution by this type of firms in 2015. Figure 5.2 shows 
that close to 50 percent exports in 2015 are from non-resource-based firms. This is after 
exclusion of contribution by other products which constitute about 20.7 percent. 
Established export firms with more than 10 years in operation responded the most. This 
could be attributed to them placing a high importance on providing feedback to this and 
similar surveys which may be used in future policy making endeavours.  
According to the response rate, Malaysian owned export firms outweigh foreign 
owned export firms. This is expected as Malaysian owned export firms are obviously 
higher in number than foreign owned export firms. The highest respondents in the survey 
were from the exporters of  small firms. This is reflective of the composition of businesses 
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in Malaysia where export firms are comprised mostly of small firms. Small firms are  
critically in need of policies that will be beneficial to them. One of the aim of this study’s 
findings is to contribute to that end.   
 The survey shows that Malaysian firms export mostly to the ASEAN region. For 
individual countries, the USA is the top export destination, followed by China, EU and 
Japan.  The bulk of exported products to ASEAN, EU and Japan concurs in percentage 
with the exports in 2015 as reported by MITI (2015). Firms with less export intensive 
range with export levels of ‘25 percent and less’ and ‘26-50 percent’ seem to face 
incidences of NTMs more than export intensive firms with export levels of more than 50 
percent. This could be attributed to the fact that the more resources that the intensive 
export firms have, the capacity and capability to manage the NTMs effectively and treat 
them as normal becomes exponentially higher. The TMs mostly faced by Malaysian 
export firms are SPS, TBT as well as pre-shipment and customs. Resource-based firms 
are largely affected by two measures, which are SPS and pre-shipment and customs while 
non-resource-based firms are affected by TBT and pre-shipment and  customs measures 
(refer to Figure 5.9).   
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CHAPTER 6: 
PERCEPTIONS OF MALAYSIAN EXPORTERS TOWARDS NON-TARIFF 
MEASURES 
 
6.1   INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter presents the findings on the impact of overall NTMs, TMs, CPs, 
ONTMs, PMs and InfoAsym of the 143 Malaysian exporters who took part in the survey. 
The findings are provided against the export levels of five export markets, namely, the 
USA, EU, Japan, China and ASEAN. Results pertaining to the overall impact of  NTMs  
is reported in section 6.2.  In section 6.3, the outcomes of the impact of stringency of TMs 
are given. Results on the stringency of specific NTMs which include; CPs, ONTMs (such 
as culture barriers and language barriers), PMs and InfoAsym against export levels with 
respect to the five export markets are given in section 6.4. The following section 
highlights the findings of the NTM types faced by Malaysian exporters and finally, the 
last section of this chapter summarizes the key findings of this research. 
 
6.2 RESULTS ON IMPACT OF STRINGENCY OF NTMs 
  The following discussion  explains the stringency of NTMs on Malaysia’s exports 
and by major export destinations. The control variables included are firm type, firm size, 
firm age and firm ownership. The multinomial logistic regression model is used to 
estimate the stringency of NTMs on the level of exports against the reference export level 
as given below; 
 1Y  = ’25 percent and less’; 2Y  = ‘26-50 percent’; 3Y  = ‘51-75 percent’; and 4Y  = ‘more 
than 75 percent’ (reference group), and for each market as mentioned in chapter 3, is 
restated below; 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRNTM      (3.12) 
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As mentioned in the research methodology chapter, the reference group ‘more 
than 75 percent’ is not analysed. The model equation used in estimating the stringency of 
NTM against each export level (including reference export level) and for each export 
market is restated below; 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRNTMUS,EU,Japan,China,ASEAN   (3.19) 
 
The diagnostic tests which use chi-square and pseudo-square (Cox and Snell; 
Nagelkerke and McFGadden) as the model fit for stringency of NTMs has been achieved. 
(refer to Table 6.1). Model fit information suggests that significance of p-value for the 
chi-square depicts that there is a relationship between the dependent variable and 
combination of independent variables. According to McFadden (1973), values of Pseudo-
square ranging from 0.2 to 0.4, are considered “highly satisfactory.” Likelihood ratio tests 
are presented in Table 6.2. It illustrates that the stringency of NTMs variable is 
significantly related to the effect (percent export). The control variables used in this 
analysis (firm type, firm ownership, firm age and firm size) were also found to be 
significantly related to the model. It can be concluded that each variable contributes to 
the model. 
The parameter estimates are further reported in Table 6.1 and it shows that 
exporters whose exports are 75 percent and below, are more likely to find NTMs to be 
stringent compared to the reference group (“more than 75 percent”). Resource-based 
firms compared to non-resource-based firms are more likely to be in two export level 
groups i.e. “26-50 percent” and “51-75 percent” compared to the reference group. These 
findings imply that resource-based firms in these two export level groups may perceive 
NTMs to be stringent compared to firms that export more than 75 percent (reference 
group). Small and medium-sized firms seem to be significantly related to three export 
level groups (“25 percent and less”, “26-50 percent” and “51-75 percent”). Small-size 
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firms’ variable in the “51-75 percent” export level is significant at 10 percent level. It 
implies that these firms are inclined to perceive NTMs to be stringent and this could be 
the reason for their lower export level (percentage). 
The argument is that an NTM is perceived to be stringent if it potentially causes 
major implications on cost, production, resources and capacities which may become an 
impediment to exports. NTMs can lead to an increase in the cost of production and 
delivery (Francois et al., 2011). Fearing the high costs that need to be incurred, the 
perceived stringency may reduce the export potential capacity of exporters, hence 
resulting in a lower export level. However, this might not be the case always as perceived 
stringency of NTMs may not always render lower exports for firms that are better 
prepared. This is because experienced exporters and large size firms with high export 
percentage are likely to perceive NTMs as less of a concern due to the fact that they are 
better positioned to withstand the costs, production and capacity implications. These 
exporters understand and manage the NTMs effectively by meeting the standards and 
requirements imposed by their importers. Hence, it is appropriate to put forth the 
argument that exporters in the “more than 75 percent” group are less likely to perceive 
NTMs as stringent. 
In reference to high-valued food exports, Jaffee and Henson (2004) found that the 
recurring costs of compliance experienced by exporters from developing countries puts 
them in a less competitive position in export markets. This could be the case for resource-
based firms’ exporting less than 75 percent from a developing country like Malaysia as 
elucidated in this study’s findings. It could also be the case of exporters deflecting their 
exports to other countries because of increased cost of compliance, especially with 
regards to export to the US market (World Bank, 2005, Debaere, 2005). Anders and 
Caswell (2009) expounded that exporters that stand to lose by complying with these 
standards, generally tend to be the small exporters. This is consistent with this study’s 
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findings, where small sized firms in the three export level groups (less than 75 percent) 
may perceive NTMs to be stringent. 
 
Table 6.1: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of NTMs 
 
More than 75 
percent 
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -1.073 .877 1.497 1 .221  
Resource-based (against non-resource-
based) 
.672 .646 1.080 1 .299 1.957 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .039 .914 .002 1 .966 1.040 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
.039 .927 .002 1 .966 1.040 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .346 .815 .180 1 .671 1.413 
Small size (against large size) 1.997 .799 6.246 1 .012 7.368 
Medium size (against large size) 2.094 .872 5.766 1 .016 8.119 
NTMs stringent (against NTMs not 
stringent) 
1.812 .743 5.942 1 .015 6.123 
26 – 50 percent 
Intercept -1.250 .874 2.046 1 .153  
Resource-based (against non-resource-
based) 
1.332 .671 3.937 1 .047 3.788 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -1.433 .923 2.412 1 .120 .239 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
.259 .967 .072 1 .789 1.295 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.245 .879 .077 1 .781 .783 
Small size (against large size) 2.611 .885 8.707 1 .003 13.607 
Medium size (against large size) 3.435 .948 13.139 1 .000 31.017 
NTMs stringent (against NTMs not 
stringent) 
2.732 .781 12.253 1 .000 15.370 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -3.349 1.330 6.344 1 .012  
Resource-based (against non-resource-
based) 
1.966 .754 6.800 1 .009 7.141 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .831 1.307 .404 1 .525 2.295 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
-.600 1.185 .256 1 .613 .549 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .388 .947 .168 1 .682 1.475 
Small size (against large size) 1.858 .960 3.746 1 .053 6.413 
Medium size (against large size) 2.188 1.029 4.521 1 .033 8.917 
NTMs stringent (against NTMs not 
stringent) 
1.808 .856 4.463 1 .035 6.097 
Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent”. Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi 
square 44.721. Cox and Snell: 0.269; Nagelkerke: 0.291; McFadden: 0.122 
 
The standards imposed by importing countries tend to be a catalyst for larger, 
more established exporters among developing countries and unfortunately, acts as a 
barrier to small exporters (Anders and Caswell, 2009). In discussing the stringency of 
NTMs which relates to costs, Prabir De (2011) discerned that the higher the transaction 
costs between trading partners, the lesser they trade. He further noted that a 10 percent 
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fall in transaction costs at borders has the effect of increasing a country’s export by about 
2 percent. 
                   Table 6.2: Likelihood Ratio Test 
To distinguish the stringency of NTMs by export destinations for Malaysian 
goods, the analysis is disaggregated by core markets, namely the US, EU, Japan, China 
and ASEAN. Each market is interacted with the NTM stringency variable. Summary of 
the findings is shown in Table 6.3 below. It can be noted from Table 6.3, that firms that 
export below 75 percent are more likely to find NTMs as stringent in most major export 
destinations. The findings for the EU market is interesting as it concurs with the 
arguments in chapter 4, where NTMs in the EU are although fewer in number, are relative 
to the other major export destinations, and also found to be stringent. NTMs imposed by 
China and ASEAN markets are considered stringent by firms with “26-50 percent” and 
“51-75 percent” export levels. Among the three export levels, resource-based firms are 
significantly related to the “51-75 percent” export group compared to the reference group. 
These resource-based firms could be petroleum, LNG, chemical, furniture and palm oil 
which constitute more than 30 percent of total exports in 2015 (MITI, 2015). Resource-
based firms that export between 51-75 percent to the US and EU may likely perceive the 
NTMs as being stringent.  
 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 175.655a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 185.639 9.984 3 .019 
Firm Ownership 182.751 7.095 3 .069 
Firm Age 178.646 2.990 6 .810 
Firm Size 194.484 18.829 6 .004 
NTMs stringent 192.070 16.415 3 .001 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.3: Summary Results of Stringency of NTMs by Export Markets 
Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent”. Refer to Appendices A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5  
for detailed results. 
  
However, resource-based firms may perceive exports to Japan and ASEAN 
markets as being significantly more stringent. This is because firms in the two export 
levels (“26-50 percent” and “51-75 percent”) may perceive NTMs to be stringent in Japan 
and ASEAN markets. Though Malaysia is part of ASEAN, resource-based firms still 
perceive NTMs as being stringent in its own region. 
Firms which have been in operation for less than 5 years are most likely to be only 
in the ‘25 percent and less’ export group. Strict TM imposed in Japan and ASEAN market 
could explain why Malaysian exporters perceive it as stringent. Firm size is also found to 
be important for export intensity especially to major markets. Small and medium sized 
firms are most likely to be in the ‘25 percent and less’ and ‘26-50 percent’ exports groups 
for the US, EU and Japan markets. NTMs are likely to pose challenges to firms in these 
export levels compared to larger export level groups.  
Fliess and Kim (2008) studied 136 exporters from 10 OECD countries and non-
OECD countries and found that more than half of the SMEs that participated in the study 
Percent Export B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 
US  
25 percent and less 2.672 1.181 5.120 1 .024 14.466 
26 -50 percent 2.635 1.181 4.976 1 .026 13.939 
51 – 75 percent 2.611 1.258 4.304 1 .038 13.610 
EU  
25 percent and less 1.713 .714 5.758 1 .016 5.544 
26 -50 percent 1.856 .729 6.483 1 .011 6.401 
51 – 75 percent 1.598 .806 3.928 1 .047 4.941 
Japan  
25 percent and less 1.429 .751 3.620 1 .057 4.176 
26 -50 percent 2.861 .838 11.670 1 .001 17.487 
51 – 75 percent 1.711 .704 5.903 1 .015 5.532 
China  
25 percent and less 1.707 .734 5.402 1 .020 5.510 
26 -50 percent 1.968 .754 6.805 1 .009 7.156 
51 – 75 percent .341 .893 .146 1 .703 1.406 
ASEAN       
25 percent and less 1.700 .576 8.703 1 .003 5.473 
26 -50 percent 1.187 .585 4.117 1 .042 3.276 
51 – 75 percent 1.080 .663 2.653 1 .103 2.945 
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experienced at least one NTM posing as a major or prohibitive barrier to trade. OECD 
(2005) found certain NTMs such as customs and administrative procedures and technical 
barriers to trade imposed by developed countries are considered stringent by developing 
countries. The OECD study findings seem to strengthen this study on Malaysian exporters 
where in reference to Table 6.3, most export groups find NTMs imposed by the US, EU, 
and Japan as stringent. Henson and Loader (2001) noted that although TMs adopted by 
developed countries may be legitimate, however, its imposition can be stringent to 
developing countries to the extent where it obstructs exports.  
WTO (2012) in support of this argument found that NTMs which have legitimate 
purpose in rectifying market failures can still increases cost for exporters. Stringent food 
safety standards imposed in developed countries generally hamper the exporting ability 
(implying the capabilities of exporters from developing countries) of developing 
countries (Otsuki et al., 2001). Zarrilli and Musselli (2004) found that in the wake of 
biotechnology trade, developed countries have imposed restrictive measures which are 
costly and burdensome for exporters from developing countries to the point where they 
find them stringent. The standards imposed cause exporters from developing countries to 
find them stringent and bear high compliance costs which restrict their ability to export 
(Portugal-Perez et al., 2010). 
The above argument is supported by an empirical study done by Henson and 
Heasman (1998) where the authors revealed that unit compliance costs are negatively 
related to firm size (implying economies of scale. Large firms are generally more able to 
comply with regulations in a manner which yields competitive advantage than small 
firms. Pasadilla and Liao (2007) found that relatively, large and well established firms are 
able to cope with the additional and varying standards as opposed to small firms. Fliess 
and Kim (2008) noted that regulatory compliance costs in EU deter smaller firms from 
engaging in international trade. However, the authors found that multiple standards in EU 
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markets tend to favour larger exporters as it quickly becomes a source of competitive 
advantage but the same is not true for SMEs as it poses a barrier to trade.  
Export intensive and larger firms generally have exposure and capabilities to 
manage and comply with NTM requirements in the export markets. On the other hand, 
such stringent measures imposed by developed countries are not perceived as stringent 
because it can spur exporters from developing countries to be competitive (Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2009) by investing in technological capabilities (Nixon and Wignaraja, 2004). 
This could be a possible explanation for large firms not perceiving NTMs as stringent in 
this study. In a study by Saini (2011), stringent labour and environmental standards 
imposed by the US and EU have caused Indian firms in the textile and clothing sector to 
face increased costs of compliance, In some cases, NTMs such as quotas and licences 
may even restrict entry of products into a particular market. The author also noted that 
NTMs may be firm specific where his study noted that smaller firms find it difficult to 
comply with NTMs’ requirements as they lack bargaining power due to insufficient 
resources and capabilities unlike their counterparts which are the larger firms. Smaller 
firms tend to lose out in exports as they tend not to benefit from economies of scale 
(Bhandari and Maiti, 2007) due to the reason that they incur higher cost of compliance 
(Loader and Hobbs, 1999). 
As mentioned above, Malaysian exporters can be divided into two export level 
groups; ‘26-50 percent’ and ‘51-75 percent. They still perceive NTMs as being stringent 
in ASEAN region, even though Malaysia is part of this trade group. Presently, studies 
with regards to NTMs imposed by ASEAN countries are minimal. According to Cadot et 
al. (2013), one reason among others could be because the region suffers from a lack of 
information on NTMs as they are not transparent. Furthermore, the authors stated that the 
price-raising effect of NTMs in the region is undoubtedly substantial. Hence, this 
argument lends support to the reason why Malaysian exporters find NTMs in the ASEAN 
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countries severe or stringent, especially those exporting less than 75 percent. As observed 
by Plummer (2006), the ASEAN economic cooperation has not developed significantly 
as it should have, citing the reason that intra-regional trade growth did not develop as 
predicted. Elliot and Ikemoto (2004) concurred with this stating that the signing of AFTA 
in 1993 did not trigger much intra-regional trade as forecasted in the subsequent years 
after the signing of AFTA took place. 
Stringency of NTMs even among the ASEAN member countries could be a cause 
for concern. Siah et al., (2009) asserted that though the AFTA was signed and paved way 
for a stronger collaboration among members that was expected to enhance trade, each 
country instead placed importance on and established protectionist measure against 
imports from the rest of the world encouraging trade diversion to take place among its 
members. Though ASEAN is proud to have AFTA where progress has been achieved in 
terms of tariffs, the NTMs continue to constitute serious impediments to intra-regional 
trade (Plummer et al., 2014 and Chia, 2013). Shepherd (2010) found that efforts by 
ASEAN countries to reduce NTMs were not encouraging. Intra-ASEAN trade has 
improved as seen from the increase in the total trade of US$166.1 billion in 2000 to 
US$602 billion in 2012 as reported in the ASEAN Secretariat 2012. Though trade is 
progressing, Basu Das (2012) notes that NTMs pose a real concern for ASEAN member 
countries to achieve a single market and production base. The author further quoted that 
among the NTMs, the non-automatic licensing, technical regulations and quality 
standards continue to prevail in the region. ASEAN countries were urged to have a 
standardised business environment and the SMEs especially were pressed to be more 
competitive (The STAR, 2015). 
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6.3  STRINGENCY OF TMs  
   The model explains the stringency of TMs on Malaysian exports and by major 
export destinations. The multinomial logistic regression model equations estimate the 
stringency of TMs on export levels against the reference export level and against each 
market are restated below (see Chapter 3): 
 Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +         
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRTM      (3.13) 
 
 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRTMUS,EU,Japan,China,ASEAN               (3.20) 
  
 
The likelihood ratio tests presented in Table 6.5 shows that the stringency of TMs 
variable is significantly related to the effect (percent export). Among the control 
variables, only the firm type and firm size are significantly related to the model. 
The UNCTAD classification of TMs comprise the first three chapters which are 
SPS, TBT and PSI and other formalities (UNCTAD, 2013). The frequency index analysed 
by Gourdon and Nicita (2013) shows that among the NTMs, TMs, TBTs and SPS are the 
measures that are most often used. These measures are imposed to ensure the protection 
of human, animal, and environmental safety. The compliance costs in meeting the TM 
requirements are normally trade-restrictive and can double the trade barrier effect for 
some products (Moise and Le Bris, 2013). This study’s findings on perceived stringency 
of TMs are presented in Table 6.4. It informs that the perceived stringency of TMs is most 
likely to be seen in the groups that export 75 percent and below, compared to the reference 
group. It implies that large-size (more than 75 percent-reference group) exporting firms 
may perceive TM as not stringent to their exports.  
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             Table 6.4: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of TMs 
 
 Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent”. 
 Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 66.028. Cox and Snell: 0.370; Nagelkerke: 0.400; McFadden: 0.180 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.5: Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 172.583a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 179.868 7.285 3 .063 
Firm Ownership 177.387 4.804 3 .187 
Firm Age 175.696 3.112 6 .795 
Firm Size 191.195 18.612 6 .005 
TMs Stringent 210.305 37.722 3 .000 
a. This Reduced Model Is Equivalent To The Final Model Because Omitting 
The Effect Does Not Increase The Degrees Of Freedom. 
 
More than 75 
percent 
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent 
and less 
Intercept -1.487 .971 2.342 1 .126  
Resource-based (against non-resource-
based) 
.435 .633 .471 1 .492 1.545 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.066 .946 1.271 1 .260 2.905 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
-.579 .966 .359 1 .549 .561 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .200 .779 .066 1 .798 1.221 
Small size (against large size) 1.691 .744 5.161 1 .023 5.426 
Medium size (against large size) 1.842 .815 5.103 1 .024 6.307 
TMs stringent (against  TMs not stringent) 2.147 .916 5.491 1 .019 8.562 
26 – 50 
percent 
Intercept -2.871 1.091 6.926 1 .008  
Resource-based (against non-resource-
based) 
.939 .694 1.832 1 .176 2.557 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .234 1.006 .054 1 .816 1.263 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
-.960 1.049 .839 1 .360 .383 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.413 .880 .220 1 .639 .661 
Small size (against large size) 2.430 .894 7.391 1 .007 11.354 
Medium size (against large size) 3.499 .949 13.608 1 .000 33.096 
TMs stringent (against  TMs not stringent) 4.243 .970 19.138 1 .000 69.608 
51 – 75 
percent 
Intercept -4.401 1.479 8.861 1 .003  
Resource-based (against non-resource-
based) 
1.718 .754 5.189 1 .023 5.575 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 2.089 1.372 2.319 1 .128 8.081 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
-1.453 1.229 1.399 1 .237 .234 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .252 .919 .075 1 .784 1.286 
Small size (against large size) 1.672 .939 3.169 1 .075 5.321 
Medium size (against large size) 2.205 .994 4.919 1 .027 9.073 
TMs stringent (against  TMs not stringent) 2.986 1.015 8.646 1 .003 19.799 
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The findings in this study clearly denote that small and medium-size firms are 
significantly related to the three groups that export 75 percent and below percentage 
compared to large size firms. Hence, it can be said that the perceived stringency of TBT 
and SPS is less likely to be a concern for large sized firms exporting more than 75 percent. 
As discussed earlier, large size firms are in better position in terms of resources, 
capabilities and capacities to meet the TMs’ requirements for their exports. The findings 
also show that resource-based firms are implicated only in ‘51-75 percent’ export level 
group. 
 The findings for each export market is shown in detail in Table 6.6. It shows that 
for almost all three export level groups in all export markets, the perceived stringency of 
TM is significantly related. It concurs with the findings by Fugazza (2013), who posited 
that TMs especially, TBT and SPS pose a concern for developing countries. He further 
noted that an average of 30 percent of products and trade from developing countries are 
likely to face the brunt of TBT and 15 percent SPS measures. The findings regarding 
Malaysia, fits Fugazza’s conclusions as Malaysia also falls under the category of  
developing countries. It seems that the NTMs imposed on these firms which exports 
sizeable export level (more than 50 percent) of resource-based products are perceived to 
be stringent because of the possibility of high compliance costs compared to the other 
lower export level groups. Small and medium size firms in the three export levels 
exporting 75 percent and below are most likely to perceive TMs as stringent compared to 
the reference group that exports more than 75 percent.  Resource-based firms are clearly 
in the ‘51-75 percent’ export groups for all the export markets.  
Interview feedback given by resource-based small and medium size firms which 
export lesser than 50 percent, perceive the TMs as stringent as their export level is not 
high enough to generate the financial strength to meet the stringent requirements imposed 
on their export products. For the ASEAN market, the same reason is given in the case of 
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stringency perceived on NTMs as it could be applicable for firms in the two export level 
groups (50 percent and below) which perceive TMs to be stringent giving rise to the 
possible cause of the current export level. 
 
Table 6.6: Summary Results of Stringency of TMs by Export Market 
 
Percent Export B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 
US  
25 percent and less 1.446 .758 3.642 1 .056 4.246 
26 -50 percent 3.612 .828 19.017 1 .000 37.040 
51 – 75 percent 1.767 .876 4.073 1 .044 5.855 
EU  
25 percent and less 1.385 .753 3.382 1 .066 3.994 
26 -50 percent 3.590 .825 18.931 1 .000 36.237 
51 – 75 percent 2.198 .867 6.419 1 .011 9.004 
Japan  
25 percent and less 1.610 .783 4.229 1 .040 5.005 
26 -50 percent 3.582 .839 18.247 1 .000 35.955 
51 – 75 percent 2.249 .889 6.397 1 .011 9.480 
China  
25 percent and less 1.767 .725 5.938 1 .015 5.853 
26 -50 percent 2.049 .739 7.685 1 .006 7.759 
51 – 75 percent .397 .880 .204 1 .652 1.488 
ASEAN       
25 percent and less 1.648 .707 5.440 1 .020 5.197 
26 -50 percent 1.509 .728 4.297 1 .038 4.521 
51 – 75 percent .354 .874 .164 1 .685 1.425 
Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent”. Refer to Appendices A6, A7, A8, A9 and  
A10 for detailed results. 
 
 
 
6.4   STRINGENCY OF SPECIFIC NTMs  
  Apart from analysing the stringency of overall NTMs in the preceding section, 
CPs, ONTMs namely, language and cultural barriers, not having an office on site and a 
bias or preference of the importing country for its own company and PMs are becoming 
a growing concern for exporters. As such, the previous analysis is repeated in this section 
to account for these NTMs. 
 
6.4.1 Stringency of CPs 
The multinomial equation for stringency of CPs is restated below; 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +          
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRCP                                      (3.14) 
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The multinomial equation for stringency of CPs for export markets is restated 
below; 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRCPUS,EU,Japan,China,ASEAN                             (3.21) 
 
The summary of the parameter estimates for perceived stringency of CPs is 
reported in Table 6.7. It suggests that stringency of CPs is significantly related to three 
export level groups; ‘25 percent and less’, ‘26-50 percent’ and ‘51-75 percent’. It implies 
perceived stringency of CPs is most likely to be in these three export level groups 
compared to the reference group. For export destinations, the findings are reported in 
Table 6.9. Custom procedures are perceived to be stringent for all firms with export levels 
of 75 percent and below compared to the reference group.  
Malaysia, although is a part of the ASEAN trade group, still regards CPs imposed 
by its ASEAN counterparts as being stringent. According to EU-ASEAN Business 
Council Report (2015), most ASEAN countries’ CPs are trade prohibitive. The report 
noted that non-transparent and inconsistent application of CPs among member countries 
impede free flow of goods and services. It further reported that non-standardized, lengthy 
and complex customs procedure in ASEAN countries weigh heavily on small and 
medium sized firms’ trade flow. Arvis et al.(2013) found that improvement in CPs will 
improve a country’s logistics performance which could reduce bilateral trade costs by ten 
times more than an equivalent reduction in tariff barriers. 
This study noted that the resource-based firms most likely to be in the ‘26-50 
percent’ and ‘51-75 percent’ export level groups perceive CPs as stringent compared to 
the reference group for US and Japan markets. For the EU market, the resource-based 
firms are most likely to be in the ‘51-75 percent’ export level group whereby they perceive 
CPs as stringent compared to the reference group.  
 
 128 
 
              Table 6.7: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of CPs 
Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent”. 
 Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 46.112. Cox and Snell: 0.276; Nagelkerke: 0.298; McFadden: 0.125 
 
 
Table 6.8: Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 148.297a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 159.348 11.051 3 .011 
Firm Ownership 153.742 5.445 3 .142 
Firm Age 152.453 4.156 6 .656 
Firm Size 162.385 14.088 6 .029 
CPs stringent 166.103 17.806 3 .000 
a. This Reduced Model Is Equivalent To The Final Model Because 
Omitting The Effect Does Not Increase The Degrees Of Freedom. 
 
For the ASEAN market, resource-based firms are most likely to be in the ‘26-50 
percent’ and ‘51-75 percent’ export level groups that perceive CPs as stringent compared 
More than 75 
percent 
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent       
and less 
Intercept -2.977 1.205 6.106 1 .013  
Resource-based (against non-resource-
based) 
.854 .671 1.619 1 .203 2.349 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .912 .926 .971 1 .324 2.490 
 Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
.249 .958 .067 1 .795 1.282 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.317 .979 1.810 1 .179 3.732 
Small size (against large size) .782 .761 1.056 1 .304 2.187 
Medium size (against large size) 2.124 .949 5.007 1 .025 8.366 
CPs stringent (against CPs not stringent) 2.600 .849 9.388 1 .002 13.464 
26 – 50 percent 
Intercept -3.521 1.274 7.638 1 .006  
Resource-based (against non-resource-
based) 
1.483 .691 4.611 1 .032 4.406 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.206 .913 .051 1 .821 .813 
 Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
.361 .990 .133 1 .716 1.435 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .777 1.036 .562 1 .454 2.174 
Small size (against large size) 1.133 .829 1.868 1 .172 3.106 
Medium size (against large size) 3.191 1.007 10.045 1 .002 24.301 
CPs stringent (against CPs not stringent) 3.420 .952 12.906 1 .000 30.566 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -5.725 1.723 11.033 1 .001  
Resource-based (against non-resource-
based) 
2.203 .788 7.823 1 .005 9.054 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.767 1.334 1.754 1 .185 5.853 
 Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
-.356 1.210 .087 1 .768 .700 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.418 1.091 1.687 1 .194 4.127 
Small size (against large size) .586 .937 .391 1 .532 1.797 
Medium size (against large size) 2.292 1.089 4.428 1 .035 9.892 
CPs stringent (against CPs not stringent) 3.026 1.039 8.477 1 .004 20.620 
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to the reference group. With regards to firm size, small and medium sized firms in all 
markets perceive CPs as stringent to their exports compared to the large sized firms. 
While there is little literature on Malaysian exporters’ experience of the CPs in  export 
markets, the existing literature generally informs that customs and administrative 
procedures are found to pose a problem for exporters. Lengthy CPs including time delays 
may hinder trade between countries (Wilson, 2007) and prevent firms from entering 
export markets (Nordas et al., 2006). The need for simple and transparent documents, 
procedures and facilities across border transactions has long been recognised in the 
revised Kyoto Convention of the World Customs Organisation. CPs are identified as trade 
barriers as it has a potentially adverse impact on exporting activity (World Bank, 2009). 
There is little literature linking CPs and export by firm size. Some studies have 
included firm size such as in USITC (2014) which found that US SMEs are affected by 
the CPs in EU. However, few studies show the situation of developing countries’ SMEs 
with regards to CPs in export markets. 
It is further noted that smaller US firms have minimal resources which cripples 
them when managing the complex EU CPs . There are many studies on trade facilitation 
(CPs included) and trade flow in country context, but they are prone to omit firm size. 
However, in the context of Malaysian exporters by firm size, such a study is practically 
non-existant . Hence, this study throws some light on how the varying firm sizes in 
Malaysia are affected by CPs in their export destination. In a study by Liu and Yue (2009), 
involving exporters (of which Malaysia is one of them) of cut flowers to Japan, it was 
found that Japan’s strict customs administrative procedures (along with strict SPS 
measures) have become a trade barrier. 
Findings from this study t tend to concur with OECD (2005) that CPs are 
considered as one of the most problematic NTMs faced by developing countries. 
Malaysia, being a developing country, could be affected by CP regulations  imposed by 
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export countries. However, the findings of this study show that not all export size firms 
from Malaysia find CP as stringent. Firms exporting more than 75 percent tend to not 
regard CPs as barrier. However, firms that export less than 75 percent find the CPs a 
hurdle to trade. Trade facilitation has effects on the extensive margin of trade and 
therefore affects the range of goods that can be traded (Persson, 2013).  
This gives a more plausible argument pertaining to this study’s findings that firms 
with less than 75 percent exports may experience higher costs of exports due to 
cumbersome trade facilitation imposed at the border of exporting countries. Larger size 
export firms have the financial strength to withstand the customs related costs as it could 
only be a small fraction of the total export costs for them. Fliess and Kim (2008) noted 
that SMEs which are predominantly the study samples, identified CPs as being the leading 
NTMs to barrier in trade. This study’s findings seem to be in tandem with Fliess and 
Kim’s where Malaysian exporters who come from mainly small and medium sized firms, 
find CPs stringent. 
Table 6.9 shows how CPs are most likely to be a concern for Malaysian exporters 
in almost all of its export markets. Even in the ASEAN region where Malaysian is a 
member, CPs are perceived to be stringent by firms with less than 75 percent export 
levels. It seems that among the export markets, China’s CPs are not a concern for firms 
exporting more than 50 percent. The above discussions and arguments about the effect of 
CPs are supported by interview feedback whereby the majority of the firms interviewed 
cited lengthy and stringent CPs as major impediment to their entry into various export 
markets. A few firms reported that the lack of standardised and transparent CPs in 
ASEAN and China markets has caused them to incur losses as they were caught off-guard 
with unexpected new procedures and documentation. 
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    Table 6.9: Summary Results of Stringency of CPs by Export Markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent”.  
     See Appendices A11, A12, A13, A14 and    A15 for detailed results. 
 
 
6.4.2  Stringency of  ONTMs 
The multinomial equations for stringency of ONTMs are restated below; 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRONTM                                    (3.15) 
 
 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRONTMUS.EU,Japan,China,ASEAN                            (3.22) 
 
 
The summary of the parameter estimates is reported in Table 6.10. It suggests that 
the stringency of ONTMs are significantly related to two export groups, “25 percent and 
less” and “26-50 percent”. In the export destinations, there is some variation in the results. 
ONTMs in Japan are perceived to be stringent for exporters exporting 75 percent and 
below of their total output (three export level groups), while for the US and EU market, 
exporters within the category of ‘25 percent and less’ and ‘26-50 percent’ of export sales 
find the ONTMs to be stringent.  
Percent Export B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 
US  
25 percent and less 2.265 .830 7.439 1 .006 9.632 
26 -50 percent 3.081 .932 10.921 1 .001 21.783 
51 – 75 percent 2.636 1.024 6.626 1 .010 13.963 
EU  
25 percent and less 1.662 .702 5.605 1 .018 5.271 
26 -50 percent 2.570 .827 9.659 1 .002 13.063 
51 – 75 percent 2.388 1.013 5.561 1 .018 10.896 
Japan  
25 percent and less 2.115 .848 6.221 1 .013 8.292 
26 -50 percent 2.950 .943 9.777 1 .002 19.096 
51 – 75 percent 2.500 1.036 5.825 1 .016 12.183 
China       
25 percent and less 1.941 1.105 3.084 1 .079 6.963 
26 -50 percent 2.881 1.102 6.830 1 .009 17.837 
51 – 75 percent 1.534 1.214 1.597 1 .206 4.639 
ASEAN  
25 percent and less 1.293 .736 3.087 1 .079 3.643 
26 -50 percent 2.124 .792 7.183 1 .007 8.360 
51 – 75 percent 1.511 .690 4.798 1 .028 4.533 
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For exports to ASEAN market, only firms in the ‘5 percent and less’ are most 
likely to perceive ONTMs as stringent in their exports. Small and medium-sized firms 
that export 50 percent and below are most likely to perceive ONTMs as being stringent. 
ONTMs are barriers which include i) language barrier, ii) cultural differences (not 
language), iii) not having an office or site in an export market, and iv) a bias or preference 
to do business with firms in their own country. One of the researched ONTMs is the 
language barrier. The findings produced mixed outcomes. Lautanen (2000) and Obben 
and Magagula (2003) found that firms with good mastery of a foreign language are likely 
to become exporters. However, other studies disregard the relationship between 
importance of language competency and exporting behaviour of small firms (Daniels and 
Guyboro, 1976, Ursic and Czinkota, 1989 and Williams, 2011). Language and religion 
differences (Anderson and Marcouller, 2002 and Dow and Karunaratna, 2006) that were 
used as cultural proxies in the gravity model examining bilateral trade concur with an 
earlier empirical study done by Beckerman (1956) that trade decreases with cultural 
differences. Moon and Song (2015) support this argument noting that cultural boundaries 
indeed pose a barrier to trade flow (export of product from one cultural community to 
another). 
Further support is garnered from Chandrasekaran and Tellis (2008) where the 
authors argue that cultural environment in the export market is an important determinant 
of a new product’s success. Interestingly, macro-level studies of the impact of cultural 
distance on bilateral trade seems to ignore insights from firm level studies on this research 
area.  
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Table 6.10: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of ONTMs 
 
 Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 35.808. Cox and Snell: 0.222 Nagelkerke: 0.240; McFadden: 0.097 
 
 
          Table 6.11: Likelihood Test Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. This Reduced Model Is Equivalent To The Final Model Because 
Omitting The Effect Does Not Increase The Degrees Of Freedom. 
 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent and 
less 
Intercept -1.103 .851 1.680 1 .195  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .605 .643 .885 1 .347 1.831 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .424 .852 .248 1 .618 1.529 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
-.036 .948 .001 1 .970 .965 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .839 .778 1.161 1 .281 2.313 
Small size (against large size) 1.830 .784 5.446 1 .020 6.235 
Medium size (against large size) 1.204 .678 3.149 1 .076 3.332 
ONTMs stringent (against ONTMs not 
stringent) 
1.692 .725 5.452 1 .020 5.433 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -.783 .788 .988 1 .320  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.228 .652 3.548 1 .060 3.415 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.724 .796 .827 1 .363 .485 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
-.015 .969 .000 1 .988 .985 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .347 .829 .175 1 .676 1.414 
Small size (against large size) 2.168 .832 6.794 1 .009 8.744 
Medium size (against large size) 1.805 .707 6.521 1 .011 6.081 
ONTMs stringent (against ONTMs not 
stringent) 
1.789 .741 5.828 1 .016 5.981 
51 - 75 percent 
Intercept -2.864 1.280 5.003 1 .025  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.540 .737 4.364 1 .037 4.663 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.135 1.233 .848 1 .357 3.111 
 Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
-.190 1.160 .027 1 .870 .827 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.050 .893 1.383 1 .240 2.857 
Small size (against large size) .737 .973 .573 1 .449 2.089 
Medium size (against large size) 1.536 .785 3.831 1 .050 4.645 
ONTMs stringent (against ONTMs not 
stringent) 
1.322 .818 2.611 1 .106 3.753 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 177.342a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 184.231 6.889 3 .076 
Firm Ownership 182.560 5.218 3 .157 
Firm Age 179.924 2.582 6 .859 
Firm Size 192.447 15.105 6 .019 
ONTMs stringent 185.189 7.847 3 .049 
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 Slangen et al. (2011), in their firm level study found that firms having foreign affiliates 
(which in turn do the sales) experience cultural difference as more of a barrier than them 
having to export directly to the export markets. 
 The authors argued that having an affiliate in a foreign country will have impact 
on cost. They further noted that cost increases at a slower rate with cultural difference if 
firms directly export to foreign markets than marketing through their affiliates based in 
the export market. 
Similar to this discussion, a firm level study of Malaysian exporters provides 
deeper meaning on their plight and behaviour with regards to exports. Rarely has such a 
study on export intensity been done. The overall findings show that Malaysian exporters 
that export less than 50 percent find that the ONTMs (encompassing language, other 
cultural factors (including religion), no affiliates and biasness to domestic firms) a barrier 
to trade, thus making a significant contribution in this field of research. It is also 
imperative to note that this finer measure should be done in the study of bilateral trade 
instead of using total export variable. Eastin et al. (2004) found that exporters who have 
office sites in the export market tend to experience improved export performance 
compared to those that do not have one. 
Eastin’s findings supports this study’s findings, where “not having an office site’ 
is proven to be one of the variables in the “ONTMs” variable where Malaysian firms that 
export less than 50 percent find ONTMs as a barrier. The situation of not having an office 
site could explain the predicament of Malaysian firms penetrating the Japanese market 
where the three export groups which are “25 percent and less”, “26-50 percent” and “51-
75 percent”, find ONTMs as a barrier. Another variable included in the ONTMs is the “a 
bias or preference to do business with firms in their own country”. It implies that the 
government’s actions through its trade regulation, procurement procedures, imposition of 
taxes and so forth appears to benefit domestic firms more than importers from foreign 
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countries. Fliess and Kim (2008) found that firms that responded to surveys identified 
preferential treatment of domestic producers by regulators or government as posing a 
barrier to trade.  
The authors further noted that manipulating the procurement procedure to favour 
domestic firm is a clear bias treatment. They further noted that when domestic firms 
produce comparable goods (with regards to importers), subsidies and bid preference are 
some advantages bestowed to them which then becomes a NTM to be overcome by 
market importers. Through this NTM, the domestic firms acquire the edge to compete 
with importers. This study on Malaysian exporters who export below 50 percent seem to 
find ONTMs as a barrier in their exports. This bias to domestic firms could have impacted 
the Malaysian exporters especially those that export below 50 percent. 
Table 6.12 shows the summary findings for the stringency of ONTMs by export 
markets. Malaysian exporters find a significant correlation between export levels below 
75 percent and Japanese market. EU and ASEAN markets are considered less stringent 
in this respect as only firms having export level ‘25 percent and less’ are significantly 
related. China and the US markets are found to be stringent by firms with export level 
less than 50 percent. Most firms interviewed informed that exporting to countries like US 
and EU find ONTMs not stringent as English language is the main medium of 
communication in economic transactions, unlike in Japan. The interview results further 
illustrated that in Japan, the time taken to conclude a transaction is lengthy as the language 
used is not English and this poses a barrier to trade . 
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Table 6.12: Summary Results for Stringency of ONTMs by Export Markets 
Percent Export B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 
US  
25 percent and less 1.311 .579 5.124 1 .024 3.711 
26 -50 percent 2.009 .621 10.481 1 .001 7.455 
51 – 75 percent -.338 .688 .241 1 .623 .713 
EU  
25 percent and less 1.173 .576 4.146 1 .042 3.233 
26 -50 percent .093 .530 .031 1 .861 1.097 
51 – 75 percent -.574 .602 .910 1 .340 .563 
Japan  
25 percent and less 2.292 .838 7.487 1 .006 9.896 
26 -50 percent 1.915 .848 5.095 1 .024 6.788 
51 – 75 percent 2.134 .924 5.340 1 .021 8.451 
China       
25 percent and less 2.027 .721 7.895 1 .005 7.588 
26 -50 percent 1.571 .732 4.606 1 .032 4.810 
51 – 75 percent 1.316 .823 2.559 1 .110 3.730 
ASEAN  
25 percent and less 1.373 .566 5.879 1 .015 3.947 
26 -50 percent .852 .576 2.182 1 .140 2.343 
51 – 75 percent .914 .673 1.845 1 .174 2.494 
Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent”.  See Appendices A16, A17, A18, A19 and A20    
for detailed results. 
 
 
6.4.3 Stringency of  PMs 
   The multinomial equation for stringency of PMs is restated below; 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRPM                                                               (3.16) 
 
The equation for stringency of PM for export markets is restated below; 
 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRPMUS.EU,Japan,China,ASEAN                                 (3.23) 
 
Table 6.13 shows that the stringency of PMs is significantly related to three export 
groups,  ‘25 percent and less’, ‘51 – 75 percent’ and ‘51-75 percent’. Looking at export 
markets (refer to Table 6.15), Malaysian exporters that export more than 75 percent to all 
the export markets do not perceive PMs as stringent. In the case of exports to ASEAN, 
PMs are only an issue for those exporting 25 percent and less of their output. Exporters 
of the three groups i.e. ‘25 percent and less’, ‘51 – 75 percent’ and ‘51-75 percent’ 
perceive PMs in the US, EU and Japan markets as stringent. As in the case of other 
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measures, the small and medium-size firms that exports 75 percent and below perceive 
PMs as stringent compared to large-size firms and as those that export more than 75 
percent.  
Only firms in the export groups of  ‘25 percent and less’ and ‘26-50 percent’ find 
PMs in China market as being stringent. It was found in the interview session that firms 
that export more than 50 percent do not find PMs in the Chinese market to be a constraint 
for trade as they have the resources to manage the barrier. They also stated that generally, 
China’s public measures are more of a concern than PMs as these measures are not 
regulated fully and its recognition by the Chinese government is still vague. 
PMs or standards introduced by private organisations and institutions are 
becoming important in the context of global trade (Henson and Hooker, 2001; Henson, 
2004 and Fulponi, 2007). For example, ISO (Internal Organisation for Standards) a non-
governmental organisation, is the world’s largest developer and publisher of international 
standards. Firms that aim to differentiate their products in international markets 
complywith private standards to have product safety and quality attributes endorsed by 
these internationally recognised organisations (Henson and Reardon, 2005). The authors 
further noted that public standards are unlikely to provide sufficient scope for product 
differentiation. 
In many situations, public measures or standards are less stringent than private 
standards. Vigani and Olper (2013) inform that the majority of retailers in EU abide by 
the requirements of private measure on genetically modified organism that is mandated  
by EU regulations. Other examples include private standards imposed by organisations 
like British Retail Consortium (BRC) or Global Partnership for Good Agriculture 
Practices (GLOBALGAP) which are more stringent than public standards in EU. Almost 
all retailers in EU adopt these standards to be accepted in the marketplace. Hence, 
Malaysian exporters entering into EU markets, likewise, must adopt these relatively 
 138 
 
stringent private standards to be competitive. The same is true for businesses in EU 
adopting the private standard by this type of benchmarking, for instance, Global Food 
Safety Initiative (GFSI) for food safety and sustainability reasons (Fulponi, 2007). 
Consumers in EU have accepted these stricter private standards as a de facto minimum 
that businesses must comply. 
The same point applies to tuna fish business in US where all retailers adopt the 
voluntary standard in the US market (Smith, 2009). While private standards ensure that 
more consumers buy the product, for producers they have to incur compliance costs 
making the production costs higher (Vandermoortele and Deconinck, 2013). Jaffee and 
Henson (2004) and the World Bank (2005) found that costs of compliance to standards 
can impede trade flows, particularly for poorer countries. The authors further noted that 
the inevitable investment and additional ‘costs of compliance’ to penetrate high income 
markets such as the US, EU and Japan renders exporters from developing countries to be 
incapable of competing with their more developed counterparts. 
In obtaining ISO certification series, the costs can be substantial as there is  
auditing costs to be considered as well. In the US, the cost for auditing can range from 
$239 to $1,372 per employee (Darnall and Edwards, 2006). Montiel and Husted (2009) 
and Blackman and Guerrero (2012) studied the drivers of ISO 140001 certification of 
exporters in developing countries.  Both studies found that exporters are more likely to 
be certified. Studies by Nishitani (2009), King et al. (2005) and Arimura et al. (2008) 
found positive correlation between firm size and certification. In this study, not having 
ISO certification may explain why Malaysian exporters find private standards stringent, 
especially in EU, the USA and Japanese markets.  
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                 Table 6.13: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of PMs 
  Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 62.407 Cox and Snell: 0.354 Nagelkerke: 0.381; McFadden: 0.165 
 
 
Table 6.14: Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More than 75 
percent 
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent and 
less 
Intercept -2.007 1.154 3.025 1 .082  
Resource-based (against non-resource-
based) 
.141 .631 .050 1 .824 1.151 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.329 .995 1.782 1 .182 3.777 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
-.042 .651 .004 1 .949 .959 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.585 .801 3.914 1 .048 .205 
Small size (against large size) 1.482 .717 4.279 1 .039 4.403 
Medium size (against large size) 1.166 .823 2.004 1 .157 3.208 
PMs stringent (against PMs not stringent) 3.209 .939 11.689 1 .001 24.764 
26 – 50 percent 
Intercept -2.555 1.183 4.663 1 .031  
Resource-based (against non-resource-
based) 
1.250 .614 4.144 1 .042 3.491 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .853 .971 .772 1 .380 2.348 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
-1.254 .719 3.045 1 .081 .285 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.047 .722 2.103 1 .147 .351 
Small size (against large size) 2.473 .788 9.850 1 .002 11.857 
Medium size (against large size) 2.396 .854 7.871 1 .005 10.981 
PMs stringent (against PMs not stringent) 3.346 .955 12.269 1 .000 28.399 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -1.341 1.284 1.091 1 .296  
Resource-based (against non-resource-
based) 
-.057 .737 .006 1 .939 .945 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .845 1.109 .581 1 .446 2.329 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
-1.612 .872 3.415 1 .065 .199 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.896 .893 4.505 1 .034 .150 
Small size (against large size) .152 .883 .030 1 .864 1.164 
Medium size (against large size) 1.600 .854 3.509 1 .061 4.952 
PMs stringent (against PMs not stringent) 2.869 1.009 8.091 1 .004 17.626 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 162.126a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 171.179 9.053 3 .029 
Firm Ownership 163.853 1.727 3 .631 
Firm Age 178.170 16.043 6 .014 
Firm Size 182.433 20.306 6 .002 
PMs Stringent 184.871 22.745 3 .000 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because 
omitting the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.15: Summary Results for Stringency of PMs by Export Markets 
 
Percent Export B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 
US  
25 percent and less 1.266 .708 3.198 1 .074 3.548 
26 -50 percent 2.192 .796 7.588 1 .006 8.953 
51 – 75 percent 1.310 .670 3.827 1 .050 3.707 
EU  
25 percent and less 1.229 .709 3.006 1 .083 3.417 
26 -50 percent 1.997 .778 6.585 1 .010 7.368 
51 – 75 percent 1.372 .670 4.186 1 .041 3.943 
Japan  
25 percent and less 1.297 .707 3.370 1 .066 3.659 
26 -50 percent 2.088 .782 7.136 1 .008 8.071 
51 – 75 percent 1.304 .672 3.770 1 .052 3.685 
China       
25 percent and less 1.654 .692 5.719 1 .017 5.230 
26 -50 percent 1.869 .778 5.774 1 .016 6.485 
51 – 75 percent 1.078 .677 2.537 1 .111 2.940 
ASEAN  
25 percent and less 1.335 .567 5.546 1 .019 3.799 
26 -50 percent .817 .558 2.145 1 .143 2.263 
51 – 75 percent .209 .659 .101 1 .751 1.233 
        Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent.” See Appendices A21, A22, A23, A24 and A25  
        for detailed results. 
 
Anders and Caswell (2009) found that compliance to standards augers well for large and 
more established firms, but is a barrier for small exporters. Fliess and Kim (2008) support 
Anders and Caswell’s findings noting that multitude standards in EU markets act as a 
competitive advantage for larger firms but a barrier to SMEs. 
 
6.4.4 Effect of InfoAsym  
The multinomial equations for the effect of InfoAsym are restated below 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +        
β4FIRMSIZE + β5INFOASYM                                                       (3.17) 
 
 
Y1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5INFOASYM US.EU,Japan,China,ASEAN                         (3.24) 
 
Table 6.16 shows the parameter estimates for InfoAsym. All three export levels – 
‘25 percent and less’, ‘26-50 percent’ and ‘51-75 percent’ compared to the reference 
group i.e. “more than 75 percent”, experience InfoAsym as it is significantly related to 
their export levels. Guadalupe and Perez-Gonzalez (2006) stated  that improved 
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information, results in the reduction of agency cost and produces accurate relative 
performance evaluation. Labaste (2005) and Porto et al. (2011) argued that exporters of 
fresh products consider promoting information sharing as a strategic priority.  
 
Table 6.16: Parameter Estimates for Effect of InfoAsym 
 
Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 49.234. Cox and Snell: 0.291; Nagelkerke: 0.316; McFadden: 0.136 
 
 
Table 6.17: Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent and 
less 
Intercept -2.732 1.162 5.532 1 .019  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.078 .722 2.226 1 .136 2.938 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.507 1.036 2.117 1 .146 4.515 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.096 1.307 .005 1 .942 .909 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .842 .988 .728 1 .394 2.322 
Small size (against large size) 2.021 .883 5.244 1 .022 7.549 
Medium size (against large size) 1.752 .960 3.333 1 .068 5.768 
InfoAsym effect (against InfoAsym no effect ) 1.460 .752 3.771 1 .052 4.307 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -2.888 1.129 6.544 1 .011  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.874 .773 5.877 1 .015 6.512 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.908 .887 1.048 1 .306 .403 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .273 1.300 .044 1 .834 1.314 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.021 1.098 .000 1 .985 .979 
Small size (against large size) 2.685 1.004 7.155 1 .007 14.654 
Medium size (against large size) 2.989 1.065 7.871 1 .005 19.870 
InfoAsym effect (against InfoAsym no effect ) 2.800 .837 11.185 1 .001 16.441 
51 - 75 percent 
Intercept -.995 .909 1.198 1 .274  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.248 .675 3.418 1 .064 3.483 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .229 .804 .081 1 .776 1.257 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .045 1.253 .001 1 .972 1.046 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .628 .946 .441 1 .507 1.874 
Small size (against large size) 1.311 .834 2.471 1 .116 3.708 
Medium size (against large size) 2.095 .880 5.662 1 .017 8.125 
InfoAsym effect (against InfoAsym no effect ) 1.679 .703 5.693 1 .017 5.358 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 166.909a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 173.443 6.534 3 .088 
Firm Ownership 177.189 10.280 3 .016 
Firm age 169.478 2.569 6 .861 
Firm Size 183.953 17.044 6 .009 
InfoAsym Effect 180.425 13.516 3 .004 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because 
omitting the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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Information sharing reduces asymmetry of information between exporter and 
buyer (import market) where both parties have the same information with regards to 
product standards, product quality, process and the likes.  
Piercy et al. (1997) noted that information sharing between a product supplier and 
a buyer is the key success in their business relationship. According to Huang et al. (2003), 
information sharing in a supply chain includes sharing product information, process 
information, quality information, resource information and cost information; all of which 
are critical for export performance. The absence of or inaccurate information will result 
in InfoAsym which will definitely affect exporters mainly in the aspect of costs and time 
in marketing a product. 
 
 Table 6.18: Summary Results for Effect of InfoAsym by Export Markets 
 
Percent Export  B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 
US  
25 percent and less 1.476 .750 3.869 1 .049 4.376 
26 -50 percent 2.842 .839 11.473 1 .001 17.150 
51 – 75 percent 1.765 .704 6.288 1 .012 5.843 
EU  
25 percent and less 1.525 .789 3.733 1 .053 4.595 
26 -50 percent 2.605 .930 7.838 1 .005 13.529 
51 – 75 percent 2.320 1.059 4.798 1 .028 10.172 
Japan  
25 percent and less 1.140 .561 4.128 1 .042 3.126 
26 -50 percent 1.433 .564 6.442 1 .011 4.190 
51 – 75 percent .402 .644 .391 1 .532 1.495 
China  
25 percent and less 1.537 .662 5.391 1 .020 4.652 
26 -50 percent 1.158 .655 3.123 1 .077 3.182 
51 – 75 percent .695 .758 .840 1 .359 2.003 
ASEAN  
25 percent and less 1.821 .596 9.325 1 .002 6.181 
26 -50 percent .909 .581 2.449 1 .118 2.483 
51 – 75 percent .920 .692 1.766 1 .184 2.509 
Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent.” See Appendices A26, A27, A28, A29 and  
A30 for detailed results. 
 
As can be seen in table 6.18, except for the reference group (‘more than 75 
percent’), firms in all other three export levels face information asymmetry. It can also be 
noted that SMEs compared to larger-sized firms are mostly affected in these export level 
group. With regards to export markets, Malaysian firms exporting to the US and EU 
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market face information asymmetry. Feedback from the interview sessions cited distance 
as being one key reason as to why many exporters do not obtain information accurately 
and on time. This reason could be also justified as information asymmetry in Japan, China 
and ASEAN markets which is experienced by two export level groups which are ‘25 
percent and less’ and ‘26-50 percent’. 
 
6.5  NTM TYPES AND EXPORTS 
 This section discusses the effects of NTMs as classified by Haveman et al. (2003) 
which are faced by Malaysian exporters. The conceptual model in chapter 3 considers 
these effects important in the study of NTMs for Malaysian exporters. Findings for the 
NTM types types faced by Malaysian exporters are stated first, followed by a discussion 
on the effects of these findings for each export market. 
As discussed in chapter 2 (Literature Review), Haveman et al. (2003) classified 
NTMs into four categories or types – price effects, quantity restrictions, quality 
restrictions and threat of retaliation. These NTM types are a concern for exporters 
especially in managing resources and export performance. Exporters with less resources 
may not be able to manage these NTM types and this may impact their export trade.  
In the case of Malaysian exporters, there is a real scarcity of research on 
Haveman’s et al’s NTM types faced by exporters, especially at the firm level. This study 
seeks to fill the gap that exists in this body of knowledge by examining what are the NTM 
types faced by Malaysian exporters. Table 6.19 shows the parameter estimates of 
stringency of NTMs and its  types.  Stringency of NTMs is significantly related to price 
effects, quantity reduction and quality restrictions compared to threat of retaliation which 
is used as a reference group. The empirical models for examining the four NTM types 
(represented by Z1-4) and for each export are restated below; 
Z1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRNTM                                                 (3.25) 
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Z1-4 = α + β1FIRMTYPE + β2FIRMOWNERSHIP + β3FIRMAGE +       
β4FIRMSIZE + β5STRNTMUS,EU,Japan, China, ASEAN                (3.26) 
 
Table 6.19 shows the four NTM types due to stringency of NTMs in the export 
markets experienced by exporters whereas Table 6.21 shows the NTM types by export 
markets.  It seems that price effects, quantity reduction and quality restrictions are found 
to be significant.  However, analyses of the markets show that all NTM types are faced 
by Malaysian exporters in the US, EU and Japanese markets except for threat of 
retaliation.  
In the China market, exporters are mainly concerned with price effects and quality 
restrictions. The elasticity of demand needs to be factored in when discussing the price 
effects. In an elastic demand situation, the rise in price may not affect demand but will 
increase trade value. When there is an elastic demand situation, increase in price will 
lower quantity demanded, thus exporters in this situation face negative impact on trade 
flow and value. In the interview results of firms that export to the USA, EU and Japanese 
markets, it was discovered that stringent measures raised cost which then caused prices 
to increase. The feedback suggests that price effects often lead to quantity restrictions 
products with elastic demand situation.  
Though Malaysia is a member of the ASEAN trade pact, its exporters still face 
price effects. The price effects could be due to higher compliance costs and costs related 
to CPs. Interview respondents from some firms exporting to ASEAN markets, stated that 
besides being required to comply with standards’ requirements, they also found CPs in 
ASEAN markets to be a costly affair. From the findings, it can be summarised that quality 
restrictions are not significantly related and thus harmonised standards and other 
requirements are put in place to promote trade among ASEAN members.  
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Table 6.19:  Stringency of NTM  Types- Price Effects, Quantity Reduction,  
                        Quality Restrictions and Threat of Retaliation  
 
Threat of  
retaliation 
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Price 
effects 
Intercept -2.393 .754 10.065 1 .002  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .569 .533 1.140 1 .286 1.767 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.535 .566 7.352 1 .007 4.641 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
-.260 .663 .153 1 .695 .771 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .263 .629 .175 1 .676 1.301 
Small size (against large size) .081 .615 .017 1 .896 1.084 
Medium size (against large size) 1.184 .651 3.311 1 .069 3.268 
NTMs stringent (against NTMs not stringent) 1.738 .559 9.655 1 .002 5.688 
Quantity 
reduction 
Intercept -1.076 .631 2.907 1 .088  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -.457 .489 .873 1 .350 .633 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.017 .522 3.795 1 .051 2.764 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
.643 .583 1.216 1 .270 1.901 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .043 .632 .005 1 .946 1.044 
Small size (against large size) -.360 .590 .372 1 .542 .698 
Medium size (against large size) .611 .620 .972 1 .324 1.843 
NTMs stringent (against NTMs not stringent) 1.609 .524 9.439 1 .002 4.999 
Quality 
restrictions 
Intercept -3.985 1.036 14.785 1 .000  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.285 .665 3.735 1 .053 3.613 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .337 .640 .277 1 .599 1.401 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
.745 .682 1.193 1 .275 2.106 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.356 .855 .173 1 .677 .701 
Small size (against large size) 1.379 .789 3.052 1 .081 3.969 
Medium size (against large size) 1.861 .838 4.931 1 .026 6.428 
NTMs stringent (against NTMs not stringent) 2.325 .667 12.140 1 .000 10.224 
   Note: Reference category is “threat of retaliation”. Model fitting: p < 0.05 for chi-   
   square 49.314. Cox and Snell: 0.292; Nagelkerke: 0.312; McFadden: 0.127 
 
 
Table 6.20: Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 226.049a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 236.516 10.467 3 .015 
Firm Ownership 235.571 9.522 3 .023 
Firm Age 232.251 6.202 6 .401 
Firm Size 235.973 9.924 6 .128 
NTMs Stringent 244.541 18.492 3 .000 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting 
the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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    Table 6.21: Stringency of NTM Types- Price Effects, Quantity Reduction,    
              Quality Restrictions, and Threat of Retaliation – by Export Markets 
 
NTM Types B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 
US  
Price Effects 1.581 .549 8.286 1 .004 4.858 
Quantity Restrictions 1.522 .518 8.649 1 .003 4.583 
Quality Restrictions 2.061 .645 10.217 1 .001 7.852 
EU  
Price Effects 1.607 .544 8.726 1 .003 4.987 
Quantity Restrictions 1.539 .514 8.962 1 .003 4.660 
Quality Restrictions 2.124 .663 10.278 1 .001 8.366 
Japan  
Price Effects 1.671 .661 6.393 1 .011 5.317 
Quantity Restrictions 1.359 .673 4.083 1 .043 3.893 
Quality Restrictions 3.320 .719 21.321 1 .000 27.659 
China       
Price Effects 1.242 .624 3.960 1 .047 3.464 
Quantity Restrictions .876 .634 1.909 1 .167 2.401 
Quality Restrictions 2.931 .684 18.374 1 .000 18.742 
ASEAN  
Price Effects 1.162 .510 5.184 1 .023 3.196 
Quantity Reduction .087 .430 .041 1 .840 1.091 
Quality Restrictions .589 .735 .641 1 .423 1.802 
       Notes: Reference category is “threat of retaliation”. See Appendices A31, A32, A33, A34 and A35 
 for detailed results. 
 
 
6.6  SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
 Firm level studies involving Malaysian exporters are not available. Studies only 
exists on country level. This study, therefore, makes a significant contribution to this end. 
Overall, as reflected in the findings, Malaysian exporters especially those that export less 
than 75 percent find NTMs in the export markets stringent. Small and medium sized firms 
tend to be affected more than large firms in this aspect.  
Countries for which Malaysian exporters find NTMs stringent are the US, EU, 
and Japan. These developed countries put in place NTMs that the Malaysian exporters 
find stringent to comply with, largely due to high costs of compliance and fewer resources 
which are able to handle the NTMs. By being unable to adhere to these NTMs, these firms 
become non-competitive in the export markets. However, exporters that export more than 
75 percent find NTMs in their export destination as not being stringent. This could be 
because these firms have the resources and capabilities to withstand the NTMs’ pressures.  
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Compliance to NTMs make these firms more competitive and able to sustain their 
exports. Firms having export levels below 75 percent seem to be affected by information 
asymmetry and this is specifically a concern in the US and EU markets compared to firms 
that export more than 75 percent. Finally, the NTM effects are real for Malaysian 
exporters. Price effects, quantity reduction and quality restrictions are a concern when 
exporting to US, EU and Japanese markets. Although Malaysia is in the same region as 
China, accessing its market is not easily done as China has stringent measures pertaining 
to quantity reduction and quality restrictions.  
However, Malaysian exporters tend to fare well in the ASEAN market as the only 
NTM effect type faced is price effects. It is heartening to note, from the findings, that 
quantity reduction and quality restrictions are not significantly related in the ASEAN 
market which implies that harmonisation of standards’ requirements in the region is 
progressing well to promote trade among its member countries.  
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CHAPTER 7 :  
STRATEGIC RESPONSES OF EXPORTERS TO NON-TARIFF 
MEASURES 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter starts with an overview of Malaysia exports and response strategy 
conceptual framework discussion. This is followed by an analysis on the country’s 
exporters response option without time dimension, response options with time dimension, 
response option by firm type and firm size and ownership. 
 In discussing the role of NTMs on exports, studies on action or response pursued 
by exporters when faced with NTMs are limited. It is widely known through a plethora 
of studies that NTMs undoubtedly impede trade. Especially in the Malaysian case study, 
little is known on how its exporters would respond upon facing NTMs in its export 
markets. Do they exit, stay-put or voice out?  This study sheds some light on this research 
area.  
 Data is collected through survey and interviews to understand the response 
position that Malaysian export firms tend to pursue when they face NTMs in export 
markets. As discussed in earlier chapters, NTMs often hamper trade flow and export firms 
from developing countries are usually adversely affected. Beyond this point, a few studies 
highlight the response strategies adopted by a variety of firms. It is not exactly known 
what responses these firms undertake, especially in the case of exporters from developing 
countries.  
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7.2 MALAYSIAN EXPORTS 
 A declining growth trend was recorded for Malaysia’s exports in three main 
sectors from 2014 - May 2015. As can be seen in figure 7.1 below, the three main sectors 
are manufacturing, mining and agricultural exports which are clearly declining. Though 
the performance of the manufacturing sector has been generally encouraging with positive 
growth in GDP and exports, its share in the world market is weakening. This is due to 
stiff competition from emerging economies such as China, India  and Vietnam. Another 
possible reason could be the effect of NTMs which is widely noted to impede exports. 
Numerous studies on NTMs have given evidence through their findings and discussions 
that NTMs are mostly detrimental to developing countries. 
 
      Figure 7.1: Export Growth Trend for Malaysia’s Main Sectors 2014-May 2015 
Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia 
Compiled by MATRADE 
 
The findings concur with others on the effect of NTMs on trade flow. As reported 
in chapter 6, Malaysian exporters in the ‘25 percent and less’, ‘26-50 percent’ and ‘51-75 
percent’ export groups are most likely to perceive NTMs to be stringent compared to the 
reference group used which is ‘more than 75 percent’. This could explain why these three 
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export groups are exporting at their current levels. Exporters exporting more than 75 
percent do not perceive NTMs as stringent. Small and medium sized firms in this study 
generally perceive NTMs as stringent compared to large sized firms. Resource-based 
firms mostly perceive NTMs as stringent. If this is matched with the growth trend in 
Figure 7.1, one of the conclusion that can be derived from this is that perceived stringency 
of NTMs does adversely affect exports. Malaysia’s share in world trade has declined by 
0.3 percentage over the last decade. Though the decline is marginal, it has received 
national attention as manufactured goods dominate total exports at 82 percent (MITI, 
2015) which is a large portion from the overall export market. 
However, the responses taken by exporters when faced with NTMs are largely 
unknown, especially in the case of Malaysian exporters. Additionally, there is a dearth of 
primary firm level data available for undertaking research on NTMs, particularly for 
Malaysia. Henson and Jaffee (2008) noted that stringent standards on agricultural product 
exports caused exporters from developing countries to deeply think about competitive 
repositioning. In light of this development, this study provides firm level evidence on the 
response strategies taken by Malaysian exporters when faced with NTMs in export 
markets. The findings can serve as an input to national stakeholders in ensuring that 
assistance is targeted to the specific group of exporters that face compliance issues. 
 
7.3 MALAYSIAN EXPORTERS’ STRATEGIC RESPONSE 
 The firms that took part in the survey were asked to provide their response on the 
‘exit’, ‘loyal’ and ‘voice’ options when they faced NTMs where compliance is a 
requirement to their exports. Table 7.1 summarizes the findings.  
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Table 7.1: Response Option by Export Levels 
 
 
Response 
Options 
Export Level (in percent) 
‘25 percent and 
less’ 
‘26-50 percent’ ‘51-75 percent’ ‘> 75 percent’ 
(in percent) 
Exit 20  12  5  0  
Loyalty 80  88  95  100  
Voice 30  22  15  5  
Notes: Numbers for response strategies are in percentage and are based on 143 export 
firms that responded to the survey.   
 
As reported in Table 7.1, about 20 percent of Malaysian exporters that export 25 
percent and less of the total output tend to exit a market that imposes NTMs which they 
are unable to comply with. Firms in this export level group complain about NTMs the 
most. This is followed by 12 percent of firms in the ‘26-50 percent’ export level. Large 
sized export firms (exports with more than 75 percent) do not exit an export market at all. 
They choose to pursue loyalty strategic response option. About 75 percent opt for loyalty 
response strategy in a reactive manner, while the others do it proactively. They sustain 
their export performance in the markets that they export.  
These findings concur with Schlegelmilch and Crook (1988) where they noted 
that high export intensities tend to be cost effective (lower total costs due to economies 
of scale) and avoid trade restricting measures imposed by governments in the export 
markets. 
 
Table 7.2: Response Option (with time dimension) by Export Levels (percent) 
 
 
Response 
Option 
Export Level (in percent) 
‘25 percent and 
less’ 
‘26-50 percent’ ‘51-75 percent’ ‘> 75 percent’ 
(in percent) 
Exit-Reactive 18  11  4  0  
Exit-Proactive 2  1  1  0  
Loyalty-Reactive 60  78  88  75  
Loyalty-Proactive 20  10  7  25  
Voice-Reactive 24  17  11  4  
Voice-Proactive 6  5  4  1  
Notes: Numbers for response strategies are in percentage and are based on 143 export firms that responded 
to the survey.  Only ‘exit’ and ‘loyalty’ are mutually exclusive, and therefore the four indicative responses 
across both options total 100 percent within the groups with differing export levels. 
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Table 7.2 provides details on the strategic response options along with time 
dimension. The reactive time dimension occurs the most among the strategic response 
options. It is noted that firms in the ’25 percent and less’ export level group pursue the 
exit strategy the most and it is done so in a reactive manner. Through the interviews, it 
was further seen that the form of ‘exit’ for less-export intensive firms involved switching 
customers, that is diverting their exports of the specific affected segments to other 
markets. 
However, it is important to note that the ‘exit’ option in itself can be a costly 
choice for exporters (Gelbach, 2006). Due to this, this particular group of exporters 
mostly chose the parallel strategy of ‘voice’. However, the reactive approach sought by 
most exporters reflects the culture of ‘stonewalling’ until the threats become ‘real’ 
(Henson and Jaffee, 2008). 
Most of the firms in the ‘26-50 percent’ and ‘51-75 percent’ export level groups 
pursue loyalty response in a reactive manner. This concurs with Henson and Jaffee’s 
findings on Kenyan and Indian firms where all the firms appear to exit a market in a 
reactive manner. The reactive manner is obvious in other strategic options too i.e. 
‘Loyalty’ and ‘Voice’. It can be seen that most firms in all export levels groups are loyal 
in a reactive manner. 
Table 7.3: Response Option (with time dimension) by Export Level and Firm Type 
 
Notes: Numbers for response strategies are in percentage and are based on 143 export firms that responded 
to the survey.   Only ‘exit’ and ‘loyalty’ are mutually exclusive, and therefore the four indicative responses 
across both options total 100 percent within the groups with differing export levels. RB - resource-based; 
and NRB - non-resource –based. 
 
 
Response Option 
Export Level and Firm Type (in percent) 
‘25 percent and 
less’ 
‘26-50 percent’ ‘51-75 percent’ ‘> 75 percent’ 
(in percent) 
RB NRB RB NRB RB NRB RB NRB 
Exit-Reactive 17   1  9  1  3  1  0  0  
Exit-Proactive 1  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  
Loyalty-Reactive 56  4  76  2  86  2  72  3  
Loyalty-Proactive 16  4  7  3  5  2  19  6  
Voice-Reactive 21  3  16  1  9  2  3  1  
Voice-Proactive 5  1  4  1  3  1  1  0  
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Table 7.3 shows that resource-based firms actively pursue all the response 
strategies. As can be seen, resource-based firms in all export level groups, mostly pursue 
loyalty response strategy in a reactive manner. Resource-based firms are also the ones 
which pursue the exit strategy and voice strategy in a reactive manner the most. These 
firms export products that are natural resource-based such as timber, furniture, 
agricultural, food, palm oil, petroleum, petro-chemicals etc.  
As reported by OECD (2005), firms from ASEAN countries face NTMs mainly 
in the forms of TBT, sanitary regulation, quotas, packaging, labelling, technical standards, 
labour and environmental standards and testing an inspection. Baller (2007) in his firm 
level study, found TMs (SPS, TBT and PSI) as main barriers imposed on exporters. 
Exporters from developing countries could incur high costs in complying with NTMs. 
Jakubiak et al., (2006) and Wilson and Otsuki (2004) found that 3.85 percent of 
production costs was spent on compliance and the average cost of customs clearance was 
6.95 percent of total export value. 
Melitz (2003) argued that due to high fixed costs, firms decide not to enter a 
market. This could result in trade diversion. Unnevehr and Hirschhorn (2000) and Wilson 
and Abiola (2003) added that stringent food safety standards is a cause of concern for 
exporters from developing countries. Lack of emphasis on the importance on NTMs 
especially the SPS and TBT measures can put exporters in an unfavourable position with 
regards to the domestic competitive markets of importing countries. Through the 
interviews, it is found that resource-based firms, especially exporters who are engaged in 
food business, attributed their reactive mode to information asymmetry in food trade. 
Most of these firms are small in firm size, thereby being in the position of  recipient of 
information which clearly shows that they are not in a capacity to internally generate 
information (Fairman and Yapp, 2004).  
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Table 7.4 shows findings on the response options pursued by firm export levels 
and firm size. It is noted that small sized firms tend to be mostly fall in the category of 
pursuing a strategic response option. Findings show that 15 percent of small sized firms 
in the ‘25 percent and less’ exit in a reactive manner while 9 percent exit in a reactive 
manner in the 26-50 percent export level group. These findings concur with Majocchi et 
al.(2005) and Williams (2011), who found that firm size is positively related to export 
performance.  
 
Table 7.4: Response Option (with time dimension) by Firm Size 
 
 
Response 
Option 
Export Levels and Firm Size (in percent) 
‘25 percent and 
less’ 
‘26-50 percent’ ‘51-75 percent’ ‘> 75 percent’ 
(in percent) 
S M L S M L S M L S M L 
Exit-Reactive 15 2 1 9 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 
Exit-Proactive 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Loyalty-Reactive 50 5 5 62 10 6 76 6 6 62 7 6 
Loyalty-Proactive 5 10 5 1 5 4 2 2 3 10 10 5 
Voice-Reactive 17 5 2 14 2 1 8 3 0 3 1 0 
Voice-Proactive 4 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 
Notes: Numbers for response strategies are in percentage and are based on 143 export firms that responded 
to the survey.  Only ‘exit’ and ‘loyalty’ are mutually exclusive, and therefore the four indicative responses 
across both options total 100 percent within the groups with differing export levels. S – small size; M – 
medium-size; and L-large size. 
  
 
Small sized firms in all export level groups pursue the loyalty and voice strategies 
in a reactive manner the most, compared to medium and large firms. High cost of 
compliance could be a reason for this occurrence. Granslandt and Markusen (2000) 
pointed out that the incompatible standards do not favour exporters of small firms as their 
costs of compliance could be substantial. Through interviews conducted with some of the 
firm exporters, it has come to light that small sized firms accept the fact that high cost of 
compliance is a major impediment to their exports. 
Table 7.5 shows the response options analysed by export level and firm 
ownership. Findings in the table show Malaysian-owned export firms seem to comply 
with the NTMs and actively do business in the export markets. Most of these firms pursue 
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loyalty response option, though in a reactive manner. Foreign owned firms that are highly 
export-oriented (with export level of more than 75 percent), have positioned themselves 
to comply with NTMs. Consequently, foreign-owned firms are less engaged in the voice 
strategy relative to local-owned firms, as they have no complaints on the NTMs imposed 
in global markets.  
In interviews with foreign owned firms, it was relayed that compliance with 
specifically public (state-centred) NTMs, is no longer an issue with them as their focus 
has shifted towards global-firm based standards in response to globalised production 
systems. Furthermore, they are able to generate strategic information that aids them to 
prepare and manage the NTMs imposed. However, ‘exit’ response strategy is noted 
among Malaysian firms in the ‘25 percent and less’ export level. This is consistent with 
other analysis where firms in this group generally exit the most. 
 
Table 7.5: Response Option (with time dimension) by Export Level and Firm 
Ownership 
 
 
Response option 
Export Level and Firm Ownership (in percent) 
‘25 percent 
and less’ 
‘26-50 
percent’ 
‘51-75 
percent’ 
‘> 75 percent’ 
(in percent) 
M F M F M F M F 
Exit-Reactive 18  0  9  1  3  1  0  0  
Exit-Proactive 1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  
Loyalty-Reactive 55  5  76  4  85  3  81  3  
Loyalty-Proactive 15  5  6  2  5  2  7  9  
Voice-Reactive 27  3  16  1  10  1  3  1  
Voice-Proactive 5 1  4  1 4  0  1  0  
Notes: Numbers for response strategies are in percentage and are based on 143 export firms that 
responded to the survey.  Only ‘exit’ and ‘loyalty’ are mutually exclusive, and therefore the four 
indicative responses across both options total 100 percent within the groups of differing export levels. 
M – Malaysian, and F – Foreign. 
 
In discussing the ownership structure and export performance, Graner and 
Isaksson (2009) found that foreign owned companies established in developing countries 
tend to be more efficient in their exports than domestic-owned firms. The authors 
reasoned that this could be because of greater experience in management and superior 
organisational structure. The handling of NTMs was not specifically discussed, but it can 
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be argued that the reasons given above could contribute to efficient management of the 
measures imposed on them in the export markets.  
Fung et al. (2008) found that foreign firms with cost-leadership advantages in 
China, tend to export and have a higher level of export intensity. Berry (1992) noted that 
foreign owned firms in many developing countries have the advantage of proprietary 
information and access to marketing networks in export markets. It is important for such 
firms to be generally foreign-trade oriented as they are able to manage the NTMs 
effectively as opposed to their counterparts.  
Table 7.6 presents findings on the response options pursued by firm export levels 
and firm age. Firms with less than 5 years in operation pursue the loyalty option in a 
reactive manner across all export levels. These young firms, exit and voice their concerns 
the most too.  
Table 7.6: Response Option (with time dimension), by Export Level and Firm Age 
 
 
Response 
Option 
Export Levels and Firm Age (in percent) 
‘25 percent and 
less’ 
‘26-50 percent’ ‘51-75 percent’ ‘> 75 percent’ 
(in percent) 
<5 5-10 >10 <5 5-10 >10 <5 5-10 >10 <5 5-10 >10 
Exit-
Reactive 
 
17 
 
1 
 
0 
 
9 
 
1 
 
0 
 
4 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Exit-
Proactive 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
2 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
Loyalty-
Reactive 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
70 
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
 
 
72 
 
 
8 
 
 
8 
 
 
84 
 
 
3 
 
 
1 
Loyalty-
Proactive 
 
2 
 
15 
 
3 
 
1 
 
3 
 
6 
 
2 
 
2 
 
3 
 
2 
 
4 
 
6 
Voice-
Reactive 
 
 
17 
 
7 
 
3 
 
16 
 
1 
 
3 
 
11 
 
2 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
0 
Voice-
Proactive 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
Notes: Numbers for response strategies are in percentage and are based on 143 export firms that responded 
to the survey.  Only ‘exit’ and ‘loyalty’ are mutually exclusive, and therefore the four indicative responses 
across both options total 100 percent within the groups of differing export levels. Firm age refers to years 
in operation. 
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The established firms (more than 10 years in operation), pursue the loyalty option 
proactively and as do firms which are mostly in the ‘more than 75 percent’ export level 
group. It is understood that such an option is pursued as they export large quantities to 
the markets that are highly regulated.  
These firms therefore take on the proactive mode to compliance, fully 
understanding that there would be cost reductions and higher sales through optimised 
input/technological change. This in in line with the resource-based view that says older 
firms have a strong, international foundation because they generally are equipped with 
larger stocks of resources than younger firms. According to Williams (2011), this implies 
that the greater the firm age, the more learning and knowledge will happen. 
 
7.4 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
 The results show a clear pattern in the level, firm size, and type of firm pursuing 
strategic response options when faced with NTMs. With regard to pursuing ‘exit’ as a 
strategic response action, it is obvious that firms that export 25 percent and less are the 
most compared to firms in higher levels of exports. Resource-based and small sized firms 
are most actively involved in pursuing strategic response actions. Malaysian-owned 
export firms tend to exit the most especially among the firms in the ‘25 percent and less’ 
export group level. In terms of firm age (years of operation), firms who have been in 
operation for less than 5 years tend to face challenges in handling NTMs in export 
markets, which leads some of the firms, especially those that have lower export intensity, 
to exit the market concerned. Established firms (more than 10 years in operation) across 
all export levels, are more entrenched in the international markets, as they have the 
capability and capacity to withstand and manage NTMs. This study’s findings contribute 
in an important way to assist policy-makers develop and implement policies and 
programmes to enhance export performance of the affected exporters.
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    CHAPTER 8 : CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
8.1 OVERVIEW OF STUDY 
 This study set out to examine the impact of NTMs on Malaysian exporters. The 
importance of understanding the impact to the exporters in Malaysia is crucial in the wake 
of the country’s increasing integration into world trade through exports. This is proven 
by studying the export trade in 2015 which grew by 1.9 percent despite the challenging 
economic environment, leading to an astounding achievement of RM779.95 billion 
(MITI, 2015). This makes Malaysia a highly export-oriented developing country. 
Moreover, the importance of this study cannot be more significant and appropriate amidst 
the current materialisation of the RCEP trade pact, of which Malaysia is one of the 16 
countries participating. 
It must be noted that the NTMs studied include those which are classified and not 
classified under UNCTAD. The non-UNCTAD classified measures included in this study 
are PMs, ONTMs and information asymmetry; and an analysis on effect of NTM types.  
This study has sought to address the following research questions; 
i.  Do NTMs impede or enchance exports from Malaysia? 
ii. How stringent are NTMs and TMs relative to other   measures for 
Malaysian exporters by export intensity and export destinations? 
iii. What are the NTM types (price effects, quantity reduction, quality 
restrictions, and threat of retaliation decision) faced by Malaysian 
exporters? 
iv. How have NTMs affected the response strategies (exit, loyal or 
express concern (voice)  of Malaysian exporters? 
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The above research questions are addressed with the following research objectives;  
i. To empirically examine the overall effects of NTMs on Malaysian 
exports. 
ii. To empirically examine the stringency of NTMs and TMs on 
exports by export intensity and major export destinations. 
iii. To determine the NTM types (price effects, quantity reduction, 
quality restrictions and threat of retaliation) faced by Malaysian 
exporters. 
iv. To assess the response strategies of Malaysian exporters in facing 
NTMs. 
 Findings that answered the research questions were derived using two data sets. 
The primary data was from the survey of 143 export firms and the secondary data was  
obtained from the TRAINS database. Apart from these, the gravity model and 
multinomial logistic regression analysis techniques were used as well. Key findings that 
answered the 5 research questions are discussed below. 
 The discussion below addresses the research questions on whether NTMs enhance 
or impede exports and the stringency of NTMs.  The findings of this study, through the 
gravity analysis technique, show that NTMs have mixed effect on exports from Malaysia. 
NTMs enhance exports for Malaysian exporters to ASEAN and Japanese markets. 
However, they do not facilitate exports to EU. While the gravity analysis of the TRAINS 
data does not provide specific details on the nature of export firms, the firm level survey 
from the 143 export firms do. The findings that indicate that NTMs impede exports to EU 
is reinforced by the survey findings which provide more specific details about the affected 
firms.  
Firms with export levels below 75 percent seemed to find exports to EU as 
stringent. Similar results were gathered for exports to the US. Interestingly, NTMs were 
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found to enhance exports to ASEAN and Japan through the gravity analysis. This is 
further supported by the survey findings but these findings were only confined to firms 
with export levels of more than 50 percent to ASEAN and firms with export levels of 
more than 50 percent to Japan. Resource-based export firms (of which agricultural 
products are part of) suffer the impact of NTMs as compared to non-resource-based 
export firms. This could be the result of stringent TMs such SPS and TBT imposed by 
importing countries, especially EU. As noted by Rau et al., (2010), the harmonization of 
standards across the EU member countries is likely to be a constraint for exporters 
especially from developing countries.  
Generally, it concurs that whenever NTMs are implicated, firstly, in the rise of 
costs of exports and secondly, in the rise through production and delivery, exports are 
affected or impeded (Francois, et al., 2011). However, in the case of experienced 
companies that are better prepared especially with higher export intensity (more than 50 
percent), NTMs are less likely to affect exports as shown in the survey findings. Small 
and medium-sized export firms are affected by NTMs compared to larger-sized firms. 
The findings on firm sizes concur with Anders and Caswell (2009) where small size firms 
are affected by NTMs because of high compliance costs.  
The research question on the effect of TMs on Malaysian exporters is addressed 
in the following discussion. The survey findings show that the TMs which are a concern 
for Malaysian exporters comprise TBT, SPS and pre-shipment and CPs. This is in line 
with Fugazza (2013) where TMs, especially TBT and SPS pose a concern for export firms 
in developing countries. However, this study found that export firms with a  higher export 
intensity (more than 75 percent) find TMs not stringent. This is perhaps these firms are 
aware of the importance in complying with NTMs to export their sizeable quantity and 
they are backed with strong resources. The US, EU and Japan seem to be active in 
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implementing TMs. Malaysian exporters especially with the export level of less than 75 
percent face lengthy and cumbersome CPs. especially those exporting below 75 percent. 
Additionally, this study also dealt with the effects of PMs and ONTMs. It seems 
lower export intensity firms (with less than 50 percent) are affected by ONTMs such as 
language barrier, not having an office site, and a bias or preference provided to own 
country’s firms by government in export countries. Apart from this, these firms found the 
Japanese market stringent due to language barrier. This can be found in the analysis of 
the results of the firms that were interviewed where, language seems to be an important 
concern for them in their exports to Japan.  
Findings on PMs show similar impact results i.e. firms exporting less than 75 
percent find the measures to be stringent. The US, E, and Japan seem to be fertile ground 
for PMs. PMs require exporters to certify their products. One of it is the ISO certification 
which is identified as one of the drivers for exporters in developing countries be 
internationally recognised (Montiel and Husted (2009) and Blackman and Guerrero 
(2012). This could be the case for Malaysian firms exporting less than 75 percent which 
find PMs such as the need to acquire the ISO certification as stringent. 
An interesting observation from the findings relates to the pattern of exports to the 
ASEAN market which Malaysia is a member of. Contrary to the expectation that member 
countries can freely export among them, this study’s findings reveals otherwise. 
Malaysian exporters with less export intensity (export level below 50 percent) face 
stringency of NTMs in the ASEAN market. This could be the case where Cadot et al. 
(2013) pointed out that the ASEAN region still suffers from lack of information on NTMs 
as they are not transparent. Unavailability of information on NTMs even to a member 
country causes constraints in effectively penetrating the trade market of the region. 
Information asymmetry is another variable examined against the export levels in this 
study. It is significantly related to three export level groups – ‘25 percent and less’, ‘26-
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50 percent’ and ‘51-75 percent’. It can be concluded that export level of these firms may 
be affected by information asymmetry. The exporters find information asymmetry for 
their exports to the US and EU. However, exporters in the ‘25 percent and less’, ‘26-50 
percent’ groups find information asymmetry in Japan and China markets. 
The research question on the NTM types faced by Malaysian exporters is 
addressed in the following discussion. Three NTM types faced by Malaysian exporters 
which are price effects, quantity reduction and quality restrictions have been noted to be 
significantly related to the stringency of NTMs. Malaysian exporters face price effects, 
quantity reduction and quality restrictions in their exports to the US, EU and Japanese 
markets, compared to threat of retaliation. So, it can be said that Malaysian exporters are 
probably not in the antidumping exercise especially in the US, EU and Japan.  The 
exporters, however, do face price effects in the ASEAN market which is their own trade 
region.  
On response options (exit, loyal and voice) pursued by Malaysian exporters, it can 
be concluded that firms that have low export intensity, particularly those exporting 25 
percent and less, tend to exit markets. They do it in a reactive manner. Most firms across 
all export levels pursue loyalty response strategy in a reactive manner. In voicing out 
concerns about NTMs, firms in lower export intensity (exports of less than 50 percent) 
do this in a reactive manner. Firms that have high export intensity (export more than 75 
percent), do not pursue exit strategy as their response option when faced with NTMs. 
From the findings, it can be concluded that resource-based firms, small size firms and 
young firms (less than 5 years in operation) pursue the exit strategy in a market or 
markets. These firms actively pursue the other two options as well, where most of them 
take the loyalty response strategy in a reactive manner. Finally, it can be concluded that 
Malaysian-owned firms, especially those which have low export intensity (below 50 
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percent) exit trade markets the most. This answers the research question on response 
strategies pursued by Malaysian exporters. 
The control variables that were used are firm type, firm ownership, firm age and 
firm size. Overall, the major conclusion is that resourced-based firms are mostly affected 
by stringency of NTMs compared to non-resource-based firms. Firm ownership seems to 
bear no significance against export levels. For firm age, overall it is does not bear 
significance for Malaysian exporters. It can be concluded that firm ownership and firm 
age (years of operation) do not affect Malaysian exporters’ effort to go international. 
Small and medium sized firms seem to be affected the most by the stringency of NTMs. 
 
8.2  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 The findings of the study have important implications related to guiding the policy 
debate on NTMs. Firstly, small and medium size resource-based firms, with less exposure 
to international trade, should be the target group of policymakers to provide assistance in 
complying with global standards and regulations. Secondly, TM, such as CPs and 
formalities as well as TBTs should be given priority by the relevant stakeholders in 
streamlining and harmonising these measures to conform to global standards and 
regulations. Thirdly, PMs, particularly for resource-based firms, should also be factored 
in the negotiations with trade partners at the outset, to facilitate trade. Lastly, the 
implementation status of the harmonisation procedures at the regional level should be 
given sufficient attention by policymakers, as this will provide the platform to benchmark 
regional standards with global requirements. 
With regards to the findings on the response options taken by Malaysian exporters, 
first there is a need for capacity building in all firms to enable them to maximise the scope 
of strategic options through the ‘proactive’ approach. A ‘proactive’ approach will enable 
exporters to minimise negative consequences/spill-overs of NTMs to their firms. As 
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Henson and Jaffee (2008) pointed out, acting proactively through ‘loyalty’ provides great 
scope and flexibility to test and apply alternative production technologies, employ and 
adopt varied administrative resources and build the necessary infrastructure needed. 
Potential first mover advantages could also be derived by proactive firms with the 
aforementioned sunk costs borne earlier than their competitors. Similarly, firms that ‘exit’ 
in a proactive manner may avoid unnecessary costs associated with sunk investment and 
other transactions. Next, there is a need to further address the most negative approach, 
which is the combination of ‘exit’ and ‘reactive’ measure taken by the affected exporters, 
namely to help these category of firms from incurring losses and improving market access 
(that is not to be excluded from highly regulated markets).  
Given that the small size and younger firms from the exporting group of 50 percent 
and below are completely reliant on external information, many of them have attributed 
to information asymmetry as the key reason for their export behaviour. Many exporters 
in this group are not aware of some of the new measures that prevail in the developed 
markets and the extent of stringency of those measures. This also explains their active 
engagement in the ‘voice’, though again reactive. Hence, policy makers should identify 
this targeted group of exporters to ensure that they receive updated information on the 
measures and requirements in major markets.  
The 11th Malaysian Plan has earmarked the Department of Standards Malaysia to 
increase collaboration with manufacturers to identify international standards to be applied 
by them (EPU, 2015). This is a step in the right direction to ensure better flow of 
information between policymakers and businesses (and industry associations). Finally, 
there is a need to engage more exporters to exhibit the ‘voice’ strategy, as only a small 
proportion of the exporters seem to factor this option as a parallel strategy in their choices. 
More importantly, there should be active participation of exporters that choose the ‘exit’ 
strategy, as their discontent gives more scope to ‘voice’. The ‘voice’ strategy is indeed 
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the defining link between exporters and policymakers to ensure that the needs of the 
former are taken up at government-to-government level or by the government through 
international institutions such as WTO. 
 
8.3  STUDY LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 As in any research, this study has limitations as well. The coverage ratio approach 
has limitations in that it does not give any direct information about the effects of NTMs. 
Broad coverage of NTMs does not mean higher trade distortion level. The endogeneity 
issue also is a drawback for the coverage ratio method. It is possible to rectify this issue 
with weights fixed at trade levels. The use of disaggregated data is important to show 
commodity –wise effects. Trade policies often have commodity specific economic 
effects. Policy evaluation is better done at micro-level using disaggregated data than at 
macro-level using aggregated data. Whole analysis with aggregated data would 
potentially result in aggregation biasness (Anderson and Yotov, 2010). However, analysis 
using disaggregation data requires resolving the prevalence of zero-trade issues. A 
number of  estimation methods can be used to overcome these problems. These methods 
include Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML), zero-inflated Poisson Pseudo 
Maximum Likelihood (ZIPPML) and Poisson Quasi-Likelihood (PQL). Burger et 
al.,(2009) and Staub and Winkelmann (2013) suggest the use of ZIPPML and PQL as  
most appropriate estimate methods with excessive zeroes trade values and dispersion.   
 This gravity model in explaining trade flows is not without criticism on its 
theoretical limitations and econometric problems (Armstrong 2007). One of the criticisms 
of this model is that it omits unobserved trade resistant variables which results in a 
violation of the assumption of a normally distributed random disturbance, leading to an 
estimation bias (Kalirajan and Findlay 2005). Plummer et al. (2010), points to another 
weakness presented by the specification and measurement error. (Plummer et al., 2010). 
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To further elucidate, Nasir and Kalirajan (2016) noted that the omission of relative 
economic distancepce term in the empirical specification of the gravity model leads to 
biased estimates. Kalirajan (2007) added that this would result in heteroskedastic error 
terms which when the empirical model is log-linearized with its presence, it leads to 
inconsistent estimates. 
 Given the limitations of the conventional gravity model, future research should 
use the stochastic frontier gravity model which is better utilized in explaining the 
variations in exports realistically. For this, the works of Kalirajan (2007) is important.  
According to Kalirajan (2007),  the stochastic frontier gravity model is a better approach 
to explain trade flows and trade potentials in a realistic manner because unapparent 
institutional characteristics and other unobservable variables are not omitted. The author 
also stresses that the stochastic frontier gravity model can explain the variations in exports 
of the focus country by capturing the influence of natural determinants, behind the border 
determinants, mutually induced determinants and the explicit beyond the border 
determinants.  
Das and Bhattacharya (2009) agree with Kalirajan and provide similar advantages 
on the usage of the stochastic frontier gravity model. Firstly, the stochastic frontier gravity 
model does not suffer from a loss of estimation efficiency unlike in the case of OLS 
estimation. Secondly, the model can measure the effects of export constraints in the home 
country (exporting country) or ‘behind the border’ constraints and the model is able to do 
this in isolation from ‘beyond the border’ constraints and the statistical error term. This 
feature of the model, where it is able to isolate the effect of ‘behind the border’ constraints 
is crucial for policy makers in giving an idea as to the extent these constraints have on 
potential exports. Finally, the model is able to provide trade estimates that are more 
realistic (potential trade estimates closer to frictionless trade estimates). 
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APPENDIX A 1: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of NTMs - US Market 
 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 37.470. Cox and Snell: 0.231; Nagelkerke: 0.250; McFadden: 0.102 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 172.221a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 180.540 8.319 3 .040 
Firm Ownership 178.883 6.661 3 .084 
Firm Age 174.940 2.719 6 .843 
Firm Size 186.431 14.209 6 .027 
NTMs stringent- US 181.385 9.164 3 .027 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
 
 
 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent 
and less 
Intercept -1.589 .952 2.789 1 .095  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .486 .655 .550 1 .458 1.626 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.258 .920 1.870 1 .171 3.520 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
.283 .931 .092 1 .761 1.327 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .057 .780 .005 1 .942 1.058 
Small size (against large size) 1.529 .707 4.680 1 .031 4.612 
Medium size (against large size) 1.687 .805 4.388 1 .036 5.401 
NTMs stringent- US (against NTMs not 
stringent- US) 
2.672 1.181 5.120 1 .024 14.466 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -1.179 .877 1.806 1 .179  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.049 .661 2.518 1 .113 2.853 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.063 .848 .006 1 .940 .939 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
.413 .961 .185 1 .667 1.511 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.515 .826 .389 1 .533 .597 
Small size (against large size) 1.950 .773 6.366 1 .012 7.026 
Medium size (against large size) 2.662 .838 10.081 1 .001 14.325 
NTMs stringent- US (against NTMs not 
stringent- US) 
2.635 1.181 4.976 1 .026 13.939 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -3.756 1.353 7.706 1 .006  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.776 .755 5.530 1 .019 5.906 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.941 1.293 2.252 1 .133 6.964 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 
years) 
-.327 1.196 .075 1 .785 .721 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .130 .906 .021 1 .886 1.139 
Small size (against large size) 1.376 .886 2.409 1 .121 3.959 
Medium size (against large size) 1.800 .957 3.536 1 .060 6.051 
NTMs stringent- US (against NTMs not 
stringent- US) 
2.611 1.258 4.304 1 .038 13.610 
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APPENDIX A 2: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of NTMs - EU Market 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent 
and less 
Intercept -.702 .817 .737 1 .391  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .229 .610 .141 1 .707 1.258 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .277 .863 .103 1 .749 1.319 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.197 .944 .044 1 .834 .821 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .297 .792 .140 1 .708 1.345 
Small size (against large size) 1.396 .741 3.543 1 .060 4.037 
Medium size (against large size) 1.339 .808 2.746 1 .098 3.814 
NTMs stringent – EU (against NTMs not 
stringent-EU) 
1.713 .714 5.758 1 .016 5.544 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -.418 .767 .296 1 .586  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .764 .619 1.524 1 .217 2.147 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.976 .836 1.363 1 .243 .377 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.043 .958 .002 1 .964 .958 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.260 .836 .097 1 .756 .771 
Small size (against large size) 1.793 .804 4.975 1 .026 6.008 
Medium size (against large size) 2.294 .848 7.317 1 .007 9.915 
NTMs stringent – EU (against NTMs not 
stringent-EU) 
1.856 .729 6.483 1 .011 6.401 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -2.939 1.292 5.173 1 .023  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.524 .719 4.498 1 .034 4.591 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.068 1.273 .704 1 .401 2.910 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.786 1.185 .440 1 .507 .456 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .348 .917 .144 1 .704 1.416 
Small size (against large size) 1.251 .908 1.899 1 .168 3.494 
Medium size (against large size) 1.470 .953 2.380 1 .123 4.348 
NTMs stringent – EU (against NTMs not 
stringent-EU) 
1.598 .806 3.928 1 .047 4.941 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 36.816. Cox and Snell: 0.227; Nagelkerke: 0.246; McFadden: 0.100 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 177.505a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 184.810 7.305 3 .063 
Firm Ownership 183.251 5.746 3 .125 
Firm Age 180.082 2.577 6 .860 
Firm Size 187.863 10.358 6 .110 
NTMs stringent- EU 186.015 8.510 3 .037 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 3: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of NTMs - Japan Market 
 
 Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
 Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 50.086. Cox and Snell: 0.295; Nagelkerke: 0.321; McFadden: 0.138 
 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 165.919a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 173.349 7.430 3 .059 
Firm Ownership 175.620 9.701 3 .021 
Firm Age 168.458 2.540 6 .864 
Firm Size 182.761 16.843 6 .010 
NTMs stringent- Japan 180.287 14.368 3 .002 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect 
does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
 
 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -2.787 1.175 5.632 1 .018  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.100 .725 2.304 1 .129 3.004 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.582 1.040 2.316 1 .128 4.867 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.044 1.305 .001 1 .973 .957 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .867 .992 .764 1 .382 2.381 
Small size (against large size) 2.062 .884 5.436 1 .020 7.858 
Medium size (against large size) 1.679 .955 3.089 1 .079 5.359 
NTMs stringent-Japan (against NTMs not 
stringent-Japan) 
1.429 .751 3.620 1 .057 4.176 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -3.130 1.163 7.240 1 .007  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 2.002 .779 6.610 1 .010 7.407 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.751 .891 .710 1 .399 .472 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .328 1.301 .064 1 .801 1.388 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .023 1.103 .000 1 .983 1.023 
Small size (against large size) 2.772 1.009 7.555 1 .006 15.990 
Medium size (against large size) 2.874 1.063 7.308 1 .007 17.704 
NTMs stringent-Japan (against NTMs not 
stringent-Japan) 
2.861 .838 11.670 1 .001 17.487 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -1.100 .927 1.408 1 .235  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.295 .677 3.654 1 .056 3.651 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .307 .813 .143 1 .706 1.359 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .087 1.252 .005 1 .945 1.091 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .652 .952 .469 1 .494 1.919 
Small size (against large size) 1.358 .837 2.636 1 .104 3.889 
Medium size (against large size) 2.022 .879 5.296 1 .021 7.553 
NTMs stringent-Japan (against NTMs not 
stringent-Japan) 
1.711 .704 5.903 1 .015 5.532 
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APPENDIX A 4: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of NTMs – China Market 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -1.127 .827 1.856 1 .173  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .957 .628 2.320 1 .128 2.604 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .385 .870 .196 1 .658 1.469 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.216 .964 .050 1 .823 .806 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .157 .795 .039 1 .844 1.169 
Small size (against large size) 1.705 .748 5.197 1 .023 5.500 
Medium size (against large size) 1.383 .810 2.916 1 .088 3.986 
NTMs stringent- China (against NTMs not 
stringent- China) 
1.707 .734 5.402 1 .020 5.510 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -.946 .792 1.425 1 .233  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.615 .654 6.106 1 .013 5.029 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -1.090 .856 1.619 1 .203 .336 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.062 .989 .004 1 .950 .940 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.469 .850 .305 1 .581 .625 
Small size (against large size) 2.305 .830 7.718 1 .005 10.028 
Medium size (against large size) 2.489 .867 8.239 1 .004 12.053 
NTMs stringent- China (against NTMs not 
stringent- China) 
1.968 .754 6.805 1 .009 7.156 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -2.394 1.240 3.729 1 .053  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.781 .731 5.945 1 .015 5.937 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .717 1.255 .326 1 .568 2.048 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.548 1.211 .205 1 .651 .578 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .300 .906 .110 1 .741 1.349 
Small size (against large size) 1.433 .906 2.498 1 .114 4.189 
Medium size (against large size) 1.666 .934 3.178 1 .075 5.289 
NTMs stringent- China (against NTMs not 
stringent- China) 
.341 .893 .146 1 .703 1.406 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 45.166. Cox 
and Snell: 0.271; Nagelkerke: 0.293; McFadden: 0.123 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 172.430a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 181.833 9.402 3 .024 
Firm Ownership 178.251 5.820 3 .121 
Firm Age 174.986 2.556 6 .862 
Firm Size 186.007 13.577 6 .035 
NTMs stringent- China 186.418 13.988 3 .003 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect 
does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 5: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of NTMs - ASEAN Market 
 
More than 75 
percent 
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -1.074 1.137 .893 1 .345  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 2.055 .546 14.156 1 .000 7.811 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.219 .537 .167 1 .683 .803 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.377 .645 4.555 1 .033 3.961 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .708 .643 1.211 1 .271 2.029 
Small size (against large size) -.255 1.061 .058 1 .810 .775 
Medium size (against large size) -1.721 1.114 2.386 1 .122 .179 
NTMs stringent-ASEAN (against NTMs not 
stringent-ASEAN) 
1.700 .576 8.703 1 .003 5.473 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -.363 1.092 .110 1 .740  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.150 .569 4.084 1 .043 3.157 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.109 .550 .039 1 .843 .897 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .634 .695 .831 1 .362 1.884 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .545 .636 .733 1 .392 1.724 
Small size (against large size) -.547 1.027 .283 1 .595 .579 
Medium size (against large size) -1.717 1.087 2.494 1 .114 .180 
NTMs stringent-ASEAN (against NTMs not 
stringent-ASEAN) 
1.187 .585 4.117 1 .042 3.276 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -1.427 1.219 1.370 1 .242  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.583 .649 5.960 1 .015 4.871 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .823 .713 1.334 1 .248 2.278 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.698 1.173 .354 1 .552 .498 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .871 .702 1.538 1 .215 2.388 
Small size (against large size) -.500 1.063 .221 1 .638 .607 
Medium size (against large size) -2.396 1.173 4.170 1 .041 .091 
NTMs stringent-ASEAN (against NTMs not 
stringent-ASEAN) 
1.080 .663 2.653 1 .103 2.945 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 42.852. Cox and Snell: 0.259; Nagelkerke: 0.278; McFadden: 0.112 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 210.321a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 227.446 17.125 3 .001 
Firm Ownership 212.927 2.606 3 .456 
Firm Age 220.043 9.722 6 .137 
Firm Size 222.107 11.786 6 .067 
NTMs stringent- ASEAN 220.042 9.721 3 .021 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does 
not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 6: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of TMs – US Market 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 62.543. Cox and Snell: 0.354; Nagelkerke: 0.384; McFadden: 0.170 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 173.295a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 181.857 8.562 3 .036 
Firm Ownership 177.454 4.159 3 .245 
Firm Age 175.597 2.303 6 .890 
Firm Size 192.592 19.297 6 .004 
TMs stringent- US 207.532 34.238 3 .000 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
 
 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -1.463 .975 2.250 1 .134  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .513 .625 .672 1 .412 1.669 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.032 .911 1.283 1 .257 2.808 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.312 .945 .109 1 .741 .732 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .311 .770 .163 1 .686 1.365 
Small size (against large size) 1.632 .734 4.940 1 .026 5.116 
Medium size (against large size) 1.791 .816 4.823 1 .028 5.998 
TMs -US stringent (against TMs not stringent-
US) 
1.446 .758 3.642 1 .056 4.246 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -3.028 1.071 7.992 1 .005  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.106 .677 2.668 1 .102 3.023 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .199 .940 .045 1 .832 1.220 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.654 1.022 .409 1 .522 .520 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.273 .868 .099 1 .753 .761 
Small size (against large size) 2.412 .879 7.530 1 .006 11.156 
Medium size (against large size) 3.532 .949 13.840 1 .000 34.184 
TMs -US stringent (against TMs not stringent-
US) 
3.612 .828 19.017 1 .000 37.040 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -3.974 1.435 7.666 1 .006  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.812 .737 6.039 1 .014 6.123 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.893 1.314 2.076 1 .150 6.642 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.045 1.201 .757 1 .384 .352 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .349 .903 .150 1 .699 1.418 
Small size (against large size) 1.552 .915 2.880 1 .090 4.721 
Medium size (against large size) 2.027 .980 4.280 1 .039 7.594 
TMs stringent – US (against (TMs not 
stringent-US) 
1.767 .876 4.073 1 .044 5.855 
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APPENDIX A 7: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of TMs  – EU Market 
Notes: Reference category is ‘More than 75 percent’. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 62.199. Cox and Snell: 0.352; Nagelkerke: 0.382; McFadden: 0.169 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 174.580a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 183.177 8.597 3 .035 
Firm Ownership 179.198 4.619 3 .202 
Firm Age 177.231 2.652 6 .851 
Firm Size 193.986 19.406 6 .004 
TMs stringent- EU 208.472 33.893 3 .000 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -1.418 .969 2.144 1 .143  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .522 .625 .698 1 .403 1.686 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.025 .908 1.272 1 .259 2.786 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.290 .944 .095 1 .758 .748 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .285 .770 .137 1 .711 1.330 
Small size (against large size) 1.590 .730 4.749 1 .029 4.906 
Medium size (against large size) 1.767 .813 4.719 1 .030 5.853 
TMs stringent – EU (against TMs not stringent-
EU) 
1.385 .753 3.382 1 .066 3.994 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -2.997 1.068 7.878 1 .005  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.130 .678 2.778 1 .096 3.095 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .204 .939 .047 1 .828 1.227 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.582 1.018 .327 1 .568 .559 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.332 .866 .147 1 .702 .718 
Small size (against large size) 2.286 .873 6.850 1 .009 9.837 
Medium size (against large size) 3.529 .948 13.854 1 .000 34.077 
TMs stringent – EU (against TMs not stringent-
EU) 
3.590 .825 18.931 1 .000 36.237 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -4.335 1.459 8.824 1 .003  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.845 .745 6.137 1 .013 6.331 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 2.027 1.327 2.333 1 .127 7.590 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.125 1.207 .869 1 .351 .325 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .319 .911 .123 1 .726 1.376 
Small size (against large size) 1.555 .924 2.833 1 .092 4.736 
Medium size (against large size) 2.159 .992 4.736 1 .030 8.662 
TMs stringent – EU (against TMs not stringent-
EU) 
2.198 .867 6.419 1 .011 9.004 
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APPENDIX A 8: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of TMs -Japan Market  
 Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent”. 
 Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 60.007. Cox and Snell: 0.343; Nagelkerke: 0.371; McFadden: 0.163 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Effect Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 177.566a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 184.088 6.522 3 .089 
Firm Ownership 182.184 4.619 3 .202 
Firm Age 180.131 2.565 6 .861 
Firm Size 195.890 18.324 6 .005 
TMs stringent- Japan 209.267 31.701 3 .000 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not 
increase the degrees of freedom. 
 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -1.235 .924 1.788 1 .181  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .325 .622 .273 1 .601 1.384 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .874 .907 .930 1 .335 2.397 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.382 .951 .162 1 .688 .682 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .242 .771 .099 1 .753 1.274 
Small size (against large size) 1.624 .736 4.872 1 .027 5.072 
Medium size (against large size) 1.760 .809 4.729 1 .030 5.812 
TMs stringent – Japan (against TMs not stringent-
Japan) 
1.610 .783 4.229 1 .040 5.005 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -2.443 1.021 5.721 1 .017  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .748 .673 1.237 1 .266 2.114 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.072 .948 .006 1 .940 .931 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.652 1.019 .409 1 .523 .521 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.335 .864 .151 1 .698 .715 
Small size (against large size) 2.320 .872 7.068 1 .008 10.172 
Medium size (against large size) 3.396 .932 13.278 1 .000 29.840 
TMs stringent – Japan (against TMs not stringent-
Japan) 
3.582 .839 18.247 1 .000 35.955 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -3.960 1.421 7.766 1 .005  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.576 .739 4.540 1 .033 4.834 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.798 1.327 1.838 1 .175 6.040 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.181 1.206 .958 1 .328 .307 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .304 .907 .112 1 .737 1.355 
Small size (against large size) 1.583 .926 2.923 1 .087 4.870 
Medium size (against large size) 2.079 .983 4.474 1 .034 7.995 
TMs stringent – Japan (against TMs not stringent-
Japan) 
2.249 .889 6.397 1 .011 9.480 
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APPENDIX A 9: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of TMs – China Market 
Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent”.  
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 40.825. Cox and Snell: 0.248; Nagelkerke: 0.269; McFadden: 0.111 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 173.179a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 178.240 5.061 3 .167 
Firm Ownership 179.449 6.270 3 .099 
Firm Age 175.748 2.569 6 .861 
Firm Size 185.670 12.492 6 .052 
TMs stringent- China 188.307 15.128 3 .002 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does 
not increase the degrees of freedom. 
 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent 
and less 
Intercept -1.007 .804 1.570 1 .210  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .459 .628 .533 1 .465 1.582 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .523 .852 .376 1 .540 1.687 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.258 .958 .073 1 .788 .772 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .162 .791 .042 1 .837 1.176 
Small size (against large size) 1.615 .742 4.731 1 .030 5.026 
Medium size (against large size) 1.277 .801 2.542 1 .111 3.586 
TMs stringent – China (against TMs not stringent-
China) 
1.767 .725 5.938 1 .015 5.853 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -.647 .745 .754 1 .385  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.057 .645 2.684 1 .101 2.879 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -1.012 .829 1.491 1 .222 .363 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.127 .977 .017 1 .897 .881 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.454 .843 .290 1 .590 .635 
Small size (against large size) 2.134 .818 6.802 1 .009 8.452 
Medium size (against large size) 2.341 .852 7.539 1 .006 10.388 
TMs stringent – China (against TMs not stringent-
China) 
2.049 .739 7.685 1 .006 7.759 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -2.106 1.205 3.057 1 .080  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.207 .713 2.866 1 .090 3.342 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .878 1.235 .506 1 .477 2.406 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.593 1.195 .247 1 .620 .553 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .349 .899 .150 1 .698 1.417 
Small size (against large size) 1.203 .891 1.823 1 .177 3.331 
Medium size (against large size) 1.473 .914 2.599 1 .107 4.362 
TMs stringent – China (against TMs not stringent-
China) 
.397 .880 .204 1 .652 1.488 
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APPENDIX A 10: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of TMs –ASEAN Market 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -.929 .847 1.204 1 .273  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .434 .618 .495 1 .482 1.544 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .395 .868 .208 1 .649 1.485 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .347 .934 .138 1 .710 1.415 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .309 .791 .152 1 .696 1.362 
Small size (against large size) 1.414 .730 3.749 1 .053 4.114 
Medium size (against large size) 1.483 .807 3.374 1 .066 4.407 
TMs stringent – ASEAN (against  TMs not 
stringent-ASEAN) 
1.648 .707 5.440 1 .020 5.197 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -.532 .787 .457 1 .499  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .975 .623 2.444 1 .118 2.650 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.830 .828 1.004 1 .316 .436 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .470 .954 .243 1 .622 1.600 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.242 .826 .086 1 .770 .785 
Small size (against large size) 1.821 .788 5.342 1 .021 6.176 
Medium size (against large size) 2.429 .842 8.325 1 .004 11.344 
TMs stringent – ASEAN against  TMs not 
stringent-ASEAN) 
1.509 .728 4.297 1 .038 4.521 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -2.881 1.279 5.073 1 .024  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.683 .719 5.479 1 .019 5.382 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.424 1.263 1.272 1 .259 4.154 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.372 1.178 .100 1 .752 .689 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .394 .911 .187 1 .665 1.483 
Small size (against large size) 1.069 .890 1.443 1 .230 2.913 
Medium size (against large size) 1.493 .943 2.505 1 .114 4.448 
TMs stringent – ASEAN (against  TMs not 
stringent-ASEAN) 
.354 .874 .164 1 .685 1.425 
 Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent”. 
 Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 38.420. Cox and Snell: 0.236; Nagelkerke: 0.255; McFadden: 0.105 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 169.649a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 177.594 7.945 3 .047 
Firm Ownership 176.008 6.359 3 .095 
Firm Age 172.532 2.884 6 .823 
Firm Size 181.362 11.713 6 .069 
TMs stringent- ASEAN 179.763 10.114 3 .018 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does 
not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 11: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of CPs– US Market 
 
 Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
 Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 42.411. Cox and Snell: 0.257; Nagelkerke: 0.278; McFadden: 0.115 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 148.990a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 158.879 9.888 3 .020 
Firm Ownership 154.255 5.265 3 .153 
Firm Age 152.855 3.865 6 .695 
Firm Size 163.178 14.188 6 .028 
CPs stringent- US 163.095 14.105 3 .003 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect 
does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -2.599 1.165 4.975 1 .026  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .649 .638 1.032 1 .310 1.913 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .748 .902 .687 1 .407 2.112 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .279 .948 .087 1 .768 1.322 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.195 .947 1.591 1 .207 3.302 
Small size (against large size) .922 .744 1.535 1 .215 2.514 
Medium size (against large size) 2.053 .929 4.881 1 .027 7.794 
CPs stringent-US (against CPs not stringent-US) 2.265 .830 7.439 1 .006 9.632 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -3.131 1.233 6.443 1 .011  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.273 .657 3.757 1 .053 3.572 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.393 .887 .196 1 .658 .675 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .393 .979 .161 1 .688 1.481 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .655 1.003 .427 1 .514 1.926 
Small size (against large size) 1.289 .812 2.520 1 .112 3.630 
Medium size (against large size) 3.136 .986 10.106 1 .001 23.003 
CPs stringent-US (against CPs not stringent-US) 3.081 .932 10.921 1 .001 21.783 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -5.275 1.688 9.762 1 .002  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.982 .756 6.873 1 .009 7.258 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.567 1.312 1.427 1 .232 4.791 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.323 1.200 .072 1 .788 .724 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.293 1.061 1.485 1 .223 3.645 
Small size (against large size) .753 .920 .671 1 .413 2.124 
Medium size (against large size) 2.237 1.073 4.342 1 .037 9.361 
CPs stringent-US (against CPs not stringent-US) 2.636 1.024 6.626 1 .010 13.963 
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APPENDIX A 12: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of CPs - EU Market 
 Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
 Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 40.164. Cox and Snell: 0.245; Nagelkerke: 0.265; McFadden: 0.109 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Effect Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 155.312a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 162.129 6.817 3 .078 
Firm Ownership 161.141 5.829 3 .120 
Firm Age 158.544 3.232 6 .779 
Firm Size 168.919 13.607 6 .034 
CPs stringent- EU 167.170 11.858 3 .008 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -2.050 1.052 3.794 1 .051  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .294 .620 .225 1 .635 1.342 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .801 .861 .864 1 .353 2.227 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .054 .926 .003 1 .953 1.055 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .907 .827 1.203 1 .273 2.478 
Small size (against large size) 1.395 .728 3.678 1 .055 4.036 
Medium size (against large size) 1.727 .833 4.298 1 .038 5.622 
CPs stringent-EU (against CPs not stringent-
EU) 
1.662 .702 5.605 1 .018 5.271 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -2.553 1.100 5.383 1 .020  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .802 .633 1.606 1 .205 2.231 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.444 .832 .285 1 .594 .642 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .226 .956 .056 1 .813 1.254 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .513 .886 .336 1 .562 1.671 
Small size (against large size) 1.799 .806 4.976 1 .026 6.043 
Medium size (against large size) 2.793 .891 9.833 1 .002 16.326 
CPs stringent-EU (against CPs not stringent-
EU) 
2.570 .827 9.659 1 .002 13.063 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -4.981 1.618 9.474 1 .002  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.540 .734 4.398 1 .036 4.664 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.576 1.276 1.525 1 .217 4.834 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.500 1.183 .179 1 .673 .607 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.152 .979 1.385 1 .239 3.163 
Small size (against large size) 1.221 .914 1.784 1 .182 3.391 
Medium size (against large size) 1.902 .996 3.647 1 .056 6.698 
CPs stringent-EU (against CPs not stringent-
EU) 
2.388 1.013 5.561 1 .018 10.896 
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APPENDIX A 13: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of CPs - Japan Market 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 40.391. Cox and Snell: 0.246; Nagelkerke: 0.266; McFadden: 0.110 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 149.098a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 159.257 10.159 3 .017 
Firm Ownership 154.280 5.181 3 .159 
Firm Age 152.877 3.779 6 .707 
Firm Size 163.865 14.766 6 .022 
CPs stringent- Japan 161.184 12.085 3 .007 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
. 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -2.489 1.176 4.477 1 .034  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .673 .636 1.120 1 .290 1.960 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .647 .892 .527 1 .468 1.910 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .308 .941 .107 1 .744 1.360 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.161 .943 1.513 1 .219 3.192 
Small size (against large size) 1.031 .731 1.986 1 .159 2.803 
Medium size (against large size) 2.079 .930 4.994 1 .025 7.997 
CPs stringent- Japan (against CPs not stringent- 
Japan) 
2.115 .848 6.221 1 .013 8.292 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -3.038 1.240 6.005 1 .014  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.300 .654 3.948 1 .047 3.667 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.494 .877 .317 1 .573 .610 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .419 .974 .186 1 .667 1.521 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .622 .999 .388 1 .534 1.863 
Small size (against large size) 1.398 .801 3.047 1 .081 4.047 
Medium size (against large size) 3.166 .985 10.336 1 .001 23.704 
CPs stringent-Japan (against CPs not stringent- 
Japan) 
2.950 .943 9.777 1 .002 19.096 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -5.181 1.695 9.346 1 .002  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 2.012 .753 7.129 1 .008 7.475 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.471 1.304 1.272 1 .259 4.353 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.298 1.196 .062 1 .804 .743 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.261 1.058 1.420 1 .233 3.529 
Small size (against large size) .858 .910 .890 1 .346 2.358 
Medium size (against large size) 2.261 1.073 4.440 1 .035 9.594 
CPs stringent-Japan (against CPs not stringent- 
Japan) 
2.500 1.036 5.825 1 .016 12.183 
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APPENDIX A 14: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of CPs– China Market 
More than 75 
percent  
B  Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -.844 .837 1.015 1 .314  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .242 .604 .161 1 .688 1.274 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .715 .856 .698 1 .404 2.045 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .015 .950 .000 1 .987 1.015 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .246 .783 .099 1 .753 1.279 
Small size (against large size) 1.515 .729 4.322 1 .038 4.551 
Medium size (against large size) 1.276 .785 2.641 1 .104 3.582 
 CPs stringent-China (against CPs not stringent- 
China) 
1.941 1.105 3.084 1 .079 6.963 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -.879 .829 1.125 1 .289  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .719 .629 1.306 1 .253 2.053 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.486 .858 .321 1 .571 .615 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .016 .987 .000 1 .987 1.016 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.404 .842 .230 1 .632 .668 
Small size (against large size) 2.143 .820 6.840 1 .009 8.528 
Medium size (against large size) 2.204 .852 6.689 1 .010 9.062 
CPs stringent-China (against CPs not stringent- 
China) 
2.881 1.102 6.830 1 .009 17.837 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -2.990 1.300 5.293 1 .021  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.559 .712 4.796 1 .029 4.756 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.436 1.262 1.294 1 .255 4.203 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.549 1.196 .211 1 .646 .577 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .374 .902 .172 1 .678 1.454 
Small size (against large size) 1.295 .895 2.095 1 .148 3.651 
Medium size (against large size) 1.430 .930 2.365 1 .124 4.180 
CPs stringent-China (against CPs not stringent- 
China) 
1.534 1.214 1.597 1 .206 4.639 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 42.589. Cox and Snell: 0.258; Nagelkerke: 0.279; McFadden: 0.116 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 176.197a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 183.557 7.361 3 .061 
Firm Ownership 181.239 5.042 3 .169 
Firm Age 178.851 2.654 6 .851 
Firm Size 187.017 10.820 6 .094 
CPs stringent- China 190.480 14.283 3 .003 
 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 15: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of CPs - ASEAN Market 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -2.949 1.182 6.222 1 .013  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.893 .760 6.207 1 .013 6.637 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.491 1.040 2.057 1 .151 4.444 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .199 1.265 .025 1 .875 1.220 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .635 1.003 .401 1 .527 1.887 
Small size (against large size) 2.126 .886 5.754 1 .016 8.380 
Medium size (against large size) 1.278 .951 1.807 1 .179 3.589 
CPs stringent- ASEAN (against CPs not stringent- 
ASEAN) 
1.293 .736 3.087 1 .079 3.643 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -2.400 1.082 4.917 1 .027  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 2.012 .798 6.352 1 .012 7.479 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.914 .870 1.104 1 .293 .401 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.063 1.262 .710 1 .399 2.895 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.367 1.099 .112 1 .738 .693 
Small size (against large size) 2.676 .991 7.297 1 .007 14.525 
Medium size (against large size) 2.502 1.032 5.878 1 .015 12.205 
CPs stringent- ASEAN (against CPs not stringent- 
ASEAN) 
2.124 .792 7.183 1 .007 8.360 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -.822 .906 .825 1 .364  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.091 .716 2.319 1 .128 2.977 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .025 .800 .001 1 .975 1.025 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .751 1.209 .386 1 .534 2.120 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .516 .949 .296 1 .586 1.676 
Small size (against large size) 1.372 .838 2.677 1 .102 3.942 
Medium size (against large size) 1.908 .870 4.812 1 .028 6.740 
CPs stringent- ASEAN (against CPs not stringent- 
ASEAN) 
1.511 .690 4.798 1 .028 4.533 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 48.910. Cox and Snell: 0.290; Nagelkerke: 0.314; McFadden: 0.134 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 175.502a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 185.847 10.345 3 .016 
Firm Ownership 186.037 10.535 3 .015 
Firm Age 180.754 5.252 6 .512 
Firm Size 193.288 17.786 6 .007 
CPs stringent- ASEAN 183.759 8.258 3 .041 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 16: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of ONTMs - US Market 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent 
and less 
Intercept .118 .657 .032 1 .858  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -2.278 .609 14.018 1 .000 .102 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.284 .586 .235 1 .628 .753 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) 2.290 1.133 4.086 1 .043 9.872 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.948 .708 1.791 1 .181 .388 
Small size (against large size) 1.980 .646 9.377 1 .002 7.240 
Medium size (against large size) 1.350 .709 3.627 1 .057 3.859 
ONTMs stringent-US (against ONTMs not stringent-US 1.311 .579 5.124 1 .024 3.711 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -.123 .687 .032 1 .858  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -1.984 .633 9.823 1 .002 .138 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.941 .606 2.406 1 .121 .390 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) 2.081 1.169 3.167 1 .075 8.009 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.605 .723 .699 1 .403 .546 
Small size (against large size) 1.490 .682 4.767 1 .029 4.435 
Medium size (against large size) 1.500 .717 4.381 1 .036 4.482 
ONTMs stringent-US (against ONTMs not stringent-US 2.009 .621 10.481 1 .001 7.455 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -1.138 .888 1.640 1 .200  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -1.140 .675 2.851 1 .091 .320 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .669 .701 .910 1 .340 1.951 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.958 1.562 1.571 1 .210 7.083 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .942 .730 1.666 1 .197 2.566 
Small size (against large size) -.865 .978 .782 1 .377 .421 
Medium size (against large size) 2.065 .694 8.854 1 .003 7.887 
ONTMs stringent-US (against ONTMs not stringent-US -.338 .688 .241 1 .623 .713 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 74.272 Cox and Snell: 0.405 Nagelkerke: 0.435; McFadden: 0.193 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 176.268a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 194.436 18.168 3 .000 
Firm Ownership 181.545 5.277 3 .153 
Firm Age 190.480 14.212 6 .027 
Firm Size 207.576 31.308 6 .000 
ONTMs stringent-US 193.769 17.501 3 .001 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect 
does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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       APPENDIX A 17: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of ONTMs - EU Market 
 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 62.815 Cox and Snell: 0.355 Nagelkerke: 0.381; McFadden: 0.163 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -.815 .797 1.045 1 .307  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -1.818 .548 11.007 1 .001 .162 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .259 .596 .189 1 .664 1.295 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.600 .889 3.239 1 .072 4.954 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.628 .679 .855 1 .355 .533 
Small size (against large size) 1.787 .619 8.324 1 .004 5.973 
Medium size (against large size) 1.197 .684 3.066 1 .080 3.310 
ONTMs stringent-EU (against ONTMs not stringent-EU 1.173 .576 4.146 1 .042 3.233 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -.178 .756 .055 1 .814  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -1.345 .561 5.747 1 .017 .260 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.154 .580 .070 1 .791 .857 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.478 .924 2.558 1 .110 4.384 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.043 .657 .004 1 .948 .958 
Small size (against large size) 1.258 .642 3.842 1 .050 3.520 
Medium size (against large size) 1.486 .667 4.958 1 .026 4.419 
ONTMs stringent-EU (against ONTMs not stringent-EU)  .093 .530 .031 1 .861 1.097 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -.767 .891 .741 1 .389  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -1.129 .649 3.027 1 .082 .323 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .578 .713 .656 1 .418 1.782 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .564 1.352 .174 1 .677 1.757 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .704 .720 .958 1 .328 2.023 
Small size (against large size) -.713 .948 .566 1 .452 .490 
Medium size (against large size) 1.980 .685 8.349 1 .004 7.240 
ONTMs stringent-EU (against ONTMs not stringent-EU -.574 .602 .910 1 .340 .563 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 201.925a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 214.797 12.872 3 .005 
Firm Ownership 203.274 1.350 3 .717 
Firm Age 210.737 8.813 6 .184 
Firm Size 230.726 28.802 6 .000 
ONTMs stringent-EU 210.423 8.498 3 .037 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does 
not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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            APPENDIX A 18: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of ONTMs – Japan Market 
 
Notes: Reference category is “more than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 40.322 Cox and Snell: 0.246 Nagelkerke: 0.266; McFadden: 0.110 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
  
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 177.330a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 184.757 7.428 3 .059 
Firm Ownership 183.099 5.770 3 .123 
Firm Age 180.388 3.059 6 .801 
Firm Size 193.727 16.398 6 .012 
ONTMs stringent-Japan 188.144 10.814 3 .013 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -1.751 .934 3.510 1 .061  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .720 .661 1.188 1 .276 2.055 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .937 .887 1.117 1 .291 2.553 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .026 .964 .001 1 .978 1.027 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .910 .792 1.318 1 .251 2.483 
Small size (against large size) 1.945 .805 5.841 1 .016 6.991 
Medium size (against large size) 1.367 .699 3.822 1 .051 3.924 
ONTMs stringent-Japan (against ONTMs not stringent-
Japan 
2.292 .838 7.487 1 .006 9.896 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -1.145 .838 1.867 1 .172  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.326 .662 4.008 1 .045 3.766 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.287 .803 .128 1 .721 .751 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .086 .976 .008 1 .930 1.090 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .381 .835 .208 1 .648 1.464 
Small size (against large size) 2.259 .843 7.188 1 .007 9.578 
Medium size (against large size) 1.976 .716 7.621 1 .006 7.214 
ONTMs stringent-Japan (against ONTMs not stringent-
Japan 
1.915 .848 5.095 1 .024 6.788 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -3.537 1.367 6.693 1 .010  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.662 .755 4.852 1 .028 5.270 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.575 1.262 1.558 1 .212 4.830 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.176 1.180 .022 1 .881 .839 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.152 .909 1.603 1 .205 3.163 
Small size (against large size) .852 .994 .735 1 .391 2.345 
Medium size (against large size) 1.684 .804 4.388 1 .036 5.388 
ONTMs stringent-Japan (against ONTMs not stringent-
Japan 
2.134 .924 5.340 1 .021 8.451 
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APPENDIX A 19: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of ONTMs - China Market 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -1.679 .920 3.327 1 .068  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .657 .651 1.018 1 .313 1.929 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .870 .874 .991 1 .320 2.387 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.087 .958 .008 1 .928 .917 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .841 .791 1.130 1 .288 2.319 
Small size (against large size) 1.823 .793 5.277 1 .022 6.188 
Medium size (against large size) 1.295 .693 3.495 1 .062 3.652 
ONTMs stringent-China (against ONTMs not stringent- 
China) 
2.027 .721 7.895 1 .005 7.588 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -1.040 .822 1.600 1 .206  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.260 .652 3.737 1 .053 3.524 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.342 .790 .188 1 .665 .710 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .051 .966 .003 1 .958 1.052 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .329 .831 .157 1 .692 1.389 
Small size (against large size) 2.148 .828 6.729 1 .009 8.572 
Medium size (against large size) 1.916 .707 7.349 1 .007 6.794 
ONTMs stringent-China (against ONTMs not stringent- 
China) 
1.571 .732 4.606 1 .032 4.810 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -3.128 1.320 5.616 1 .018  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.568 .739 4.504 1 .034 4.796 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.425 1.237 1.328 1 .249 4.160 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.178 1.164 .024 1 .878 .837 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.044 .896 1.358 1 .244 2.841 
Small size (against large size) .727 .973 .558 1 .455 2.070 
Medium size (against large size) 1.609 .789 4.159 1 .041 4.999 
ONTMs stringent-China (against ONTMs not stringent- 
China) 
1.316 .823 2.559 1 .110 3.730 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 39.787. Cox and Snell: 0.243; Nagelkerke: 0.263; McFadden: 0.108 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 181.322a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 188.298 6.975 3 .073 
Firm Ownership 186.745 5.422 3 .143 
Firm Age 184.093 2.771 6 .837 
Firm Size 196.907 15.585 6 .016 
ONTMs stringent-China 191.601 10.279 3 .016 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 20: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of ONTMs - ASEAN 
Market 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -.980 1.124 .760 1 .383  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.978 .533 13.757 1 .000 7.232 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.182 .539 .114 1 .736 .834 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.360 .640 4.511 1 .034 3.895 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .624 .634 .968 1 .325 1.867 
Small size (against large size) -.245 1.056 .054 1 .816 .783 
Medium size (against large size) -1.537 1.101 1.948 1 .163 .215 
ONTMs stringent-ASEAN (against  ONTMs not stringent- 
ASEAN) 
1.373 .566 5.879 1 .015 3.947 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -.300 1.084 .076 1 .782  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.072 .558 3.685 1 .055 2.920 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.049 .555 .008 1 .929 .952 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .612 .692 .782 1 .377 1.845 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .466 .631 .547 1 .460 1.594 
Small size (against large size) -.509 1.027 .246 1 .620 .601 
Medium size (against large size) -1.516 1.077 1.980 1 .159 .220 
ONTMs stringent-ASEAN (against  ONTMs not stringent- 
ASEAN) 
.852 .576 2.182 1 .140 2.343 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -1.381 1.214 1.294 1 .255  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.509 .640 5.560 1 .018 4.523 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .824 .724 1.296 1 .255 2.280 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.689 1.173 .345 1 .557 .502 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .808 .698 1.339 1 .247 2.242 
Small size (against large size) -.514 1.069 .231 1 .631 .598 
Medium size (against large size) -2.272 1.168 3.786 1 .052 .103 
ONTMs stringent-ASEAN (against  ONTMs not stringent- 
ASEAN) 
.914 .673 1.845 1 .174 2.494 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 39.413. Cox and Snell: 0.241 Nagelkerke: 0.258; McFadden: 0.103 
 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 206.797a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 223.258 16.461 3 .001 
Firm Ownership 209.118 2.321 3 .509 
Firm Age 216.153 9.356 6 .155 
Firm Size 217.075 10.278 6 .113 
ONTMs stringent-ASEAN 213.080 6.283 3 .099 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does 
not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 21: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of PMs - US Market 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 70.081 Cox and Snell: 0.387 Nagelkerke: 0.416; McFadden: 0.182 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -2.547 1.145 4.950 1 .026  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.121 .730 2.355 1 .125 3.067 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.462 1.022 2.045 1 .153 4.315 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .282 1.253 .050 1 .822 1.325 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .804 .981 .672 1 .412 2.235 
Small size (against large size) 1.858 .855 4.725 1 .030 6.412 
Medium size (against large size) 1.598 .938 2.904 1 .088 4.945 
PMs stringent-US (against PMs not stringent-US) 1.266 .708 3.198 1 .074 3.548 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -2.720 1.130 5.792 1 .016  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.891 .785 5.803 1 .016 6.629 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.938 .875 1.151 1 .283 .391 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .995 1.259 .624 1 .429 2.704 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.127 1.098 .013 1 .908 .880 
Small size (against large size) 2.806 1.015 7.641 1 .006 16.547 
Medium size (against large size) 2.827 1.079 6.867 1 .009 16.896 
PMs stringent-US (against PMs not stringent-US) 2.192 .796 7.588 1 .006 8.953 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -.850 .899 .893 1 .345  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.374 .691 3.956 1 .047 3.950 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .143 .793 .032 1 .857 1.154 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .498 1.202 .172 1 .678 1.646 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .538 .947 .323 1 .570 1.713 
Small size (against large size) 1.308 .813 2.587 1 .108 3.699 
Medium size (against large size) 1.791 .876 4.178 1 .041 5.998 
PMs stringent-US (against (PMs not stringent-US) 1.310 .670 3.827 1 .050 3.707 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 168.321a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 174.998 6.677 3 .083 
Firm Ownership 178.694 10.373 3 .016 
Firm Age 172.364 4.043 6 .671 
Firm Size 182.747 14.426 6 .025 
PMs stringent- US 176.754 8.432 3 .038 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 22: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of PMs - EU Market 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -2.522 1.146 4.842 1 .028  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.152 .731 2.483 1 .115 3.164 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.454 1.022 2.024 1 .155 4.280 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .236 1.254 .036 1 .850 1.267 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .709 .987 .515 1 .473 2.031 
Small size (against large size) 1.879 .855 4.833 1 .028 6.547 
Medium size (against large size) 1.533 .943 2.644 1 .104 4.632 
 PMs stringent-EU (against PMs not stringent-EU) 1.229 .709 3.006 1 .083 3.417 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -2.548 1.113 5.242 1 .022  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.771 .776 5.202 1 .023 5.877 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.858 .866 .982 1 .322 .424 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .941 1.252 .564 1 .453 2.562 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.153 1.088 .020 1 .888 .858 
Small size (against large size) 2.788 1.008 7.649 1 .006 16.250 
Medium size (against large size) 2.942 1.069 7.574 1 .006 18.952 
PMs stringent-EU (against  PMs not stringent-EU) 1.997 .778 6.585 1 .010 7.368 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -.917 .903 1.032 1 .310  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.388 .692 4.026 1 .045 4.007 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .163 .795 .042 1 .838 1.177 
 Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .522 1.203 .188 1 .664 1.685 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .641 .945 .460 1 .497 1.899 
Small size (against large size) 1.267 .815 2.419 1 .120 3.551 
Medium size (against large size) 1.764 .878 4.035 1 .045 5.837 
PMs stringent-EU against (PMs not stringent-EU) 1.372 .670 4.186 1 .041 3.943 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 43.327 Cox and Snell: 0.261 Nagelkerke: 0.283; McFadden: 0.119 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept   170.734a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 176.737 6.003 3 .111 
Firm Ownership 180.486 9.751 3 .021 
Firm Age 174.766 4.032 6 .672 
Firm Size 186.195 15.461 6 .017 
PMs stringent- EU 178.032 7.298 3 .063 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does 
not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 23: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of PMs - Japan Market 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -2.565 1.146 5.009 1 .025  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.077 .729 2.182 1 .140 2.935 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.499 1.022 2.149 1 .143 4.476 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .225 1.252 .032 1 .857 1.252 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .734 .981 .559 1 .455 2.083 
Small size (against large size) 1.924 .852 5.101 1 .024 6.850 
Medium size (against large size) 1.611 .938 2.953 1 .086 5.010 
PMs stringent-Japan (against  PMs not stringent-
Japan) 
1.297 .707 3.370 1 .066 3.659 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -2.690 1.123 5.739 1 .017  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.836 .777 5.582 1 .018 6.271 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.817 .869 .884 1 .347 .442 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.089 1.248 .762 1 .383 2.972 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.171 1.090 .025 1 .875 .843 
Small size (against large size) 2.817 1.007 7.818 1 .005 16.726 
Medium size (against large size) 2.934 1.070 7.514 1 .006 18.800 
PMs stringent-Japan (against  PMs not stringent-
Japan) 
2.088 .782 7.136 1 .008 8.071 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -.845 .901 .878 1 .349  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.411 .692 4.154 1 .042 4.098 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .106 .793 .018 1 .894 1.112 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .461 1.209 .145 1 .703 1.585 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .604 .947 .407 1 .524 1.829 
Small size (against large size) 1.205 .817 2.174 1 .140 3.336 
Medium size (against large size) 1.742 .879 3.932 1 .047 5.710 
PMs stringent-Japan (against PMs not stringent-
Japan) 
1.304 .672 3.770 1 .052 3.685 
  Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
  Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 47.014. Cox and Snell: 0.280 Nagelkerke: 0.303; McFadden: 0.128 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
  
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 170.623a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 177.321 6.698 3 .082 
Firm Ownership 180.359 9.736 3 .021 
Firm Age 175.652 5.029 6 .540 
Firm Size 186.490 15.867 6 .014 
PMs stringent- Japan 178.474 7.851 3 .049 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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 APPENDIX A 24: Parameter Estimates for PMs Stringency – China Market 
 Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
 Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 42.351. Cox and Snell: 0.256; Nagelkerke: 0.277; McFadden: 0.115  
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -1.740 .991 3.085 1 .079  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.219 .712 2.932 1 .087 3.384 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .732 .858 .728 1 .394 2.080 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .701 1.213 .334 1 .563 2.015 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .791 .967 .669 1 .414 2.205 
Small size (against large size) 1.453 .830 3.065 1 .080 4.275 
Medium size (against large size) 1.143 .922 1.535 1 .215 3.135 
PMs stringent-China (against PMs not stringent-
China) 
1.654 .692 5.719 1 .017 5.230 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -3.105 1.209 6.599 1 .010  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.723 .780 4.886 1 .027 5.603 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.480 .877 .300 1 .584 .619 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .927 1.254 .547 1 .460 2.528 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.084 1.080 .006 1 .938 .919 
Small size (against large size) 3.193 1.083 8.697 1 .003 24.351 
Medium size (against large size) 3.302 1.140 8.392 1 .004 27.171 
PMs stringent-China (against PMs not stringent-
China) 
1.869 .778 5.774 1 .016 6.485 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -.989 .920 1.155 1 .283  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.393 .699 3.975 1 .046 4.027 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .166 .800 .043 1 .836 1.181 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .060 1.240 .002 1 .961 1.062 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .521 .950 .301 1 .583 1.684 
Small size (against large size) 1.509 .826 3.334 1 .068 4.521 
Medium size (against large size) 2.005 .887 5.112 1 .024 7.426 
PMs stringent-China (against PMs not stringent-
China) 
1.078 .677 2.537 1 .111 2.940 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 174.165a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 179.796 5.630 3 .131 
Firm Ownership 177.721 3.556 3 .314 
Firm Age 178.581 4.416 6 .621 
Firm Size 192.307 18.141 6 .006 
PMs stringent- China 182.422 8.257 3 .041 
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APPENDIX A 25: Parameter Estimates for Stringency of PMs – ASEAN Market 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -1.154 1.074 1.153 1 .283  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .069 .557 .015 1 .901 1.071 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .762 .892 .731 1 .393 2.143 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .692 .625 1.228 1 .268 1.998 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.925 .735 1.584 1 .208 .396 
Small size (against large size) .831 .624 1.771 1 .183 2.296 
Medium size (against large size) .157 .746 .045 1 .833 1.170 
PMs stringent- ASEAN (against  PMs not stringent- 
ASEAN) 
1.335 .567 5.546 1 .019 3.799 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -1.303 1.083 1.448 1 .229  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .917 .545 2.828 1 .093 2.502 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .402 .875 .211 1 .646 1.495 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.628 .670 .880 1 .348 .534 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.418 .647 .418 1 .518 .658 
Small size (against large size) 1.639 .685 5.724 1 .017 5.149 
Medium size (against large size) 1.339 .758 3.120 1 .077 3.816 
PMs stringent- ASEAN (against PMs not stringent- 
ASEAN) 
.817 .558 2.145 1 .143 2.263 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept .063 1.182 .003 1 .958  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -.238 .657 .131 1 .717 .788 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .250 1.022 .060 1 .807 1.284 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.078 .831 1.684 1 .194 .340 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.503 .839 3.211 1 .073 .222 
Small size (against large size) -.563 .813 .479 1 .489 .570 
Medium size (against large size) .885 .773 1.310 1 .252 2.423 
PMs stringent- ASEAN (against PMs not stringent- 
ASEAN) 
.209 .659 .101 1 .751 1.233 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 44.886. Cox and Snell: 0.269; Nagelkerke: 0.290; McFadden: 0.119 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 190.486a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 196.802 6.316 3 .097 
Firm Ownership 191.250 .764 3 .858 
Firm Age 205.967 15.481 6 .017 
Firm Size 206.970 16.484 6 .011 
PMs stringent- ASEAN 197.726 7.240 3 .065 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect 
does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 26: Parameter Estimates for Effects of InfoAsym – US Market  
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”. 
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 49.699. Cox and Snell: 0.294; Nagelkerke: 0.219; McFadden: 0.137 
 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Erro
r 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
 Intercept -2.730 1.161 5.524 1 .019  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.035 .720 2.068 1 .150 2.814 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.496 1.037 2.083 1 .149 4.465 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.089 1.306 .005 1 .946 .915 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .861 .989 .758 1 .384 2.365 
Small size (against large size) 2.039 .882 5.337 1 .021 7.679 
Medium size (against large size) 1.779 .960 3.432 1 .064 5.923 
InfoAsym effect-US (against InfoAsym no effect -
US) 
1.476 .750 3.869 1 .049 4.376 
26 - 50 percent 
 Intercept -2.916 1.133 6.626 1 .010  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.833 .771 5.652 1 .017 6.254 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.939 .889 1.117 1 .291 .391 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .277 1.300 .046 1 .831 1.320 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .001 1.099 .000 1 .999 1.001 
Small size (against large size) 2.731 1.006 7.377 1 .007 15.351 
Medium size (against large size) 3.055 1.068 8.182 1 .004 21.220 
InfoAsym effect-US (against InfoAsym no effect -
US) 
2.842 .839 11.473 1 .001 17.150 
51 – 75 percent 
 Intercept -1.034 .912 1.286 1 .257  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.215 .674 3.255 1 .071 3.372 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .203 .807 .063 1 .802 1.225 
 Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .037 1.253 .001 1 .977 1.037 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .648 .949 .466 1 .495 1.911 
Small size (against large size) 1.334 .835 2.550 1 .110 3.796 
Medium size (against large size) 2.135 .883 5.838 1 .016 8.455 
InfoAsym effect-US (against InfoAsym no effect -
US) 
1.765 .704 6.288 1 .012 5.843 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept   167.126a .000 0 . 
Firm Type  173.408 6.282 3 .099 
Firm Ownership 177.524 10.398 3 .015 
Firm Age  169.715 2.590 6 .858 
Firm Size  184.663 17.537 6 .007 
InfoAsym effect -US   181.107 13.981 3 .003 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect 
does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 27: Parameter Estimates for Effects of InfoAsym – EU Market 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”.  
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 43.159. Cox and Snell: 0.261; Nagelkerke: 0.282; McFadden: 0.118 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept  149.003a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 158.982 9.979 3 .019 
Firm Ownership 154.292 5.290 3 .152 
Firm Age 152.351 3.348 6 .764 
Firm Size 161.947 12.944 6 .044 
InfoAsym effect - EU 158.568 9.566 3 .023 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not 
increase the degrees of freedom. 
 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -1.920 1.114 2.969 1 .085  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .584 .623 .879 1 .349 1.793 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .612 .869 .496 1 .481 1.844 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .286 .930 .095 1 .758 1.332 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .920 .879 1.094 1 .295 2.509 
Small size (against large size) 1.101 .723 2.316 1 .128 3.007 
Medium size (against large size) 1.711 .845 4.097 1 .043 5.535 
InfoAsym effect -EU (against InfoAsym no 
effect-  EU) 
1.525 .789 3.733 1 .053 4.595 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -2.683 1.213 4.894 1 .027  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.215 .641 3.587 1 .058 3.370 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.535 .854 .392 1 .531 .586 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .402 .961 .175 1 .676 1.495 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .392 .940 .174 1 .676 1.480 
Small size (against large size) 1.448 .793 3.334 1 .068 4.254 
Medium size (against large size) 2.766 .902 9.408 1 .002 15.899 
InfoAsym effect -EU (against InfoAsym no 
effect-  EU) 
2.605 .930 7.838 1 .005 13.529 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -5.015 1.695 8.759 1 .003  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.955 .743 6.921 1 .009 7.061 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.459 1.291 1.276 1 .259 4.300 
 Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.322 1.188 .074 1 .786 .725 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.053 1.010 1.089 1 .297 2.867 
Small size (against large size) .896 .905 .979 1 .322 2.449 
Medium size (against large size) 1.897 1.005 3.567 1 .059 6.669 
InfoAsym effect -EU (against InfoAsym no 
effect-  EU) 
2.320 1.059 4.798 1 .028 10.172 
 223 
 
APPENDIX A 28: Parameter Estimates for Effects of InfoAsym – Japan Market 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -1.162 .997 1.358 1 .244  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -.025 .554 .002 1 .964 .975 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .785 .796 .974 1 .324 2.193 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .503 .615 .669 1 .414 1.654 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.055 .728 2.101 1 .147 .348 
Small size (against large size) .984 .640 2.360 1 .124 2.674 
Medium size (against large size) .559 .755 .548 1 .459 1.749 
InfoAsym effect –Japan (against InfoAsym no effect-
Japan) 
1.140 .561 4.128 1 .042 3.126 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -1.591 1.006 2.501 1 .114  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .808 .554 2.128 1 .145 2.244 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .035 .732 .002 1 .961 1.036 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.687 .677 1.029 1 .310 .503 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.458 .649 .499 1 .480 .632 
Small size (against large size) 1.931 .711 7.372 1 .007 6.899 
Medium size (against large size) 1.766 .784 5.074 1 .024 5.849 
InfoAsym effect –Japan (against InfoAsym no effect-
Japan) 
1.433 .564 6.442 1 .011 4.190 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -.351 1.153 .093 1 .761  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -.157 .659 .057 1 .812 .855 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .474 .970 .239 1 .625 1.607 
 Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.074 .827 1.688 1 .194 .342 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.478 .827 3.196 1 .074 .228 
Small size (against large size) -.406 .827 .241 1 .624 .666 
Medium size (against large size) 1.003 .783 1.643 1 .200 2.727 
InfoAsym effect –Japan (against InfoAsym no effect-
Japan) 
.402 .644 .391 1 .532 1.495 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”.  
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 47.280. Cox and Snell: 0.282; Nagelkerke: 0.303; McFadden: 0.125 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 204.472a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 209.434 4.961 3 .175 
Firm Ownership 206.073 1.601 3 .659 
Firm Age 218.585 14.113 6 .028 
Firm Size 221.763 17.290 6 .008 
InfoAsym effect- Japan 212.906 8.434 3 .038 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 29: Parameter Estimates for Effects of InfoAsym – China Market 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -.742 1.012 .538 1 .463  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -.043 .554 .006 1 .938 .958 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .805 .895 .808 1 .369 2.236 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .570 .615 .860 1 .354 1.769 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.288 .745 2.990 1 .084 .276 
Small size (against large size) .651 .617 1.114 1 .291 1.917 
Medium size (against large size) .106 .746 .020 1 .887 1.112 
InfoAsym effect –China (against InfoAsym no effect 
- China) 
1.537 .662 5.391 1 .020 4.652 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -1.143 1.041 1.205 1 .272  
 Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .843 .545 2.387 1 .122 2.322 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .473 .885 .286 1 .593 1.605 
 Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.698 .665 1.101 1 .294 .498 
 5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.663 .654 1.027 1 .311 .515 
 Small size (against large size) 1.529 .677 5.097 1 .024 4.614 
 Medium size (against large size) 1.270 .763 2.775 1 .096 3.562 
 InfoAsym effect –China (against InfoAsym no effect 
- China) 
1.158 .655 3.123 1 .077 3.182 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept .012 1.163 .000 1 .992  
 Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -.225 .653 .119 1 .730 .798 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .273 1.038 .069 1 .792 1.314 
 Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.105 .824 1.797 1 .180 .331 
 5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.591 .835 3.632 1 .057 .204 
 Small size (against large size) -.572 .807 .502 1 .479 .564 
 Medium size (against large size) .830 .775 1.147 1 .284 2.293 
 InfoAsym effect –China (against InfoAsym no effect 
- China) 
.695 .758 .840 1 .359 2.003 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”.  
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 44.709. Cox and Snell: 0.268; Nagelkerke: 0.289; McFadden: 0.118 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept  185.041a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 191.012 5.971 3 .113 
Firm Ownership 185.888 .847 3 .838 
Firm Age 201.029 15.988 6 .014 
Firm Size 200.058 15.017 6 .020 
InfoAsym effect- China 191.905 6.864 3 .076 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not 
increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 30: Parameter Estimates for Effects of InfoAsym – ASEAN Market 
More than 75 
percent  
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
25 percent  
and less 
Intercept -1.619 .921 3.086 1 .079  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .359 .623 .332 1 .564 1.432 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .583 .878 .440 1 .507 1.791 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .146 .960 .023 1 .879 1.157 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .342 .789 .189 1 .664 1.408 
Small size (against large size) 1.295 .733 3.119 1 .077 3.649 
Medium size (against large size) 1.316 .810 2.637 1 .104 3.727 
InfoAsym effect- ASEAN (against InfoAsym no effect 
- ASEAN) 
1.821 .596 9.325 1 .002 6.181 
26 - 50 percent 
Intercept -.637 .810 .620 1 .431  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .910 .618 2.170 1 .141 2.485 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.645 .810 .633 1 .426 .525 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .329 .967 .116 1 .734 1.389 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.231 .814 .081 1 .776 .794 
Small size (against large size) 1.721 .771 4.984 1 .026 5.590 
Medium size (against large size) 2.296 .825 7.749 1 .005 9.939 
InfoAsym effect- ASEAN (against InfoAsym no effect 
- ASEAN) 
.909 .581 2.449 1 .118 2.483 
51 – 75 percent 
Intercept -3.260 1.327 6.039 1 .014  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.675 .721 5.396 1 .020 5.341 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.353 1.259 1.155 1 .282 3.871 
 Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.440 1.197 .135 1 .713 .644 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .375 .901 .173 1 .678 1.455 
Small size (against large size) 1.189 .890 1.786 1 .181 3.283 
Medium size (against large size) 1.462 .940 2.418 1 .120 4.314 
InfoAsym effect- ASEAN (against InfoAsym no effect 
- ASEAN) 
.920 .692 1.766 1 .184 2.509 
Notes: Reference category is “More than 75 percent”.  
Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 38.998. Cox and Snell: 0.239; Nagelkerke: 0.258; McFadden: 0.106 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 176.550a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 184.797 8.247 3 .041 
Firm Ownership 181.959 5.409 3 .144 
Firm Age 179.194 2.644 6 .852 
Firm Size 187.609 11.059 6 .087 
InfoAsym effect- ASEAN 187.243 10.692 3 .014 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not  
     increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 31: Stringency of NTM  Types- Price, Quantity Reduction,              
                                        Quality Restrictions and Threat of Retaliation 
                                        – US Market 
  
Notes: Reference category is “Threat of retaliation”. Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 46.492. Cox and 
Snell: 0.278; Nagelkerke: 0.297; McFadden: 0.120 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a.  This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because  
omitting the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
 
Threat of Retaliation B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Price effects 
 Intercept -2.204 .728 9.168 1 .002  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .406 .520 .609 1 .435 1.501 
 Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.517 .563 7.258 1 .007 4.559 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.315 .665 .224 1 .636 .730 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .420 .616 .464 1 .496 1.522 
Small size (against large size) .131 .609 .047 1 .829 1.140 
Medium size (against large size) 1.082 .647 2.792 1 .095 2.950 
NTMs stringent- US (against NTMs not 
stringent- US) 
1.581 .549 8.286 1 .004 4.858 
Quantity 
reduction 
 Intercept -.955 .620 2.375 1 .123  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -.591 .485 1.486 1 .223 .554 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.011 .522 3.756 1 .053 2.748 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .587 .582 1.016 1 .313 1.798 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .177 .625 .080 1 .778 1.193 
Small size (against large size) -.306 .585 .275 1 .600 .736 
Medium size (against large size) .524 .620 .715 1 .398 1.689 
NTMs stringent- US (against NTMs not 
stringent- US) 
1.522 .518 8.649 1 .003 4.583 
Quality 
restrictions 
 Intercept -3.597 .973 13.667 1 .000  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.021 .642 2.531 1 .112 2.775 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .288 .633 .206 1 .650 1.333 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .708 .679 1.086 1 .297 2.029 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.115 .838 .019 1 .891 .891 
Small size (against large size) 1.346 .776 3.007 1 .083 3.842 
Medium size (against large size) 1.687 .821 4.226 1 .040 5.403 
NTMs stringent- US (against NTMs not 
stringent- US) 
2.061 .645 10.217 1 .001 7.852 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced 
Model 
Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
Intercept 229.893a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 239.332 9.439 3 .024 
Firm Ownership 239.458 9.565 3 .023 
Firm Age 235.686 5.793 6 .447 
Firm Size 238.568 8.675 6 .193 
NTMs stringent-US 245.562 15.670 3 .001 
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APPENDIX A 32: Stringency of NTM Types- Price, Quantity Reduction,  
                                          Quality Restrictions and Threat of Retaliation  
                                         – EU Market 
Notes: Reference category is “Threat of retaliation”. Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 52.740. Cox 
and Snell: 0.308; Nagelkerke: 0.330; McFadden: 0.136 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Threat of Retaliation  B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Price effects 
 Intercept -2.532 .824 9.433 1 .002  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .608 .535 1.288 1 .256 1.836 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.245 .565 4.858 1 .028 3.474 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.368 .632 .339 1 .561 .692 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .060 .625 .009 1 .924 1.062 
Small size (against large size) .816 .671 1.480 1 .224 2.261 
Medium size (against large size) 1.397 .707 3.909 1 .048 4.043 
NTMs stringent- EU (against NTMs not 
stringent- EU) 
1.607 .544 8.726 1 .003 4.987 
Quantity 
reductions 
 Intercept -1.639 .738 4.934 1 .026  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -.320 .503 .403 1 .525 .726 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .860 .524 2.696 1 .101 2.362 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .649 .563 1.327 1 .249 1.913 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .065 .633 .011 1 .918 1.067 
Small size (against large size) .486 .630 .594 1 .441 1.626 
Medium size (against large size) 1.176 .652 3.257 1 .071 3.242 
NTMs stringent- EU (against NTMs not 
stringent- EU) 
1.539 .514 8.962 1 .003 4.660 
Quality 
restrictions 
 Intercept -5.577 1.408 15.686 1 .000  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.361 .668 4.156 1 .041 3.902 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .407 .645 .397 1 .529 1.502 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .983 .721 1.857 1 .173 2.672 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .391 .816 .229 1 .632 1.478 
Small size (against large size) 2.465 1.177 4.383 1 .036 11.760 
Medium size (against large size) 3.451 1.189 8.424 1 .004 31.526 
NTMs stringent- EU (against NTMs not 
stringent- EU) 
2.124 .663 10.278 1 .001 8.366 
Effect Model 
Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 228.835a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 238.823 9.989 3 .019 
Firm Ownership 234.752 5.917 3 .116 
Firm Age 235.093 6.258 6 .395 
Firm Size 242.735 13.900 6 .031 
NTMs stringent-EU 244.608 15.774 3 .001 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because 
omitting the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 33: Stringency of NTM Types- Price, Quantity Reduction,  
                                        Quality Restrictions, and Threat of Retaliation 
              -Japan Market 
 
Notes: Reference category is “Threat of retaliation”. Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 66.621. Cox 
and Snell: 0.372; Nagelkerke: 0.398; McFadden: 0.170 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
 
Threat of Retaliation   B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Price effects 
Intercept -1.634 .674 5.873 1 .015  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.400 .642 4.763 1 .029 4.057 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .605 .570 1.126 1 .289 1.831 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.004 .699 .000 1 .995 .996 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.067 .687 .009 1 .923 .936 
Small size (against large size) 1.065 .707 2.269 1 .132 2.900 
Medium size (against large size) 1.591 .713 4.984 1 .026 4.908 
NTMs stringent- Japan (against NTMs not 
stringent- Japan) 
1.671 .661 6.393 1 .011 5.317 
Quantity 
reduction 
Intercept -2.413 .745 10.476 1 .001  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .982 .672 2.134 1 .144 2.671 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.792 .639 7.872 1 .005 6.003 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .863 .702 1.510 1 .219 2.370 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .269 .707 .144 1 .704 1.308 
Small size (against large size) 1.105 .695 2.525 1 .112 3.019 
Medium size (against large size) .865 .751 1.324 1 .250 2.374 
NTMs stringent- Japan (against NTMs not 
stringent- Japan) 
1.359 .673 4.083 1 .043 3.893 
Quality 
restrictions 
Intercept -3.102 .776 15.966 1 .000  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.666 .687 5.887 1 .015 5.290 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.385 .645 .357 1 .550 .680 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.230 .736 2.793 1 .095 3.420 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .681 .765 .793 1 .373 1.975 
Small size (against large size) 1.847 .759 5.924 1 .015 6.344 
Medium size (against large size) 1.563 .803 3.789 1 .052 4.775 
NTMs stringent- Japan (against NTMs not 
stringent- Japan) 
3.320 .719 21.321 1 .000 27.659 
Effect Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 217.453a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 225.019 7.566 3 .056 
Firm Ownership 234.117 16.664 3 .001 
Firm Age 223.424 5.971 6 .426 
Firm Size 227.536 10.083 6 .121 
NTMs stringent- Japan 247.769 30.315 3 .000 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not 
increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 34:   Stringency of NTM Types- Price, Quantity Reduction,  
          Quality Restrictions, and Threat of Retaliation  
         – China Market 
 
Threat of Retaliation  B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Price effects 
Intercept -1.384 .669 4.279 1 .039  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.139 .604 3.560 1 .059 3.124 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .443 .553 .641 1 .423 1.557 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.041 .682 .004 1 .952 .960 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.101 .670 .023 1 .880 .904 
Small size (against large size) 1.072 .700 2.345 1 .126 2.922 
Medium size (against large size) 1.540 .708 4.738 1 .030 4.666 
NTMs stringent- China (against NTMs not 
stringent- China) 
1.242 .624 3.960 1 .047 3.464 
Quantity 
reduction 
Intercept -2.139 .742 8.298 1 .004  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .700 .631 1.230 1 .267 2.013 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) 1.657 .625 7.018 1 .008 5.244 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .835 .686 1.483 1 .223 2.306 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .246 .694 .126 1 .723 1.280 
Small size (against large size) 1.092 .690 2.505 1 .114 2.979 
Medium size (against large size) .784 .750 1.093 1 .296 2.190 
NTMs stringent- China (against NTMs not 
stringent- China) 
.876 .634 1.909 1 .167 2.401 
Quality 
restrictions 
Intercept -2.869 .762 14.167 1 .000  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) 1.436 .647 4.923 1 .026 4.203 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.578 .623 .860 1 .354 .561 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) 1.182 .716 2.727 1 .099 3.261 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .626 .741 .713 1 .398 1.870 
Small size (against large size) 1.867 .744 6.295 1 .012 6.468 
Medium size (against large size) 1.517 .792 3.672 1 .055 4.559 
NTMs stringent- China (against NTMs not 
stringent- China) 
2.931 .684 18.374 1 .000 18.742 
Note: Reference category is “Threat of retaliation”. Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 61.381. Cox and Snell: 
0.349; Nagelkerke: 0.373; McFadden: 0.156 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effect Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept  222.555a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 228.766 6.210 3 .102 
Firm Ownership 238.963 16.408 3 .001 
Firm Age 228.438 5.883 6 .436 
Firm Size 232.846 10.290 6 .113 
NTM stringent- China 248.953 26.398 3 .000 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting 
the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX A 35: Stringency of NTM Types- Price, Quantity Reduction,      
    Quality Restrictions, and Threat of Retaliation  
    – ASEAN Market 
 
Threat of Retaliation  B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Price 
effects 
Intercept -1.822 1.237 2.169 1 .141  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) .106 .505 .044 1 .833 1.112 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.390 .570 .468 1 .494 .677 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .098 .640 .023 1 .878 1.103 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) .481 .624 .593 1 .441 1.617 
Small size (against large size) 1.361 .997 1.865 1 .172 3.899 
Medium size (against large size) .121 .971 .016 1 .901 1.129 
NTMs stringent- ASEAN (against NTMs not 
stringent- ASEAN) 
1.162 .510 5.184 1 .023 3.196 
Quantity 
reduction 
Intercept .153 .954 .026 1 .873  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -.441 .446 .976 1 .323 .643 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) .281 .494 .323 1 .570 1.324 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) .343 .573 .358 1 .550 1.409 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -.701 .494 2.015 1 .156 .496 
Small size (against large size) 1.152 .880 1.714 1 .190 3.164 
Medium size (against large size) .319 .837 .146 1 .703 1.376 
NTMs stringent- ASEAN (against NTMs not 
stringent- ASEAN) 
.087 .430 .041 1 .840 1.091 
Quality 
restrictions 
Intercept 1.791 .948 3.571 1 .059  
Resource-based (against non-resource-based) -1.487 .752 3.909 1 .048 .226 
Malaysian-owned (against foreign owned) -.035 .800 .002 1 .965 .965 
Less than 5 years (against “more than 10 years) -.570 1.023 .310 1 .578 .566 
5-10 years (against “more than 10 years) -1.073 .754 2.022 1 .155 .342 
Small size (against large size) -1.500 .950 2.493 1 .114 .223 
Medium size (against large size) -2.857 .944 9.166 1 .002 .057 
NTMs stringent- ASEAN (against NTMs not 
stringent- ASEAN) 
.589 .735 .641 1 .423 1.802 
Notes: Reference category is “Threat of retaliation”. Model fitting: p<0.05 for chi-square 47.063. Cox and Snell: 
0.280; Nagelkerke: 0.303; McFadden: 0.126 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
Effect Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 209.285a .000 0 . 
Firm Type 214.848 5.563 3 .135 
Firm Ownership 211.745 2.460 6 .873 
Firm Age 215.833 6.548 3 .088 
Firm Size 230.849 21.564 6 .001 
NTMs stringent- ASEAN 216.110 6.825 3 .078 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect 
does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX B : Multicollinearity Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Independent Variables Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
 
 
Model 1ª 
Firm Type 
Firm Ownership 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
NTMs Stringent Overall 
.959 1.043 
.890 1.124 
.856 1.168 
.795 1.258 
.954 1.049 
 
 
Model 2ª 
Firm Type 
Firm Ownership 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
TMs Stringent Overall 
.975 1.026 
.890 1.124 
.860 1.162 
.795 1.257 
.975 1.025 
 
 
Model 3ª 
Firm Type 
Firm Ownership 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
CPs Stringent Overall 
.966 1.036 
.883 1.133 
.864 1.158 
.763 1.310 
.937 1.067 
 
 
Model 4ª 
Firm Type 
Firm Ownership 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
ONTMs Stringent Overall 
.977 1.023 
.881 1.135 
.862 1.161 
.795 1.257 
.964 1.038 
 
 
Model 5ª 
Firm Type 
Firm Ownership 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
PMs Stringent Overall 
.975 1.026 
.898 1.114 
.858 1.165 
.790 1.267 
.982 1.018 
 
 
Model 6ª 
Firm Type 
Firm Ownership 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
InfoAsym Overall 
.979 1.021 
.888 1.126 
.851 1.175 
.795 1.257 
.959 1.043 
 
 
 
 
Model 7ª 
Firm Type 
Firm Ownership 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
NTMs US Stringent 
NTMs EU Stringent 
NTMs Japan Stringent 
NTMs China Stringent 
NTMs ASEAN Stringent 
.948 1.055 
.878 1.139 
.833 1.200 
.759 1.317 
.893 1.120 
.911 1.098 
.975 1.026 
.886 1.129 
.940 1.064 
 
 
 
 
Model 8ª 
Firm Type 
Firm Ownership 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
TMs US Stringent 
TMs EU Stringent 
TMs Japan Stringent 
TMs China Stringent 
TMs ASEAN Stringent 
.942 1.062 
.886 1.128 
.836 1.196 
.786 1.272 
.870 1.149 
.963 1.038 
.868 1.152 
.863 1.159 
.882 1.134 
 
 
 
Model 9ª 
Firm Type 
Firm Ownership 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
CPs US Stringent 
.936 1.069 
.889 1.125 
.840 1.191 
.767 1.303 
.922 1.085 
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Model Independent Variables Collinearity Statistics 
 Tolerance VIF 
CPs EU Stringent 
CPs Japan Stringent 
CPs China Stringent 
CPs ASEAN Stringent 
.852 
.910 
.805 
.804 
1.173 
1.099 
1.242 
1.243 
 
 
 
 
Model 10ª 
Firm Type 
Firm Ownership 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
ONTMs US Stringent 
ONTMs EU Stringent 
ONTMs Japan Stringent 
ONTMs China Stringent 
ONTMs ASEAN Stringent 
.930 1.076 
.873 1.145 
.817 1.223 
.771 1.296 
.587 1.704 
.554 1.804 
.530 1.887 
.521 1.921 
.663 1.507 
Model 11ª Firm Type 
Firm Ownership 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
PMs US Stringent 
PMs EU Stringent 
PMs Japan Stringent 
PMs China Stringent 
PMs ASEAN Stringent 
.969 1.032 
.864 1.157 
.830 1.205 
.783 1.277 
.622 1.608 
.592 1.689 
.568 1.760 
.559 1.789 
.707 1.415 
 
 
 
 
Model 12ª 
Firm Type 
Firm Ownership 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
InfoAsym US Stringent 
InfoAsym EU Stringent 
InfoAsym Japan Stringent 
InfoAsym China Stringent 
InfoAsym  ASEAN 
Stringent 
.838 1.193 
.882 1.133 
.848 1.180 
.780 1.282 
.891 1.123 
.954 1.048 
.824 1.213 
.906 1.104 
.901 1.110 
 
 
Model 13       
Firm Type 
Firm Ownership 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
NTMs Stringent Overall 
.972 1.029 
.898 1.114 
.863 1.159 
.794 1.259 
.984 1.016 
 
 
 
 
Model 14 
 
Firm Type 
Firm Ownership 
Firm Age 
Firm Size 
NTMs US Stringent 
NTMs EU Stringent 
NTMs Japan Stringent 
NTMs China Stringent 
NTMs ASEAN Stringent 
.948 1.055 
.878 1.139 
.833 1.200 
.759 1.317 
.893 1.120 
.911 1.098 
.975 1.026 
.886 1.129 
.940 1.064 
Note: Modelª has dependent variable- Percent Export 
          Model 13    has dependent variable – NTM Types 
          Model 14    and Model 7ª  have same VIF values because of   
          same independent variables used in the test.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
b 
b 
b* 
b 
b*  
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APPENDIX C : Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
My name is Arumugam G. Sithamparam (ID: EHA 110001).  I am currently pursuing my Phd 
at the Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya. My study seeks to 
evaluate the effects of non-tariff measures (NTMs) on Malaysian exporters, focusing on 
exporters of manufactures. The study is expected to contribute to a better understanding of the 
severity of the NTMs in major export destinations and the response/ repositioning strategies of 
Malaysian firms. The results of this survey will assist policymakers and trade negotiators in 
establishing effective strategies to assist Malaysian exporters surmounting these barriers and 
improving their negotiating positions through free trade agreements respectively.   
 
   
  Kindly amswer all questions in the questionnaire.  
 Your answers will be treated with strict confidentiality. 
 
 
 
I thank you in advance for your time and cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
For further enquiries, please contact: 
 
Arumugam G.Sithamparam 
Faculty of Economics & Administration 
University of Malaya 
50603 Kuala Lumpur 
Malaysia. 
 
Tel: 03-90114118 
Mobile: 013-3543379 
Email:arumuga@siswa.um.edu.my 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NON-TARIFF MEASURES AND EXPORTS:   
THE MALAYSIAN CASE  
PART 1: INTRODUCTION 
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01 What industry category is your firm classified in? (Please tick ONE only). 
 
Industry Tick 
 Agricultural Product              
 Building Hardware, Building Supplies & Products  
 Chemicals, Petrochemicals & Pharmaceuticals  
 Clay/Sand-Based & Non-Metallic Mineral Products  
 Electrical, Electronic Product Components & Parts  
 Food & Beverage Products  
 Furniture Products     
 Iron & Steel Products              
 Machinery & Machinery Components  
 Medical, Scientific, Measuring Equipment & Parts  
 Non-Ferrous Metals Products              
 Photographic, Cinematographic, Video & Optical  
 Palm & Palm Kernel Oil Products    
 Plastic Products              
 Pulp, Paper & Paperboard Products   
 Rubber Products     
 Souvenirs, Handcrafts & Giftware              
 Sports Goods & Equipments  
 Supporting Products/Services     
 Textile & Textile Products              
 Toys  
 Transport Equipment, Components & Accessories  
 Wood & Wood Products  
   
02 Please indicate the nature of ownership of your firm. 
 Malaysian owned (more than 50 percent shareholding by Malaysian) 
Fully Foreign owned (more than 50 percent shareholding by Foreigner) 
 
03 How long has your firm been in operation? 
    Less than 5 years        5-10 years                    More than 10 years  
 
04 What is your firm size in terms of employees? 
     5-74 employees                  75 – 199 employees         200 or more employees  
 
05 Please indicate your firm’s annual turnover. 
   Less than RM100,000                              RM101,000 – RM500,000  
     RM501,000 – RM1,000,000        More than RM1,000,000  
PART 2:  PROFILE OF FIRM 
 235 
 
06 Please indicate which state/ region your firm is located in. 
  Wilayah Persekutuan                 Selangor                               East Malaysia    
     Johor Bahru                      Penang                                Others 
                                            
07 What percent share of total output do you export? 
 
 25 percent and less      26 – 50 percent        51 – 75 percent 
 More than 75 percent  
       
 
08 Which of the following is/are your major export market(s)? (More than one 
option is possible) 
Market Tick  
United States (US)  
European Union (EU)   
Japan   
China   
ASEAN   
 
 
  
NTMs are any measure other than tariffs that are imposed on your exports by importing countries 
that could distort or enhance trade. To assist in your response to the questions in this section, a 
brief description of the various non-tariff measures (NTMs) based on the UNCTAD classification 
is provided below.  
 
 (A) TECHNICAL Measures: Deals with i) sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures; ii) 
technical barriers to trade (TBT); and iii) pre-shipment inspection and other formalities. 
SPS refers to measures such as restriction for substances, ensuring food safety, and those for 
preventing dissemination of disease or pests. It also includes all conformity assessment measures 
related to food safety, such as certification, testing and inspection, and quarantine.  TBT refers to 
measures as labeling, standards on technical specifications, and quality requirements, and other 
measures protecting the environment. TBT also includes all conformity assessment measures 
related technical requirements, such as certification, testing and inspection. Pre-shipment refers 
to measures related to pre-shipment inspections and other customs formalities. 
 
(B) NON-TECHNICAL Measures include the following: 
i) Contingent trade protective measures: includes antidumping, countervailing, and 
safeguard measures.   
ii) Non-automatic licensing and quantity control measures: includes licensing, quotas 
and other quantity control measures, including tariff rate quotas. 
iii) Price control measures, additional taxes and charges: These are also measures used in 
trade policy that are implemented to control or affect the prices of imported goods. 
iv) Finance measures: refers to measures restricting the payments of imports, for example 
when the access and cost of foreign exchange is regulated. It also includes measures 
imposing restrictions on the terms of payment.  
PART 3: NON-TARIFF MEASURES (NTMs) 
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v) Measures affecting competition: refers mainly to monopolistic measures, such as 
state trading, sole importing agencies, or compulsory national insurance or transport.  
vi) Trade-related investment measures: measures that restrict investment by requiring 
local content, or requesting that investment should be related to export in order to 
balance imports. 
vii)     Distribution restrictions: refers to restrictive measures related to the internal 
distribution 
of imported products 
viii)     Restrictions on post – sales services:  refers to restriction on post sales services. For 
example,  
             restrictions in the provision of accessory services. 
ix) Subsidies: measures that relate to the subsidies that affect trade. 
x) Government procurement restrictions:  refers to the restrictions bidders may find 
when trying to sell their products to a foreign government. 
xi) Intellectual property restrictions: refers to restrictions related to intellectual property 
measures and intellectual property rights. 
xii) Rules of origin: measures that restrict the origin of products, or its inputs. 
xiii) Export measures: includes export taxes, export quotas or export prohibitions, etc. 
 
 
 
 
09.   Which NTM category is critical for your firm’s exports? 
 
  Technical measures         Non-Technical measures  
 
10.   Tick and note (more than one option is allowed) the measures in the export market and  
         rank in ascending order from the not stringent (1) to very stringent (5).   
              
Non-Tariff Measures Tick Rank 
Technical Measures    
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures    
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)    
Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities    
Non-Technical Measures    
Contingent and trade protection measures    
Non-automatic licensing & quantity control measures    
Price control measures, additional taxes and charges    
Finance measures    
Measures affecting competition   
Trade-related investment measures    
Distribution restrictions    
Restrictions on post – sales services    
Subsidies   
Government procurement restrictions    
Intellectual property restrictions    
Rules of origin    
Export measures    
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11. Based on your exporting experience, rank (in ascending order from the ‘not 
difficult’ (1) to very difficult (5) the region with the most difficult measures to 
surmount.  
 
Region Rank 
US  
EU  
Japan  
China  
ASEAN  
 
Questions 12(a) – 12(f) relate to stringency of NTMs faced by your firm with regard to the 
export destinations in six regions. Please rate the stringency of the measure(s) accordingly.   
       1: Not stringent    2: Somewhat Stringent    3: Moderately Stringent      4:  Stringent      
      5: Very Stringent 
   12 (a). Please rate the stringency of the NTMs in US. 
 Non-Tariff Measures         Region: US 
Technical Measures     1        2         3        4          5 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures     
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  
Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities  
Non-Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Contingent trade protective measures  
Non-automatic licensing & quantity control measures  
Price control measures, additional taxes and charges  
Finance measures  
Measures affecting competition  
Trade-related investment measures  
Distribution restrictions  
Restrictions on post – sales services  
Subsidies  
Government procurement restrictions  
Intellectual property restrictions  
Rules of origin  
Export measures  
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12(b). Please rate the stringency of NTMs in the EU. 
 
 12(c).   Please rate the stringency of NTMs in the Japan. 
 
 Non-Tariff Measures         Region: US 
Technical Measures     1        2         3        4         5 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures     
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  
Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities  
Non-Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Contingent trade protective measures  
Non-automatic licensing & quantity control 
measures 
 
Price control measures, additional taxes and charges  
Finance measures  
Measures affecting competition  
Trade-related investment measures  
Distribution restrictions  
Restrictions on post – sales services  
Subsidies  
Government procurement restrictions  
Intellectual property restrictions  
Rules of origin  
Export measures  
  
 Non-Tariff Measures         Region: US 
Technical Measures     1        2         3        4         5 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures     
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  
Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities  
Non-Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Contingent trade protective measures  
Non-automatic licensing & quantity control measures  
Price control measures, additional taxes and charges  
Finance measures  
Measures affecting competition  
Trade-related investment measures  
Distribution restrictions  
Restrictions on post – sales services  
Subsidies  
Government procurement restrictions  
Intellectual property restrictions  
Rules of origin  
Export measures  
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12(d).   Please rate the stringency of NTMs in the China. 
 Non-Tariff Measures         Region: US 
Technical Measures     1        2         3        4         5 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures     
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  
Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities  
Non-Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Contingent trade protective measures  
Non-automatic licensing & quantity control measures  
Price control measures, additional taxes and charges  
Finance measures  
Measures affecting competition  
Trade-related investment measures  
Distribution restrictions  
Restrictions on post – sales services  
Subsidies  
Government procurement restrictions  
Intellectual property restrictions  
Rules of origin  
Export measures  
 
 
12(e). Please rate the stringency of NTMs in the ASEAN. 
 Non-Tariff Measures         Region: AMERICAS 
Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures     
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  
Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities  
Non-Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Contingent trade protective measures  
Non-automatic licensing & quantity control measures  
Price control measures, additional taxes and charges  
Finance measures  
Measures affecting competition  
Trade-related investment measures  
Distribution restrictions  
Restrictions on post – sales services  
Subsidies  
Government procurement restrictions  
Intellectual property restrictions  
Rules of origin  
Export measures  
 
13.   Please indicate the amount of time spent on complying with the technical 
regulations requirements in your export market (s).  
 
 Less than 3 days 
 
       3-7 days      
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 8-10 days 
 
 More than 10 days 
 
14. Please indicate the amount of time spent on complying with the non-technical 
regulations requirements in the export market (s).  
 
 Less than 3 days 
 
       3-7 days      
 
 8-10 days 
 
 More than 10 days 
 
 
15. Based on your exporting experience, rank (in ascending order from least costly = 1,  to 
most costly =5) of the markets listed below, following compliance with NTMs. 
 
Region Rank 
US  
EU  
Japan  
China  
ASEAN  
 
 
Questions 16(a) – 16(e) relate to rating of specific non-tariff measures experienced in the 
export markets.  They are customs procedures, other non-tariff measures and private 
measures. 
 
Customs procedures are formalities and procedures imposed on exporters to comply in order 
for their goods to be cleared and enter the country concerned (export market). 
Other non-tariff measures are other than the non-tariff measures mentioned in Section 2. 
These measures can pose difficulty or limitation or distortion to your firm’s exports. This can 
include: i) language barrier; ii) cultural differences (not language); iii) not having an office or 
site in an export market; and; iv)  a bias or preference of the export market to do business with 
firms in their own country. 
Private non-tariff measures are measures imposed by private bodies as part of requirement for 
your firm’s exports. An example is the requirement to have ISO certification for your firm’s 
processes involved in producing the products that are considered for exports. 
For customs procedures and private measures the rating scale is below: 
1 = not stringent  and 5 = very stringent. 
For Other non-tariff measures (ONTMs), the rating scales is as below: 
1= none and 5= very high 
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16 (a).  Please rate the stringency of specific measures in US.  
   
 
16(b).  Please rate the stringency of specific measures in EU.  
 Specific Measures         Region: EU 
     1         2         3        4         5 
Customs procedures  
Other Non-Tariff Measures  
Language barriers     
Cultural barriers (not language)  
Not having an office or site in an export market  
A bias or preference to do business with companies in 
their own country/region 
 
Private Measures  
 
16(c).  Please rate the stringency of specific measures in Japan.  
 
 
16 (d).  Please rate the stringency of specific measures in China.  
 Specific Measures         Region: China 
     1         2         3        4         5 
Customs procedures  
Other Non-Tariff Measures  
Language barriers     
Cultural barriers (not language)  
Not having an office or site in an export market  
A bias or preference to do business with companies in 
their own country/region 
 
Private Measures  
 Specific Measures         Region: US 
     1         2         3        4         5 
Customs procedures  
Other Non-Tariff Measures  
Language barriers     
Cultural barriers (not language)  
Not having an office or site in an export market  
A bias or preference to do business with companies in 
their own country/region 
 
Private Measures  
 Specific Measures         Region: Japan 
     1         2         3        4         5 
Customs procedures  
Other Non-Tariff Measures  
Language barriers     
Cultural barriers (not language)  
Not having an office or site in an export market  
A bias or preference to do business with companies in 
their own country/region 
 
Private Measures  
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16(e).  Please rate the stringency of specific measures in ASEAN.  
 Specific Measures         Region: ASEAN 
     1         2         3        4         5 
Customs procedures  
Other Non-Tariff Measures  
Language barriers     
Cultural barriers (not language)  
Not having an office or site in an export market  
A bias or preference to do business with companies in 
their own country/region 
 
Private Measures  
 
17.  Please indicate the obstacles your firm faces with regard to custom procedures.  
 
 Time-consuming procedure  
 
       Costly procedure   
     
 Unclear or uncertain regulations   
 
 Other, please specify:______________________________________________  
 
      No obstacles   
 
18. Do your firm’s products need to undergo testing for conformity of technical 
regulations in the export market? 
 
 Yes               No         
 
19. Are the test results and conformity certificates issued in Malaysia accepted in the 
export market(s)?  
 
 Always              Sometime                 Never 
 
 
20. Which market has been difficult to deal with regard to test results and conformity 
certificates? Please tick (more than one option is allowed) and rank those options 
selected in ascending order (1 = not difficult, 5 = very difficult). 
 
Region Tick Rank 
US   
EU   
Japan   
China   
ASEAN   
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Questions 21(a) – 21(f) relate to asymmetry of information experience and in the export 
destinations or regions with regard to NTMs. Asymmetric information is a situation in 
which one party in a transaction has more or superior information compared to another.  
Please rate the level of information asymmetry. 
1: None    2: Low    3: Medium       4:  High     5: Very High 
 
21. (a) Please rate the level of information asymmetry with regard to NTMs . 
 
 Non-Tariff Measures                      Overall 
Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures     
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  
Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities  
Non-Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Contingent trade protective measures  
Non-automatic licensing & quantity control measures  
Price control measures, additional taxes and charges  
Finance measures  
Measures affecting competition  
Trade-related investment measures  
Distribution restrictions  
Restrictions on post – sales services  
Subsidies  
Government procurement restrictions  
Intellectual property restrictions  
Rules of origin  
Export measures  
 
21(b). Please rate the level of information asymmetry with regard to NTMs in US. 
 Non-Tariff Measures         Region: US 
Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures     
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  
Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities  
Non-Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Contingent trade protective measures  
Non-automatic licensing & quantity control 
measures 
 
Price control measures, additional taxes and charges  
Finance measures  
Measures affecting competition  
Trade-related investment measures  
Distribution restrictions  
Restrictions on post – sales services  
Subsidies  
Government procurement restrictions  
Intellectual property restrictions  
Rules of origin  
Export measures  
PART 6:  INFORMATION ASYMMETRY WITH REGARD TO NTMs 
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21(c).  Please rate the level of information asymmetry on NTMs in EU. 
 
 Non-Tariff Measures         Region: EU 
Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures     
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  
Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities  
Non-Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Contingent trade protective measures  
Non-automatic licensing & quantity control measures  
Price control measures, additional taxes and charges  
Finance measures  
Measures affecting competition  
Trade-related investment measures  
Distribution restrictions  
Restrictions on post – sales services  
Subsidies  
Government procurement restrictions  
Intellectual property restrictions  
Rules of origin  
Export measures  
 
 
21 (d). Please rate the level of information asymmetry on NTMs in JAPAN. 
 Non-Tariff Measures         Region: JAPAN 
Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures     
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  
Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities  
Non-Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Contingent trade protective measures  
Non-automatic licensing & quantity control measures  
Price control measures, additional taxes and charges  
Finance measures  
Measures affecting competition  
Trade-related investment measures  
Distribution restrictions  
Restrictions on post – sales services  
Subsidies  
Government procurement restrictions  
Intellectual property restrictions  
Rules of origin  
Export measures  
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21(e). Please rate the level of information asymmetry on NTMs in CHINA. 
 
 Non-Tariff Measures         Region: CHINA 
Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures     
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  
Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities  
Non-Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Contingent trade protective measures  
Non-automatic licensing & quantity control measures  
Price control measures, additional taxes and charges  
Finance measures  
Measures affecting competition  
Trade-related investment measures  
Distribution restrictions  
Restrictions on post – sales services  
Subsidies  
Government procurement restrictions  
Intellectual property restrictions  
Rules of origin  
Export measures  
 
 
 
21 (f). Please rate the level of information asymmetry on NTMs in ASEAN. 
 Non-Tariff Measures         Region: ASEAN 
Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures     
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)  
Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities  
Non-Technical Measures     1         2         3        4         5 
Contingent trade protective measures  
Non-automatic licensing & quantity control measures  
Price control measures, additional taxes and charges  
Finance measures  
Measures affecting competition  
Trade-related investment measures  
Distribution restrictions  
Restrictions on post – sales services  
Subsidies  
Government procurement restrictions  
Intellectual property restrictions  
Rules of origin  
Export measures  
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Non-tariff measure (NTM) types’ effects are faced by exporters, classified into 4 types which 
are price effects, quantity reduction, quality restrictions and threat of retaliation. Price 
effects happen when NTMs imposed on exporters cause the exporters price to usually 
increase. Quantity reduction is when exporters reduce the quantity exported. Quality 
restrictions are measures imposed on exporters that require them to comply to quality 
requirements. Threat of retaliation measures include serious antidumping law which can 
impact exports and trade. 
 
22a.   What are the NTM types faced by your firm? Pleases tick (more than one 
option is allowed). Please note that NTM referred to a non-tariff measure that 
usually distorts trade.  
 
NTM Effect Types Tick 
Price effect     
Quantity reduction  
Quality restrictions  
Threat of retaliation  
 
22b.  What are the NTM effect type faced by your firm in the export  markets? 
Pleases tick (more than one option is allowed).  
 
NTM Effect Types US EU JAPAN CHINA ASEAN 
Price effect         
Quantity reduction      
Quality restrictions      
Threat of retaliation      
 
 
Question 23a and 23b relate to the response strategy pursued when faced with NTMs. The 
response strategies are:  
i) : Exit  reactive : exit a market or markets when NTMs imposed 
ii): Exit proactive: exit a market or markets before NTMs imposed 
iii) Loyal reactive: loyal to a market or markets and comply to the NTMs when imposed 
iv) Loyal proactive: loyal to market or markets, anticipate NTMs and prepare to comply 
v)  Voice reactive: voice concerns when faced with NTMs 
vi) Voice proactive: voice concerns in about the potential implementation of NTMs 
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23a.   Please indicate the response strategy for a market or markets that you pursue. You 
may tick more than one option. 
 
Response Strategy          
Exit Reactive     
Exit Proactive  
Loyal Reactive  
Loyal Proactive     
Voice Reactive  
Voice Proactive  
 
 
23b.   What form(s) of compliance cost(s) does your firm face? Please tick (more than one 
option is allowed) and rank those options selected in ascending order from the most 
important to the least important (1 = not important,  5= very important). 
 
Types of Compliance Costs      Tick       Rank 
Increased production costs         
Increased networking costs   
Increased marketing costs   
Increased transportation costs   
 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------- End ---------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Thank you 
 
